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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on entry regulation, institutions, and development.
Chapter 1 examines the effect of a business registration reform in Mexico on economic ac-
tivity. This reform made registration procedures less complex and was implemented in different
municipalities at different points in time, allowing for identification. I find that the reform
increased the number of registered businesses in eligible industries. This increase was due to
former wage earners opening businesses. Former unregistered business owners were not more
likely to register their business after the reform. The results also show an increase in employ-
ment in eligible industries. Moreover, they indicate that the competition from new entrants
lowered prices and decreased the income of incumbent businesses.
Chapter 2, coauthored with Francisco Gallego, argues that within country variation in eco-
nomic development across the Americas can be explained by differences in institutions that have
their roots in the colonial era. Colonizers engaged in different economic activities in different
regions of a country, depending on the local conditions and the supply of native labor. Some
activities where "bad" since they created extractive institutions, while "good" activities cre-
ated inclusive institutions. We show that areas with bad colonial activities have lower GDP per
capita today than other areas. Areas with high pre-colonial population density also have lower
GDP per capita today. The intermediating factor between history and current development
appears to be institutions and not income inequality or the share of ethnic minorities.
Chapter 3 uses the example of Mexico's Progresa and Microrregion programs to illustrate
that one can arrive at very different conclusions about the relative cost-effectiveness of public
development programs, depending on the assumptions made about social opportunity costs.
For Progresa, I estimate the amount of US$ required to save one life per 1000 live births to be
14.1. For the Microrregion Program, this number could fall anywhere between 7.6 and 29. The
main challenge is that social opportunity costs are not necessarily equal to market prices in the
presence of market failures, and that we currently lack good guidelines for how to address this
issue in applied work.
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Chapter 1
License to Sell: The Effect of
Business Registration Reform on
Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico
1.1 Introduction
According to Djankov et al. (2002), who present data on regulation of entry for 85 countries, the
number of procedures for registering a business varied from 2 in Canada to 21 in the Dominican
Republic in 1999. Finding these large differences in entry regulation around the world has
spurred an interest in studying the effect of entry regulation on economic outcomes. Bertrand
and Kramarz (2002) examine what happens to employment growth in the retail trade industry
in France after the introduction of zoning regulation which restricts the establishment of large
retail stores. Exploiting regional variation in the enforcement of this regulation, they show that
stronger deterrence of entry decreased employment growth.
Building on the Djankov et al. data, some cross-country studies have also established that
countries with less regulation grow faster, suggesting that simplifying business registration may
increase output1 . Along similar lines, Hernando de Soto claims, based on anecdotal evidence,
that complicated and costly business registration procedures have caused "two thirds of the
'For example, Loayza, Oviedo, and Serv6n (2005) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2006).
world's population [to be] locked out of the global economy: forced to operate outside the rule
of law, they have no legal identity, no credit, no capital, and thus no way to prosper."
A concern with cross-country studies is that they cannot rule out that causality goes the
other way, such that increases in entry or output lead to reforms. It is also possible that
both simpler regulation and higher entry or growth are caused by a third variable. Klapper,
Laeven, and Rajan (2006), as well as Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), convincingly address
the reverse causality and omitted variable problems by performing cross-country, cross-industry
analyses. They show that countries with heavier entry regulation have lower firm entry and
lower growth in value added in naturally high-entry industries. However, these cross-country,
cross-industry studies cannot quantify the overall effect of differences in entry regulation. They
can only quantify this effect relative to the United States, which is the country they use to
obtain the benchmark values of the "natural" rates of entry within industries.
Based on De Soto's argument and the cross-country evidence, some policy institutions,
such as the World Bank, promote simplification of business registration regulation as a vehicle
to foster growth. However, there is very little evidence on the actual effects of a business
registration reform. This paper exploits cross-municipality and cross-time variation in a recent
business registration reform in Mexico to measure the effect of this reform on registration,
employment, and income2. The reform in Mexico reduced registration procedures from 8 on
average to less than 3. To give a sense of the magnitude of this reform, the reduction corresponds
to going from the 30th percentile in registration procedures to the 2nd percentile, or equivalently
it corresponds to going from Peru or Pakistan to New Zealand or Australia.
Studying the impact of a reform by using micro data considerably refines and enriches the
analysis based on cross-country studies. (See Pande and Udry, 2005, for a call to move to
research of this type). First, causality can be established more convincingly. Second, the use of
microeconomic data makes it possible not only to quantify the effects of the reform on overall
levels of entry and production, but also to trace its effect on the functioning of the product and
2To my knowledge, only two other studies present evidence on the consequences of entry regulation reform.
First, the World Bank's Doing Business in 2005 report states that the top 5 reformers in 2003 - Ethiopia, France,
Morocco, Slovakia and Turkey - have experienced higher increases in new registrations than the OECD average.
Second, concurrently to this paper, Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2006) analyze the effect of the business registration
reform in Mexico on firm creation. Using data from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), they find an
increase in new firms that have workers registered with the IMSS of 4 percent in eligible industries.
labor markets.
More generally, many economists have argued that barriers to entry harm consumers by
raising prices and thwarting employment growth. The Mexican reform effectively reduced
entry costs for a large fraction of businesses in the economy in many industries, which allows
for analyzing the impact of entry regulation in a general set up. This paper first examines
whether the reform led to increased entry or merely relabelling of existing informal businesses3 .
Having shown that it led to creation of new businesses, this paper traces out the impact of this
increase in competition on consumer prices, incumbents' income, and employment.
The paper starts by building a simple model describing the expected effects on the product
and labor markets when the registration cost drops. In the model, high cost of registration
prevents individuals with medium range ability from opening a formal business. Therefore, the
reform leads to increased entry. Depending on the assumption about the returns in the informal
business sector, the increase in entry comes either from informal business owners registering
their business or from wage earners opening businesses. When returns in the informal sector
are high, it is the informal business owners who register their businesses after a reform, which
corresponds to the De Soto view. When returns in the informal sector are low, it is wage
earners who open businesses after the reform and informal business owners do not register their
businesses. This latter effect is in line with a view where informal business owners are low
ability individuals who operate in a residual sector. The model also predicts that increased
entry leads to a decrease in prices and to a decline in income for incumbent businesses.
The paper then tests the predictions of the model using the Mexican reform. The identifi-
cation strategy used to estimate the effects of the reform relies on the fact that implementation
of the business registration reform in Mexico varied across municipalities and across time. The
reform was organized by a federal agency, the COFEMER. This agency had to coordinate
with municipality governments on implementing the reform since many business registration
procedures are set locally in Mexico. COFEMER's goal was to bring the reform to urban mu-
nicipalities that had the largest volume of economic activity in Mexico. However, due to staff
constraints, COFEMER could not implement the reform in all the priority municipalities at
3Relabeling of existing informal businesses corresponds to De Soto's view and may still result in an increase
in production and efficiency even if no new businesses are created due to the benefits of formality.
the same time. Moreover, they did not specify a particular pattern of implementation within
the set of priority municipalities. A number of checks suggest that the order of implementation
was indeed exogenous in this set of municipalities. Only firms in low-risk to society4 and un-
regulated industries were eligible for the reform. Approximately 80 percent of pre-reform firms
operated in eligible industries.
The results show that the reform increased the number of registered businesses by 5.6
percent in eligible industries, supporting the finding of the cross-country literature that lower
regulation leads to more entry. The increase in the number of new businesses came exclusively
from former wage earners opening businesses. Informal (non-registered) business owners were
not more likely to register their business after the reform. This finding is contrary to the De
Soto view of informal businesses and suggests that informal business owners are instead low-
ability individuals who operate micro businesses in a residual sector. The results also show
that employment in eligible industries increased by 2.6 percent after the reform. In particular,
people who were previously unemployed or out of the labor force were more likely to work as
wage earners after the reform.
By increasing competition, the reform benefitted consumers and hurt incumbent businesses.
First, using the Mexican CPI as an outcome variable, I find that the reform decreased the price
level by 1 percent. Second, the income of incumbent registered businesses declined by 3.5
percent. The fact that the income decline was concentrated among owners of businesses in the
non-tradable goods sector indicates that this was due to competition. Some of the evidence also
suggests that the income of previous wage earners decreased after the reform, possibly because
business owners passed on the decline in prices to their workers. Interestingly, the results do
not show an increase in income for the wage earners who opened a business. One possible
explanation is that these new entrepreneurs are still paying off the fixed cost of opening their
business during the period of observation. Previous wage earners are observed for a maximum
of 4 quarters after the reform. Finally, the income of the previously unemployed and out of the
labor force increased after the reform, by 5 percent on average.
The results suggest that the effect of the reform on average income was zero or slightly
4Low-risk industries are industries that do not present a serious risk to public health, public security, or the
environment. An example of a high-risk industry is chemical production.
negative. This may be due to that fact that total employment did not increase after the reform.
Employment increased in eligible (low-risk) industries, but decreased in ineligible (high-risk to
society) industries. This shift could imply that welfare went up, even if income did not go up.
Employees may prefer to work in low-risk industries and may therefore be willing to accept a
lower wage in these industries than in high-risk industries.
Overall, this paper confirms that the effects of a business registration reform are positive
and potentially important. However, it underestimates the effect of a nationwide reform since
the general equilibrium effects would be larger.
The rest; of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the business registration
reform. Section 1.3 develops a simple occupational choice model which provides the framework
for analyzing the effects of the registration reform. Section 1.4 discusses the identification
strategy and Section 1.5 describes the Mexican employment survey data. Section 1.6 presents
the empirical results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Mexican Rapid Business Opening System Reform
According to Djankov et al. (2002), in 1999, the number of procedures required to register a
business in Mexico was 15 and the number of days was 67. Both numbers were above the cross-
country average (10 and 48 respectively) 5. Realizing that Mexico had rather heavy regulations
by international comparison, in 2000, the Mexican government created the Federal Commission
for Improving Regulation (COFEMER), charged with providing information about the state of
regulation across Mexico and implementing possible reforms.
The COFEMER suggested a reform to simplify business registration procedures with the
goal of stimulating investment and economic growth. Following this proposal, on March 1, 2002,
the Mexican government passed a federal law stating that the number of federal procedures
required for starting operation of most businesses should be reduced to a maximum of two
procedures that could be administered within 72 hours. These two procedures are obtaining a
tax payer number and incorporating the business in case it is a corporation. Once a firm starts
5 The minimum number of procedures (days) was 2 (2) both in Canada and Australia. The maximum number
of procedures (days) was 21 in the Dominican Republic (152 in Madagascar). These numbers refer to business
registration in the largest city of each country. For Mexico, this is Mexico City.
operating, it has three months to take care of the other federal requirements that may apply,
such as registering workers for medical insurance. This reform applied only to non-governmental
firms in industries which do not require special permits or concessions and which do not present
a serious risk to public health, public security, or the environment. These eligible "low-risk"
industries made up 55 percent of all industries and 80 percent of operating firms, typically
micro, small or medium size businesses. Another 10 percent of industries were governmental
and 35 percent were classified as "high-risk" or regulated. Appendix Table 1 lists examples of
low-risk and high-risk/regulated industries as classified by the COFEMER. Examples of low-
risk industries are commerce and restaurants. Examples of high-risk or regulated industries are
chemical production and transportation (including taxis).
However, simplifying federal regulations was not enough, since there were additional state
and municipal procedures required for starting a business. These procedures typically varied
from state to state and municipality to municipality. Having simplified federal regulations, the
COFEMER then approached state and municipal governments to suggest that they cut down
on local regulations and that they implement one-stop-shop centers where entrepreneurs could
take care of federal, state, and municipal procedures at the same time. The COFEMER's
goal was to create a Rapid Business Opening System (SARE) in Mexico's most populous and
economically important urban municipalities in order to quickly reach a large number of people
and a large fraction of economic activity with the reform. However, the COFEMER was not
able to bring a SARE to all those municipalities at the same time since it had limited resources.
There were only four people within the COFEMER working on spreading the reform to local
governments. Consequently, the SARE was implemented in different municipalities at different
times, staring in May 2002. By September 2006, 103 municipalities had a SARE and another
13 municipalities were in the process of setting up a SARE6.
The SARE was successful in simplifying local business registration procedures. Table 1
shows summary statistics for business registration procedures before and after the reform for
a sample of 32 municipalities from 17 different states. The averages for the number of days,
6There are 2454 counties in Mexico, but 94 percent of the population and 98 percent of economic activity are
concentrated in 450 counties. These 450 counties include 99 of the 103 counties which had a SARE by September
2006. The SARE counties contain 33 percent of the population and 47 percent of economic activity. The four
counties which are not part of the 450 biggest counties, but have a SARE, implemented the reform when other
counties in the same state implemented it.
procedures and office visits required to register a business all decreased significantly, falling
from 30.1 to 1.4, from 7.9 to 2.7 and from 4.2 to 1, respectively7 . The standard deviations of
all three measures also became much smaller, implying relatively small differences in business
registration procedures across municipalities after the reform.
I have fairly detailed administrative data on licenses issued in 2004 from the registration
center in one of the municipalities which adopted the reform in 2003, Guadalajara. Looking
at these data provides an insight into what types of businesses registered after the reform.
Guadalajara reports that a total of 16,631 businesses were created in 2004, corresponding to
an investment of US$ 90,997,003 and to 21,170 new jobs created. The average investment was
thus US$ 5,471 and the average employment per firm was 1.27. The most frequent business
types were video game console rental, computer rental, small grocery stores, clothing stores,
home-style food-to-go vendors, and beauty salons.
1.3 A Simple Occupational Choice Model
To have a framework for analyzing the effects of the business registration reform, I develop
a simple occupational choice model. The model generates a division of the population into
three occupational groups: wage earners, informal (non-registered) business owners and formal
(registered) business owners. An important issue is how we should model informal business
owners. There are two different views in the literature. One view is that informal business
owners are people who can not be wage earners since their ability is too low. Therefore, they
set up a micro firm in the informal sector. Under this view, the informal sector is a residual
sector (See for example Loayza, 1994). The other view says that informal business owners
are and have relatively high ability. However, their ability is lower than the ability of formal
business owners, and they operate in an unregulated environment since the costs of formality
are high (See Levenson and Maloney, 1998, and Maloney, 2004). The latter is also largely
consistent with Hernando de Soto's view.
The model considers two alternative assumptions about returns in the informal sector, which
7These pre-reform data are different from the data in Djankov et al since the latter are for Mexico City
only. The 32 counties for which COFEMER reports data don't include any county from Mexico City since these
counties have not implemented reforms.
generate occupation divisions corresponding to each of the two views. Both assumptions give
the same predictions about the overall effects of the business registration reform. However, the
predictions about the effects on wage earners and informal business owners are different across
the two models. I test these predictions in Section 1.6. The reform thus helps to discriminate
between the two views described above.
1.3.1 The Environment
The economy lasts for one period and is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass one.
Individuals have strictly increasing preferences over consumption, u(c). They have one unit of
labor they can supply, and they have to choose between becoming a wage earner, setting up a
formal (registered) firm, or setting up an informal (unregistered) firm.
Each individual is endowed with an ability level, x, drawn from a uniform distribution H(x)
with support [0, 1]. Wage earners are employed by formal firms and get a wage w(x).
Each formal firm employes exactly one worker. The production function for formal firms,
y(x, x,), depends on the ability level of the owner, x, and the ability level of the worker, x,.
In particular, I assume
y = 'yx + xW,
where y > 1. Formal firms face a downward sloping demand curve for the good they produce,
such that the price of this good is a function, P(Y), of the aggregate quantity produced, Y,
where d(Y) < 0. Note that the assumption that prices decrease with aggregate output should
be true only for non-tradable goods, but not for tradable goods. I assume that the price is
measured in terms of a second good that all agents produce at home and that plays no role in
the labor market or in firm production. The home good is thus the numeraire.
There is a fixed cost, F, of registering a formal firm, implying that formal firms' profits are
ir(x, x,, P(Y), F) = P(Y)[yx + x,] - w(xw) - F.
Since formal firms are relatively small, they do not consider the impact their output has on
aggregate output and the price in their decision to produce.
Profit maximization implies that
w'(x,) = P(Y),
such that the marginal increase in wage for an additional unit of ability is equal to the price.
This implies that the wage of a worker of ability x, w(x), is of the form P(Y)x - k, where is a
k constant that clears the labor market.
Informal business owners produce the same good as formal firms, but they have a different
production function, y = tx, where 0 < s < y. In this model, informal business owners work
alone. This fact generally matches my data. In the pre-reform period, 79 percent of informal
business owners work alone, another 20 percent have one employee and only 1 percent have
more than one employee. In contrast, only 40 percent of formal business owners work alone, 50
percent have one employee and another 10 percent have more than one employee.
Agents choose their occupation by maximizing utility subject to their ability constraint.
In this economy, utility maximization is equivalent to income maximization, where the income
from the different types of occupations, I(x, P(Y), F), is given by
P(Y)lix for informal business owners,
I(x, P(Y), F) = P(Y)x - k for wage earners,
P(Y)'yx + k - F for formal business owners.
Depending on the size of returns in the informal sector, 1, the resulting occupation division
matches one of the two different views of informal businesses mentioned above. If returns in the
informal sector are low, such that y < 1, then the resulting occupation division is consistent
with the residual sector view. If returns in the informal sector are high, such that 1 < IL < -,
then the resulting occupation division matches the De Soto view.
The following subsections discuss the occupation divisions and equilibria under the different
assumptions about productivity in the informal sector.
1.3.2 Occupational Choice with a Low Productivity Informal Sector
If pj < 1, then income from wage work exceeds income from informal businesses for levels of
x higher than a cutoff, Y,. This threshold level is defined by P(Y)A-Y, = P(Y),, - k, and
agents with ability lower than T, become informal business owners.
Agents with ability higher than Y, have to choose between becoming wage earners and
formal business owners. Holding the price fixed, a firm's profits are strictly increasing in x,
which implies that only agents with relatively high ability, x, choose to become formal business
owners. In particular, there exists a threshold level, Y, such that for values of ability above
this level profits exceed the income of wage earners. This threshold level Y is defined by
P(Y)7-' + k - F = P(Y)' - k. Given this threshold level, the occupation division is as follows
1. Agents with ability above 7 become formal business owners.
2. Agents with ability between Y and Y, become wage earners.
3. Agents with ability below T, become informal business owners.
Figure 1 depicts income and the occupation division as a function of ability under the
assumption that firms in the informal sector have low productivity.
1.3.3 Equilibrium with a Low Productivity Informal Sector
Aggregate labor demand is given by
L(P(Y), F) = h(x)dx.
J(P(Y),F)
Labor supply has to equal demand, such that
I (P(Y),F)
/I (P(Y)) h(x)dx = I ),F) h(x)dx.
J,(P(Y)) JE(P(Y),F)
This condition closes the model since it determines the value of the constant k that clears
the labor market.
Aggregate output is given by
Y(P(Y), F) = i 'yxh(x)dx +I (P(Y),F)xh(x)dx + -(P(Y))xh(x)dx.
Y(P(Y),F) J Jo(P(Y)) O
Note that both labor demand and aggregate output depend on the price level and the fixed
cost of registration.
1.3.4 Occupational Choice with a High Productivity Informal Sector
If 1 < A < y, then income from an informal business exceeds the income from wage work.
Therefore, the cutoff level of ability T is now the cutoff between formal business owners and
informal business owners. This cutoff level, 5, is defined by P(Y)7 + k - F = P(Y)p5.
Note that, under the assumption that 1 < p < y, formal firms need to share more of
their revenues with their workers than they do when u < 1, such that k becomes negative in
equilibrium. Otherwise, all agents with x smaller than T would prefer to be informal business
owners since ux > x - k would be true for each level of x if k were positive. The threshold level,
Yw, now represents the cutoff level of ability between workers and informal business owners.
This threshold level is given by P(Y)xw = P(Y)Yw - k.
The occupation division is a follows
1. Agents with ability above 7 become formal business owners.
2. Agents with ability between - and ,w become informal business owners.
3. Agents with ability below Yw become wage earners.
Figure 2 depicts income and the occupation division as a function of ability under the
assumption that firms in the informal sector have high productivity.
1.3.5 Equilibrium with a High Productivity Informal Sector
In equilibrium, labor demand is again given by
L(P(Y),F) = (P ) h(x)dx.
Labor supply has to equal demand, such that
' ~'(P(Y)) d
0" h(x)dx = h(x)dx.O "J(P(Y),F)
This condition again determines the value of the constant k that clears the labor market.
Aggregate output is now given by
I1 '(P(Y),F) (P(Y))
Y(P(Y), F) = ) xh(x)dx + P I) xh(x)dx + xh(x)dx.
"(P(Y),F) J 1.(P(Y)) o
Both labor demand and aggregate output depend on the price level and the fixed cost of
registration.
1.3.6 Differences in Occupation Division Across Assumptions
Note that the main differences generated by the different assumptions about productivity in
the informal sector lie in the relative income and ability levels of wage earners and informal
firms. Under the low productivity assumption, informal businesses earn less than wage earners
and are also of lower ability. Under the high productivity assumption, informal businesses earn
more than wage earners and are of higher ability.
To gauge which assumption fits the facts better, I look at averages in log monthly income and
income residuals for different occupation groups from my pre-reform data. Table 2 reports these
statistics for informal (non-registered) business owners, wage earners, and formal (registered)
business owners. Registered business owners have the highest income on average (8.27), followed
by wage earners (7.94), and finally non-registered businesses (7.46). The income residuals are
the residuals of a regression that includes age, education dummies, a gender dummy, and a
martial status dummy, as well as time and municipality dummies. The ranking of the average
income residuals is the same as the ranking of average income, with registered businesses having
the highest income residuals, followed by wage earners, and then non-registered businesses.
The pre-reform data thus suggest that the low productivity assumption is more appropriate,
meaning that informal business owners are low-income/low-ability individuals who are in this
occupation for the lack of better options. The data do not support the view that informal
business owners are medium-range-ability individuals who choose informal production over
wage work.
The next subsection analyzes what happens under each assumption when the cost of regis-
tration drops. I test the predictions generated by both assumptions in Section 1.6.
1.3.7 Comparative Statics
The business registration reform corresponds to a reduction in the fixed cost of registration, F.
This decrease in F has a number of effects in the model. These effects are depicted in Figures
3 and 4, where F' is the decreased level of F, such that F' < F. The first effect under both
assumptions is that the profit line for formal firms shifts up, such that potential formal firm
profits are higher for each ability level. This means that the threshold level Y moves to the left.
As Y moves to the left, there is entry into the registered business sector, which increases
aggregate output and decreases the price, P (as mentioned before, the decrease in P should
only be observed in the non-tradables sector). As a result, the profit line of formal firms rotates
downward, and Y shifts to the right. The wage line also rotates downward, which moves Y to
the left. Overall, Y has to shift to the left. It is not possible for the decrease in P and the
rotation in the profit line to shift Y back its original value or to the right. In that case, there
would be no entry, or there would be exit, and P would not decrease in the first place. The
decrease in the price implies that incumbent formal businesses see a decline in revenues. The
income of informal businesses also declines.
As the number of formal businesses increases, labor demand increases by the same amount.
The constant k then adjusts down to give an incentive to informal business owners to become
wage earners. This decline in k further contributes to the decline in income of formal business
owners. The effect on the income of agents who remain wage earners after the reform is
ambiguous. The decrease in the price lowers their income, but the decline in k increases their
income.
To summarize, the model predicts that the registration reform should lead to
1. An increase in the fraction of registered businesses.
2. An increase in the number of wage earners and total employment in the formal sector.
3. A decrease in the price level.
4. A decrease in revenues for incumbent formal businesses and for informal businesses.
Under the low productivity assumption, the agents who open a registered business are
former wage workers. Therefore, we should observe that
1. Agents who open a registered business are previous wage earners.
2. The wage earners who switch are the ones with the highest ability.
3. Income increases for the wage earners who open a business.
Under the high productivity assumption, it is not wage earners who open registered busi-
nesses. Instead, informal business owners register their business. In that case, we should see
that
1. Some informal business owners register their businesses.
2. The informal business owners who register are the ones with the highest ability.
3. Income increases for the informal business owners who register their business.
In Section 1.6, when testing the prediction in the data, I present evidence on the overall
changes in the outcome variables after the reform and break down these effects by pre-reform
occupation. However, before moving on to the empirical results, I discuss the identification
strategy and the data in the following two sections.
1.4 Identification Strategy
This paper uses the cross-municipality and cross-time variation in the implementation of the
reform to determine its effect. The data cover all quarters from the second quarter of 2000 to
the fourth quarter of 2004, and I restrict my sample to the 34 municipalities that adopted the
reform by December 20048. This allows me to exploit only variation in the time of adoption,
holding the decision to adopt fixed for all municipalities in my sample. I restrict my comparison
to adopter municipalities only since municipalities that never adopt may be very different from
the ones which adopt. A list of the municipalities which implemented the reform by December
8In fact, 38 counties adopted the reform by December 2004, but I do not have data for four of them.
2004 with respective implementation dates is provided in Appendix Table 2. Figure 5 shows
the geographic location of these municipalities. The map is coded in the following way. The
17 municipalities which adopted the reform early, between May 2002 and March 2004, are
marked by circles. The 17 municipalities which adopted the reform late, between April 2004
and December 2004 are marked by triangles. Both early and late adopters are fairly dispersed
throughout Mexico.
The fact that adoption of the reform varied across municipalities and across time makes it
possible to control for municipality specific and time specific effects. The effect of the reform
is thus identified using cross-municipality differences in the reform dummy over time. The
identification strategy is valid as long as the changes in outcome variables over time would
be similar across municipalities in the absence of the reform. In particular, the identification
strategy may be violated if the implementation of the reform followed a specific pattern in
terms of municipality characteristics that are related to changes in outcomes. For example, if
the municipalities which experienced a high increase in registered businesses adopted the reform
first, I might find an effect of the reform even if there was no effect. To gauge whether or not
there was such a specific pattern of implementation, I performed a number of checks.
First, I interviewed several staff members at the COFEMER who are in charge of imple-
menting the reform. They informed me that their goal was to bring the reform first to the
urban municipalities that have the largest volume of economic activity in Mexico. However,
within this set of municipalities they did not specify a particular pattern of implementation. In
fact, they mentioned that all municipality governments they approached were very interested
in adopting the reform. As discussed in Section 2, COFEMER was not able to implement the
reform in all municipalities simultaneously since they did not have enough personnel.
Second, to check whether the 34 municipalities in my sample are indeed comparable, I
examine data from the 1994 and 1999 Economic Census. Table 3 presents averages for 1999 log
GDP per capita, log economic establishments per 1000 capita and log investment per capita
split-up by early and late adopters 9. The comparison of early and late adopters shows that
they are similar in terms of log GDP per capita, log economic establishments per capita and log
9The GDP, establishment and investment data come from the 1994 and 1999 Economic Censuses. To convert
these numbers into per capita values I use population data from the 1995 Population Count and the 2000
Demographic Census.
investment per capita. As Column 3 of Table 3 shows, none of the differences in averages across
the groups are statistically significant. To further examine the pattern of implementation of
the reform, I regress each of the three Census variables on the quarter of implementation. The
coefficients on quarter of implementation are reported in Column 4 of Table 3. While there is
no statistically significant trend for changes in log employment per capita and log investment
per capita, log GDP per capita is higher for municipalities that adopted the reform earlier.
The fact that log GDP per capita tends to be higher for municipalities which adopted
the reform earlier does not per se invalidate the identification strategy since the identification
strategy relies on changes over time being similar across municipalities. Thus, I also compare
changes in log GDP per capita, log economic establishments per capita, and log investment per
capita from 1994 to 1999. The averages for early and late adopters are in Columns 1 and 2
in the lower part of Table 3. Columns 3 and 4 show that changes in log GDP per capita, log
establishments per capita and log investment per capita are not significantly different across
early and late adopters and do not follow a specific pattern of implementation over time. This
adds plausibility to the argument that changes of outcomes in these municipalities would have
been similar in the absence of the reform. In the following section, I also analyze whether there
is a pattern of adoption in terms of the pre-period outcome data.
1.5 Mexican Employment Survey Data
The data on my main outcome variables come from the Mexican National Employment Survey
(ENE). The ENE has been conducted every quarter since 2000-II and covers a random sample of
approximately 150,000 households each quarter, where each household remains in the survey for
five consecutive quarters. The ENE is the survey that the Mexican government uses to calculate
unemployment statistics and thus includes detailed questions about a person's economic activity.
I am using data for 2000-II to 2004-IV (19 quarters in total). After 2004-IV, the ENE was
changed to a new survey, whose results have not been made publicly available.
It is worth pointing out that the way the ENE sample is constructed implies that a
municipality-year average is not necessarily representative of the municipality in that year.
The sample selection procedure randomly selects households at a geographic unit, the AGEB
(Basic Geo-Statistical Area), that is smaller than the municipalities in my sample. All AGEBs
within a state are first stratified by socioeconomic characteristics. Within each strata, a certain
number of AGEBs is chosen at random. Then, households are chosen at random within the
AGEB. This procedure implies that it could happen that only some socioeconomic groups get
selected in a given municipality in a given year. However, since the strata are randomly chosen,
this remains in expectation a random sample of the households in a municipality, so that the
estimate should remain unbiased. Moreover, the survey includes several different strata for
most of the municipalities in my sample.
Since I am looking at labor market outcomes, I keep only individuals of working age (between
the ages of 20 and 65) in my sample. I construct three of my main outcome variables by
creating dummy variables for each person in the sample, which indicate whether the person
a) is employed, b) is a wage earner, and c) owns a registered business 0o. The later dummies
encompass subcategories of the earlier dummies, in the sense that everybody who is employed
can either be a wage earner or a business owner. Business owners can either be registered or
unregistered. However, since all dummies are defined for the whole sample, they denote the
fraction of all individuals in my sample who fall into each category, not the fraction of people
in the preceding category who fall into each subcategory. For example, a value of 0.08 of
the registered business owner dummy means that 8 percent of all people own and operate a
registered business, not 8 percent of employed individuals.
I create six more dummy variables which split up the employed dummy, the wage earner
dummy, and the registered business dummy into low-risk and high-risk registered businesses,
using the industry information provided in the ENE and matching it to the low-risk and high-
risk/regulated industries as specified by COFEMER. Finally, I also use monthly income as an
outcome variable. While the dummy variables are defined for everybody in my sample, income
is available only for the gainfully employed and is missing for the unemployed, for individuals
who are out of the labor force, and for unpaid workers.
The upper panel of Table 4a includes summary statistics for the outcome variables split up
by early and late adopter municipalities, where these groups are defined as in Table 3 with early
(late) adopters adopting the reform between May 2002 (April 2004) and March 2004 (December
10 The Appendix includes a description of how I constructed these dummy variables.
2004). The data in Table 4a are for the pre-reform period, including only observations between
2000-II and 2001-IV. The averages in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4a show that 65.8 percent of the
people in my sample are employed 1". Individuals who are employed fall into three categories
- wage earners (who make up 50.3 percent of the population), registered business owners (8.3
percent) and non-registered business owners (7.7 percent). Most registered business owners are
in low-risk/unregulated industries (7.2 percent), with only 1 percent of the population owning
registered high-risk/regulated businesses.
The third column of Table 4a reports the differences in pre-reform averages for early and
late adopters. The differences are small and not statistically significant, except for log monthly
income. Income is 15.5 percent higher in early adopter municipalities. However, as Column 4
of Table 4a shows, none of the outcome variables are systematically increasing or decreasing in
the quarter of implementation.
As explained above, the required assumption for my estimations to be valid is that the
changes of the outcome variables would not have differed systematically between treatment and
control municipalities during the treatment period if the reform had not occurred. While this
assumption is fundamentally untestable, it is likely to hold if there are no initial systematic
differences in trends. To verify this, I report pre-period average changes in outcome variables in
Table 4b. The changes are quarter-to-quarter changes in outcome variables, where the outcome
variables are averaged over municipalities. The quarter-to-quarter changes are then averaged
over the period 2000-II to 2001-IV to arrive at the final numbers used to construct Table 4b.
The average changes in outcome variables are not statistically different between early and late
adopter municipalities. Most of the changes are also not significantly related to the quarter
of implementation. An exception is the average change in employment, which shows a slight
upward trend in the quarter of implementation.
I also use a number of individual background variables from the ENE as control variables
in my regression. These variables include age, gender, marital status, and education dummies.
Summary statistics for these background variables and their pre-period changes are listed in
the lower panels of Table 4a and 4b. The background variables are very similar across early
" Labor force participation is about 68 percent. The unemployment rate is at a low 2 percent. Measured
unemployment tends to be low in Mexico since individuals count as employed even if they worked only one hour
during the past week.
and late adopter municipalities. The only statistically significant difference in Table 4a is
in the fraction of females, where early adopter municipalities have about one percent fewer
females. The changes in background variables shown in Table 4b are also largely similar across
municipalities.
1.6 Results
In this section, I put to test the predictions of the model developed above and analyze the
effects of the reform on average labor market outcomes. I also break down these effects by
pre-reform occupation and examine the impact of the reform prices.
According to the identification strategy described in Section 1.4, I obtain the main results
by running the following regression with OLS
yit = a + c, + "It + 6SAREdC + 7rZict + eic,
where the subscript i denotes individuals, c denotes municipalities, and t denotes quarters. This
regression includes municipality fixed effects, 0,, and quarter fixed effects, "Yt. The variable
SAREct is the reform dummy and, for each municipality, it is equal to one for the quarter in
which the reform was implemented and for all following quarters. I run the regression with
and without the individual background variables, Zict. Note that I do not include individual
dummies or time trends interacted with municipality dummies in my regressions since they
take out a lot of the variation in the reform dummy. The standard errors of the regressions are
clustered at the municipality level. As explained in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004),
clustering at the region level helps to prevent the problem that difference-in-difference estimates
which use a large number of time periods severely understate uncorrected standard errors if the
outcomes are serially correlated.
1.6.1 Registration
The first prediction of the model above is that the fraction of registered businesses should
increase after the reform. Table 5 contains the regressions for the registered business dummy,
which denotes the fraction of all people who own a registered business. Both, the specification
with individual level controls and the one without individual level controls, show a positive and
significant impact of the reform on the number of registered businesses. The increase of 0.35
percentage points is equal to a 4 percent increase in registered businesses from the pre-reform
level of 8.3 percent.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 show the impact on registered businesses broken down by low-
risk and high-risk businesses. Since only the low-risk businesses are eligible for the reform, the
increase in registered businesses should only come from low-risk businesses. This is indeed what
the results in Columns 3 to 6 confirm. The fraction of low-risk registered businesses increased
by 0.41 percentage points (a increase of 5.6 percent from the pre-reform level of 7.3 percent),
while there was no statistically significant change in high-risk registered businesses. Based on
the fact that the 34 municipalities in my sample had a total population of 8,285,900 between
ages 20 and 65, according to the 2000 Demographic Census, an increase of 0.41 percentage
points in low-risk registered businesses corresponds to an increase in 33,972 firms for all 34
municipalities or 999 firms per municipality, on average.
The regression above estimates only the average effect of the reform on registration over
the post-treatment period. However, it is also interesting to see how this effect looks over time.
Figures 6 shows a plot of the coefficients of the following regression
yit = a + PC + 7t + 6ItQuarteric+ rZict + Cict
where Quarterj is a set of dummy variables for lag and lead quarters relative to the time of
implementation in a given municipality. For example, Quarter_l is equal to one for the last
quarter before the reform was implemented. Since the implementation of the reform was phased
in over time and since the data set overs quarters 2000-II to 2004-IV only, I do not observe the
outcome data for all lags and leads for all municipalities. For instance, the data set includes
information on Quarter+5 only for the eight municipalities that implemented the reform in
2003 or earlier. For Quarter+6 the data cover only six municipalities. Similarly, for the lags,
the data cover all municipalities only for Quarter_s and higher. For this reason, I limit the
regression above to observations that fall between Quarter_8 and Quarter+5. Quarter_8 is
also the omitted quarter in the regression, to which all other quarters are being compared.
Figure 6 shows the coefficients on the lag and lead dummies for the regression with the low-
risk registered business owner dummy as the outcome variable. The two lighter colored lines
are the 95 percent confidence bands of the estimates. Between Quarters and Quarter_l, the
estimated differences tend to be negative and close to zero. After implementation of the reform,
the differences become positive, reflecting the increase in registration. The only exception to
the positive differences after implementation is Quarter+5. As mentioned above, the data set
covers fewer municipalities for this lead quarter than for previous lead quarters. The decrease
in registration may thus be driven by missing data rather than by a actually reversal of the
effect of the reform.
To check whether the measured increase of 0.41 percentage points in low-risk registered
businesses from Table 5 seems plausible, I use the 2004 administrative data from the business
registration center in Guadalajara. First, I calculate how many new businesses the increase
of 0.41 percentage points implies for Guadalajara. Given that Guadalajara had a population
between the ages of 20 and 65 of 879,019 in 2000, and assuming that the number of additional
businesses which came into being due to the reform was equal to the average 0.41 percentage
points, this implies that 3,604 new businesses in Guadalajara were created due to the reform.
Then, I compare 3,604 to the total number of licenses issued by the registration center in
Guadalajara. The center issued 16,613 new licenses in 2004. Given that the reform was imple-
mented in Guadalajara in May 2003, 16,613 is a lower-bound for the total number of businesses
created since the reform was implemented. The regression results thus suggest that most of the
new licenses issued since the reform in Guadalajara (13009 and up) would have been issued in
the absence of the reform as part of the normal turnover in businesses, and that 3,604 of them
were issued as a result of the reform.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, for some municipalities, the COFEMER reports statistics on
pre-reform and post-reform registration procedures. These data are available for 27 municipal-
ities in my sample, and I use it to test whether the effect on registration and income is greater
in municipalities with greater reductions in registration procedures. This test corresponds to
the following regression
yizt = a + 8c + Yt + 6SAREct + OSAREct * (AProcedures)c + rZict + ict,
where AProcedures is the reduction in the number of procedures in municipality c. Con-
ditional on having the reform, the average reduction in the number of procedures was 5, with
a standard deviation of 6. The minimum was 0 and the maximum 2212. Column 1 of Table 6
shows the regression results for the registration dummy, where the regression includes individual
background variables. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term of the reform and
reduction in procedures is positive, implying that the reform had a bigger effect on registration
in municipalities that saw a higher reduction in procedures. For a municipality with the average
reduction in procedures (5), the increase in registration was 1.8 percent.
The model from Section 1.3 predicts that the reform should affect individuals in different
pre-reform occupations differently. To test these predictions, I make use of the panel structure
of my data. For each individual, I create four dummy variables that specify which of four
occupations they held when I first observed them in the pre-reform period. The four possible
occupations are registered business owner, non-registered business owner, wage earner, and not
employed (unemployed or out of the labor force). For example, for somebody who was a wage
earner in the first period when I observed her, the "past wage earner" dummy is equal to one.
I then drop the first period of observation for each person and run the following regression for
the remaining periods
yiotd = a + ýc + yt + PastOccup, + 0, * PastOccupo + yt * PastOccupo
+6SARE0 t * PastOccupo + 7rZioct + ejot,
which includes the reform dummy interacted with all five past occupation dummies. The
regression also includes quarter, municipality and past occupation dummies, PastOccupo, as
well as the interactions of quarter with occupation dummies and time with occupation dummies.
Finally, it includes the set of individual background characteristics, Ziot. Individuals who are
never observed in the pre-reform period are dropped from this analysis, which makes the sample
smaller than the one used to determine the main effects above.
12The minimum of 0 only applies to three counties. In these counties, the number of procedures was already
low pre-reform. However, the reform was still effective in these counties since it reduced the number of days it
takes to register a business in all three counties. In two of the counties the reform also reduced the number of
office visits.
Table 7 presents the regression results for this analysis. Column 1 shows that the only
individuals who switched to being registered business owners are the ones who previously were
wage earners. Past informal business owners are no more likely to register their businesses after
the reform. This finding is consistent with the assumption of low productivity of the informal
sector in the model above and is inconsistent with the high productivity assumption.
The model with the low productivity assumption also predicts that the wage earners who
open a registered business should be the ones with the highest ability levels. To test this, I need
an estimate of their ability. I calculate the ability of wage earners by estimating the residual in
a pre-reform earnings regression
ln(incometd) = a + #c + yt + 7rZict + Vicd,
where fc is a municipality fixed effect, 7t is a quarter fixed effect, and Zic is the same set of
individual background variables as in the previous regressions in this section. Similarly to the
way pre-reform occupation status is defined, I run this regression for the set of individuals who
were wage earners in the pre-reform period when they were first observed and calculate the
income residual for each wage earner. I then drop this period and run the following regression
for the remaining periods
yit = a + # + yt + xi + # * xi + yt * xi + 6SAREd + ,SAREd * xi + 7rZic + eict,
where xi is the estimated income residual.
If the wage earners with the highest ability were the ones who opened a registered business,
the coefficient on the interaction of the reform dummy with the income residual, 77, should be
positive. Column 1 of Table 8 shows that this coefficient is in fact positive and significant, as
predicted by the model with the low productivity assumption. The results thus suggests that
the low-ability (residual sector) view of informal business owners is more appropriate than the
De Soto view 3
13A limitation of the model and its predictions is that they are based on the quite restrictive assumption that
the ability relevant for wage work is the same as the ability relevant for opening a business. In future work, it
would be interesting to estimate a full Roy model of occupational choice to determine whether the people who
1.6.2 Employment
The model from Section 1.3 also predicts that the reform leads to an increase in the number
of wage earners. Table 9 reports the regression for the wage earner dummy. Columns 3 and 4
show that the fraction of wage earners increased in low-risk (eligible) industries. This increase
in the fraction of wage earners of 0.61 percentage points corresponds to an increase of about 2
percent over the pre-reform fraction of low-risk wage earners. In the model, overall employment
in the formal sector also increases since more agents become formal business owners and wage
earners. Table 10 examines the impact of the reform on employment. Employment in low-risk
industries went up by 1.17 percentage points, which corresponds to a 2.6 percent increase over
the pre-reform low-risk employment level.
Figures 7 and 8 show the effect on wage work and employment in low-risk industries bro-
ken down by lag and lead quarters relative to the quarter of implementation. These figures
were constructed using the same methodology as for Figure 6. The changes in the fraction
of wage earners and employment are close to zero until the quarter of implementation. From
Quartero on, both variables are significantly and increasingly higher than before. The drop off
in Quarter+5 may be due to the fact that the data cover fewer municipalities than for previous
lead quarters.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 show that, similarly to the fraction of registered businesses,
employment and the fraction of wage earners in low-risk industries increased more in munici-
palities where the reduction in registration procedures was greater. In a municipality with the
average reduction in procedures (5), employment increased by 1 percent and the fraction of
wage earners increased by 0.8 percent.
In the model, the increase in wage earners comes from informal business owners. Column
2 of Table 7 breaks down the effect on the fraction of wage earners in low-risk industries by
pre-reform occupation type. The results show that instead of informal business owners, it was
individuals who were previously not employed (the unemployed or out of the labor force) who
switched to being wage earners after the reform. The model could not have predicted this effect
since all agents in the model are employed. In the data, however, about 35 percent of the
open a business are the ones with the highest return to opening a business.
individuals do not participate in the labor force or are unemployed. The model in this paper
is kept simple to emphasize what the reform in Mexico can say about the differing views of
informal business owners. In order to capture more of the effects of the reform, the model would
have to be more complex. Agents who are not employed could, for example, be introduced into
the model if agents had different costs of participating in the labor market.
Another extension of the model for future work is the inclusion of non-eligible industries. In
the model, the entire formal business sector is subject to the reform. However, as Tables 9 and
10 show, the overall fraction of wage earners and overall employment did not increase. Instead
the increase in wage earners and employment in low-risk (eligible) industries went along with
a decrease in wage earners and employment in high-risk (non-eligible) industries. This effect
suggests that some wage earners may prefer to work in low-risk industries rather than high-
risk industries. Before the reform, there may not have been enough jobs available in low-risk
industries, but the creation of new firms after the reform made it possible for some wage earners
to switch industries.
1.6.3 Prices
The model above predicts that entry of new registered businesses after the reform decreases
prices. My measure of the price level is the Mexican consumer price index (CPI), which is
constructed by the Bank of Mexico. Price data are only available at the city level, not at the
municipality level. In Mexico, a city can consist of one or several municipalities. I thus convert
the price data to the municipality level by assigning each municipality the price index of the
city where it is locatedl4. CPI data exists only for 20 out of 34 municipalities in the sample
since the other 14 municipalities do not fall into cities for which the CPI is calculated. As
opposed to the ENE data, which have a quarterly frequency, the price data come at a monthly
frequency. The specification used to analyze the effect on the price level is thus
log(CPIcm) = a + ýc + 7Yn + 6SAREc, + 6em,
14In my sample, only three counties lie in the same city (Guadalajara, Zapopan and Tlaquepaque in Guadala-
jara). These three counties are thus assigned the same price data. All other counties have unique observations.
where the CPI varies by municipality and month and the subscript m stand for months. The
base month for the CPI is June 2002.
Table 11 presents the results for the price regression, for two different time spans. Both
regressions include the same set of municipalities, which are only the municipalities that are in
the ENE sample. Column 1 of Table 11 corresponds to the time span for which I have ENE
data. As predicted by the model above, the coefficient on the reform dummy is negative and
statistically significant at the 13.6 percent level. In the regression in Column 2, the time period
covered goes up to May 2006, which is the last month for which I have the CPI data. The
negative coefficient on the reform dummy is somewhat smaller in magnitude, but it is now
significant at the 10 percent level. The decrease in the consumer price level after the reform
confirms the argument that lowering barriers to entry benefits consumers.
The coefficients in Table 11 indicate that the reform decreased the log price level by approx-
imately 1 percent. To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect, I compare it to the average
inflation rate from 2000 to 2001. This average inflation rate, calculated as the increase in the
CPI from each month in 2000 to the same month in 2001, was 5.7 percent. The decrease in the
log CPI of approximately 1 percent due to the reform is a decrease in inflation of approximately
1 percent. A back-of-the-envelope calculation thus suggests that the reform decreased inflation
to about 4.7 percent from 5.7 percent. Moreover, the increase in registered businesses by 4
percent and the decrease in prices by 1 percent suggest a price elasticity of 4.
1.6.4 Income
The regression results for the last ENE outcome variable, monthly income, are reported in
Table 12. This table displays the effect on log income by past occupation group. The model
predicts that the reform should decrease the income of incumbent registered business owners.
The results in Column 1 indeed show that nominal income decreased for past registered business
owners, by 3.5 percent. Given that the reform led to a decrease in the price level, it is also
important to examine the impact of the reform on real income, in order to check whether the
decrease in income is solely due to the price effect. Column 3 of Table 12 examines the effect
on real income by past occupation group. As mentioned above, for real income, the analysis is
restricted to a smaller sample since the CPI is only available for 20 of the 34 municipalities in
my main sample"5 . Column 3 of Table 12 thus reports the effect on real income in the small
sample. Although the effect on the real income of incumbent registered business owners is
slightly smaller than the effect on their nominal income, it is statistically significant.
Table 13 breaks down the effect on nominal income of past-registered business owners into
tradable and non-tradable sectors. The estimation strategy compares income across municipal-
ities, implying that the relative decline in income should come from past registered business
owners in the non-tradable sector. This is because the prices of non-tradables may decrease
locally, but the price of tradables should not be affected by an increase in the supply in some
municipalities only16 . Table 13 indeed shows that income declined significantly only for past
registered business owners who were in the non-tradable sector.
The model also predicts that the income of informal business owners goes down after the
reform. The regressions in Table 12, however, show no statistically significant effect on the
income of informal business owners. It may be that informal business owners are not affected
by the decline in prices in the same way as formal business owners because the goods they are
producing are differentiated from formal sector goods.
The regressions in Table 12 also indicate that there was no statistically significant effect on
the average income of past wage earners. The wage earners who opened registered businesses,
however, should be earning more. It is possible that the regressions in Table 12 do not detect
this effect since the wage earners who opened a registered business are a small group compared
to the stayers. Moreover, wage earners who switched and who earn more should only be the
ones with the highest ability levels. I thus examine the impact of the reform on the income of
past wage earners interacted with their ability in Column 2 of Table 8. Ability is calculated
in the same way as described at the end of Subsection 1.6.1. Although the coefficient on the
interaction term between the reform and ability in Column 2 is not statistically significant,
it is positive and thus points in the right direction. A possible explanation for the lack of a
statistically significant effect on the income of wage earners who opened a business is that they
are still paying off the fixed cost of their new business during the period of observation. When
15The second column of Table 12 contains the same nominal income regression as Column 1, but for the smaller
sample. The comparison between Columns 1 and 2 illustrates that the effect on nominal income across samples
is very similar for all past occupation groups.
16Even if these counties were big enough to cause the price of tradables to change, no-arbitrage would imply
that there should not be any relative price difference for tradables across counties.
analyzing the effect on the income of past wage earners, the regressions include a maximum of
four quarters after the reform was implemented. This is due to the fact that the labor market
survey keeps individuals only for five quarters. Since the methodology requires one pre-reform
period to define pre-reform occupation status, post-reform observations exist for at most four
quarters.
The results for the effect on employment in Subsection 1.6.2 indicate that the previously
unemployed or out of the labor force were more likely to work as wage earners after the reform.
These switchers should thus also have seen a increase in their income. When aiming to measure
this increase, I cannot use log income as the outcome variable as is done in Table 12. Individuals
who were initially unemployed or out of the labor force have zero income and thus have to
be dropped from a log regression. I choose two different ways of including the zero income
observations, which are reported in Table 14. First, Columns 1 through 3 display regressions
where the outcome variable is the quadratic root of income. The quadratic root mimics the
logarithmic function well for positive numbers. (See Thomas et al., 2003, who choose the
quadratic root of income instead of log to include zero and negative yields). Second, Columns
5 through 6 of Table 14 report Tobit regressions. For the Tobit regressions, log(0) observations
are replaced with the smallest observed log income in the data. This value is then used as
the lower bound for the Tobit. The quadratic root and the Tobit regressions show a significant
increase in the income of the previously not employed. Nominal income for this group increased
by approximately 5 percent on average.
Table 14 also shows a negative and significant effect on the average income of previous wage
earners. This effect is generally consistent with the model and suggests that business owners
may have passed on some of the decline in prices to their workers.
The previous tables in this subsection have illustrated the effect on the income of different
pre-reform occupation groups. Table 15 displays the effect of the reform on average income.
The first column uses log income as the outcome variable. Panel A shows that the reform
decreased nominal income by 2.1 percent on average. Panel B reports the nominal income
regression for the smaller sample of municipalities for which price data is available, and Panel
C reports real income regressions. The effect on log income is negative and significant in all
three panels. These regressions thus pick up the effect of the decrease in income for incumbent
registered business owners. However, the log regressions in Column 1 exclude zero incomes
and may therefore be misspecified. Similarly to the regressions in Table 14, the regressions in
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 15 aim at resolving this problem by using the quadratic root of income
as an outcome variable and by running a Tobit. The quadratic root and Tobit regressions show
no statistically significant change in average income. This is because, in addition to the decline
in income for incumbent formal business owners and for some wage earners, these regressions
pick up the increase in income for the previously not employed.
Finally, Column 4 of Table 15 presents another way of including zero income observations
in the regression by looking at log aggregate municipality income per capita as the outcome
variable. Aggregate municipality income per capita was constructed by summing up all income
observations for a given municipality in a given quarter and then dividing by the number of
people observed in that quarter. The aggregate income regression for the whole sample shows a
negative but insignificant effect on income. In the regressions for the smaller sample, however,
the effect is negative and significant. The reason for the negative effect on overall income may be
that total employment did not increase after the reform. Instead, as shown in Subsection 1.6.2,
there was a shift from employment in high-risk industries to employment in low-risk industries.
This shift could imply that welfare went up, even if income did not go up. Employees may prefer
to work in low-risk industries, and may be willing to accept a lower wage in these industries
than in high-risk industries.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper uses microeconomic data to analyze the effects of a business registration reform in
Mexico on registration, employment, prices, and income. It also traces out the effects of the
reform on different pre-reform occupation groups, thereby offering an insight into the channels
through which the effects operate.
First, the paper provides evidence that simplifying entry regulation increases the number
of registered businesses. After the business registration reform in Mexico, the total number
of registered businesses increased by 5.6 percent in eligible industries. This finding is in line
with previous cross-country studies which show that countries with simpler regulation have
more business entry. The paper then illustrates that the increase in registered businesses was
due to former wage workers opening businesses, and not due to unregistered business owners
registering their businesses. This effect is consistent with a model where unregistered business
owners are low-ability individuals in a residual sector. The evidence does no support models
that are in line with Hernando De Soto's view that informal business owners are medium-range
ability individuals who choose a small scale production technology over wage work and who
cannot register since registration is too costly and complicated.
The results also show that employment in eligible industries increased by 2.6 percent. In
particular, those previously unemployed and out of the labor force were more likely to work as
wage earners after the reform as the number of businesses increased. This effect mirrors the
cross-country results on output growth, where less complicated regulation is associated with
higher growth in output. It also provides evidence that lowering barriers to entry benefits
consumers. Another piece of evidence suggesting that consumers benefit from the reform is
that prices decreased by 1 percent after the reform in Mexico. I attribute this to the fact that
new entrants increase total output in a market with a downward sloping demand curve. The
increased competition also decreases income of incumbent firms by 3.5 percent. This income
decline was concentrated among owners of businesses in the non-tradable goods sector, which
indicates that it was due to competition.
Interestingly, this paper does not find an increase in the income of wage earners who opened
businesses. A possible explanation is that these new entrepreneurs were still paying off the
fixed cost of opening a business during the time span covered in the data. This paper measures
only the short-term effects of the reform, covering 3 quarters on average. For future research, it
would be interesting to also measure the longer run effects, and in particular, to examine what
happens to the income of new entrepreneurs over several periods.
Overall, the results suggest that promoting simplification of entry regulation is an effective
policy for fostering entrepreneurial activity and for making consumers better off by increasing
employment opportunities and by lowering prices. The attention that business registration
reform has recently received from policy makers thus appears to be warranted.
1.8 Appendix: Variable Definitions
* Employed Dummy: The employed dummy is equal to one for everybody who
1. Worked for pay for a least one hour during the past week, or
2. Was on paid vacation, leave or on strike, or
3. Helped somebody else without pay in their business.
The dummy is zero for everybody else in my sample, which are people of working age
(between 25 and 60 years old).
* Wage Earner Dummy: This dummy is equal to one for people who
1. Are employed according to the definition above, and
2. Who chose the option of "worker" or "member of a cooperative" as the answer to
the question about which position they held in their main job.
The dummy is zero for everybody else in my sample.
* Registered Business Dummy: This dummy is equal to one for people who
1. Are employed according to the definition above, and
2. Who chose the option of "boss" or "self-employed" as the answer to the question
about which position they held in their main job, and
3. Who say that their business has a legal name under which the business is registered
with the authorities.
Only 53 percent of people in my sample who comply with criteria 1 and 2 also comply
with criterion 3. The others are self-employed without being registered. Most of these
people are engaged in small commerce, food preparation, repair work or construction.
They work roadside without a fixed locality, in the home of their clients, or in their own
home.
A concern is that people may not truthfully report whether their business is registered
with the authorities. To check whether the fraction of individuals who report having
a registered business seems reasonable, I compare the ENE number to the number of
economic establishments per population of age 20-65, calculated from the 1999 Economic
Census and the 2000 Demographic Census. For the 34 muncipalities in my sample, the
total number of establishments is 553,235 and the total population 20-65 is 8,285,900,
implying a ratio of 0.067. This number is similar to the mean of the registered business
dummy in my ENE sample (0.083). The Census number may be lower since the Economic
Census only includes businesses that have a fixed establishment. While the majority of
registered businesses fall into this category, there are also some who operate in vehicles
(such as taxi drivers), who work from home or in the home of their clients.
* Low-Risk (High-Risk) Registered Businesses Dummy: The low-risk (high-risk) dummy is
equal to one for individuals for whom the registered business dummy is equal to one and
who are in a low-risk (high-risk) industry. Appendix Table 2 describes the division of
industries into low-risk and high-risk.
* Income: This variable is the monthly income from the main job that individuals held in
the past week. It is zero for the people who work without pay, who are unemployed, or
who are out of the labor force.
* Schooling Dummies: These dummies refer to the highest completed level of schooling.
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Table 1: Local Business Registration Procedures in Mexico
Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-reform
Days 30.1 16.7 2 60
Procedures 7.9 7.0 1 27
Office visits 4.2 2.0 1 10
Post-reform
Days 1.4 0.6 1 3
Procedures 2.7 2.1 1 9
Office visits 1.0 0.2 1 2
Note: These data come from the COFEMER website and are based on 32
municipalities from 17 different states. On top of these procedures, most firms
need to comply with one or two federal procedures, which can often be done in the
same location (this one-stop-shop solution is part of the reform).
Table 2: Pre-Reform Income by Occupation
Non-registered Wage workers Registered
business owners business owners
Avg. pre-reform income (in logs) 7.463 7.940 8.274
Avg. pre-reform income residual -0.250 0.008 0.192
Table 3: Municipality Characteristics from 1994 and 1999 Economic Census
Early adopters
average
Late adopters
average
Difference in
averages
Coefficient on
quarter of
implementation
Log GDP per capita
Log establishments per capita
Log investment per capita
Log GDP per capita change
Log establishments per capita change
Log investment per capita change
Observations
(1)
10.250
(0.699)
3.508
(0.441)
6.665
(0.971)
0.588
(0.275)
0.117
(0.102)
0.826
(0.739)
17
(2)
9.917
(0.823)
3.437
(0.239)
6.702
(1.045)
0.610
(0.283)
0.149
(0.094)
1.139
(0.954)
17
(3)
0.333
(0.262)
0.071
(0.122)
-0.036
(0.346)
-0.022
(0.096)
-0.032
(0.034)
-0.312
(0.293)
34
(4)
-0.105**
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.017)
-0.078
(0.050)
-0.010
(0.018)
0.010
(0.006)
0.058
(0.069)
34
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. I define early adopters as the municipalities which implemented the reform
between May 2002 and March 2004. Late adopters are municipalities which adopted the reform between April 2004
and December 2004, when my dataset ends. Establishments are measured per 1000 inhabitants. Changes are defined as
[Y(1999)-Y(1994)]. Column 4 presents the coefficients of a separate regression for each variable or change on quarter
of implementation. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 4a: Averages of Individual Level Variables from 2000 & 2001 ENE
Early adopters
averaeP
Outcome Variables
Employed dummy
Low-risk employed dummy
High-risk employed dummy
Wage earner dummy
Low-risk wage earner dummy
High-risk wage earner dummy
Registered business owner dummy
Low-risk registered owner
High-risk registered owner
Log monthly income
Background Variables
Primary education dummy
Secondary education dummy
High school education dummy
University education dummy
Female dummy
Age
Married dummy
Late adopters Difference
avera 
e 
in avera 
es
Coefficient on
quarter of
..... 6.. . ....... Al ,-,, implementation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.658(0.474)
0.445
(0.497)
0.213
(0.409)
0.503
(0.500)
0.303
(0.460)
0.199
(0.399)
0.083
(0.276)
0.073
(0.260)
0.010
(0.101)
7.997
(0.748)
0.229(0.420)
0.225
(0.417)
0.240
(0.427)
0.147
(0.354)
0.534
(0.499)
36.79
(11.970)
0.670
(0.470)
0.652
(0.476)
0.433
(0.495)
0.220
(0.414)
0.492(0.500)
0.286
(0.452)
0.207
(0.405)
0.084
(0.277)
0.073
(0.260)
0.011
(0.102)
7.842
(0.809)
0.228
(0.420)
0.227
(0.419)
0.230
(0.421)
0.137
(0.344)
0.544
(0.498)
37.04
(12.087)
0.682
(0.466)
0.006
(0.011)
0.013
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.019)
0.011
(0.011)
0.018
(0.017)
-0.007
(0.019)
0.000
(0.007)
0.000
(0.006)
0.000
(0.002)
0.155**
(0.074)
0.000
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.013)
0.010
(0.017)
0.010
(0.014)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.257
(0.160)
-0.012
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.026
(0.017)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.039*
(0.022)
0.004*
(0.001)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). The employed include wage earners and self-
employed/business owners. Column 4 presents the coefficients of a separate regression for each variable on quarter
of implementation. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 4b: Average Quarterly Changes of Individual Level Variables from 2000 & 2001 ENE
Early adopters
aveara e
Outcome Variables
Employed change
Low-risk employed change
High-risk employed change
Wage earner change
Low-risk wage earner change
High-risk wage earner change
Registered business owner change
Low-risk registered owner change
High-risk registered owner change
Log monthly income change
Background Variables
Primary education change
Secondary education change
High school education change
University education change
Female change
Age change
Married change
Late adopters
avera e
Difference in
21aran e
Coefficient on
quarter of
5 ... implementation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0002
(0.0032)
0.0010
(0.0036)
-0.0013
(0.0027)
-0.0008
(0.0033)
0.0002
(0.0040)
-0.0010
(0.0024)
0.0007
(0.0024)
0.0006
(0.0020)
0.0001
(0.0008)
0.0268
(0.0118)
0.0001
(0.0027)
0.0015
(0.0036)
0.0000
(0.0035)
0.0002
(0.0033)
0.0004
(0.0026)
0.0823
(0.0865)
-0.0020
(0.0045)
0.0020(0.0056)
0.0036
(0.0072)
-0.0016(0.0036)
0.0006
(0.0033)
0.0022
(0.0030)
-0.0016
(0.0037)
0.0002
(0.0027)
0.0001
(0.0027)
0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0304
(0.0144)
-0.0011
(0.0032)
0.0000
(0.0035)
0.0026
(0.0032)
0.0011
(0.0021)
-0.0007
(0.0024)
-0.0022
(0.1023)
-0.0012
(0.0032)
-0.0022
(0.0016)
-0.0026
(0.0020)
0.0003
(0.0011)
-0.0014
(0.0011)
-0.0020
(0.0012)
0.0006
(0.0011)
0.0005
(0.0009)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0037
(0.0045)
0.0012
(0.0010)
0.0014
(0.0012)
-0.0026**
(0.0011)
-0.0008
(0.0009)
0.0011
(0.0009)
0.0844**
(0.0325)
-0.0008
(0.0013)
0.0005*
(0.0003)
0.0007*
(0.0003)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0004*
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0013
(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0003*
(0.0002)
-0.0102
(0.0071)
0.0000
(0.0002)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Changes are average quarter to quarter changes in municipality averages for
2000-II to 2001-IV. Column 4 presents the coefficients of a separate regression for each variable on quarter of
implementation. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 5: Impact of Business Registration Reform on Registration
Dependent variable:
Registered business
owner dummy
Reform dummy (SARE)
Primary education dummy
Secondary education dummy
High school educ. dummy
University education dummy
Female dummy
Age
Married dummy
R-squared
No. of observations
(1)
0.0038**
(0.0015)
0.003
1,628,903
(2)
0.0035**
(0.0014)
0.0313***
(0.0022)
0.0476***
(0.0030)
0.0556***
(0.0032)
0.1156***
(0.0066)
-0.0823***
(0.0035)
0.0030***
(0.0001)
0.0255***
(0.0013)
0.056
1,628,903
Low-risk registered High-risk registered
business owner dummy business owner dummy
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0043*** 0.0041*** -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.0248*** 0.0065***
(0.0020) (0.0006)
0.0396*** 0.0080***
(0.0028) (0.0009)
0.0478*** 0.0078***
(0.0029) (0.0007)
0.1108*** 0.0049***
(0.0062) (0.0011)
-0.0635*** -0.0188***
(0.0033) (0.0017)
0.0026*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0000)
0.0203*** 0.0052***
(0.0011) (0.0005)
0.003 0.047 0.001 0.014
1,628,903 1,628,903 1,628,903 1,628,903
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality
fixed effects. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 6: Impact of Reform By Reduction in Number of Procedures
Dependent variable:
Registered
Reform dummy (SARE)
Reform dummy*Reduct. in procedures
R-squared
No. of observations
Low-risk Low-risk
business owner employed wage earner
dummy dummy dummy
(1) (2) (3)
0.0018 0.0054 0.0019
(0.0024) (0.0066) (0.0043)
0.0003* 0.0009*** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.057 0.094 0.077
1,385,579 1,385,579 1,385,579
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and
municipality fixed effects, as well as individual background variables. Significance levels: * 10%, **
5%, *** 1%
Table 7: Impact of Reform by Pre-Reform Occupation
Dependent variable:
Registered business Low-risk wage
owner dummy earner dummy
(1) (2)
SARE*Past registered owner -0.0038 0.0127**(0.0082) (0.0056)
SARE*Past non-registered owner -0.0021 0.0046
(0.0064) (0.0088)
SARE*Past wage earner 0.0028* 0.0039
(0.0016) (0.0048)
SARE*Past not employed -0.0002 0.0123***
(0.0017) (0.0031)
R-squared 0.381 0.195
No. of observations 1,061,416 1,061,416
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation
variables refer to pre-reform occupations when the person was first observed. The past
not employed include the unemployed and out of the labor force. Regressions include
quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for occupation interacted
with quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background variables.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 8: Impact on Wage Earners by Ability Level
Dependent variable:
Registered business Log monthly
owner dummy income
(1) (2)
Reform dummy (SARE) 0.0024* -0.0073
(0.0013) (0.0069)
Reform dummy*Estimated Ability 0.0053** 0.0400
(0.0026) (0.0331)
R-squared 0.012 0.551
No. of observations 469,455 402,073
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Estimated
ability is the pre-reform income residual for workers when they were first observed.
Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as ability
interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background
variables. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 9: Impact of Business Registration Reform on Wage Work
Dependent variable:
Reform dummy (SARE)
Primary education dummy
Secondary education dummy
High school education dummy
University education dummy
Female dummy
Age
Married dummy
R-squared
No. of observations
Wage earner dummy
(1) (2)
-0.0009 -0.0007
(0.0026) (0.0026)
0.0576***
(0.0041)
0.1212***(0.0069)
0.1040***
(0.0082)
0.2412***
(0.0119)
-0.2483***
(0.0098)
-0.0048***
(0.0003)
-0.0814***
(0.0074)
0.003 0.119
1,628,903 1,628,903
Low-risk High-risk
wage earner dummy wage earner dummy
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0056* 0.0061** -0.0065* -0.0068***
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0024)
0.0052* 0.0524***
(0.0029) (0.0041)
-0.0061 0.1273***
(0.0044) (0.0076)
-0.0857*** 0.1897***
(0.0061) (0.0085)
-0.1363*** 0.3775***
(0.0081) (0.0155)
-0.1461*** -0.1022***
(0.0105) (0.0080)
-0.0061*** 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
-0.0954*** 0.0140***
(0.0060) (0.0034)
0.007 0.078 0.010 0.113
1,628,903 1,628,903 1,628,903 1,628,903
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality
fixed effects. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 10: Impact of Business Registration Reform on Employment
Dependent variable:
Reform dummy (SARE)
Primary education dummy
Secondary education dummy
High school educ. dummy
University education dummy
Female dummy
Age
Married dummy
R-squared
No. of observations
Employed dummy
(1) (2)
0.0044 0.0043
(0.0037) (0.0038)
0.0530***
(0.0035)
0.0988***
(0.0041)
0.0665***
(0.0069)
0.2287***
(0.0060)
-0.3899***
(0.0116)
-0.0005
(0.0003)
-0.0579***
(0.0070)
0.003 0.201
1,628,903 1,628,903
Low-risk
employed dummy
(3) (4)
0.0115** 0.0117***
(0.0044) (0.0042)
-0.0052
(0.0049)
-0.0345***
(0.0083)
-0.1286***
(0.0104)
-0.1499***
(0.0142)
-0.2643***
(0.0140)
-0.0022***(0.0002)
-0.0774***
(0.0059)
0.007 0.093
1,628,903 1,628,903
High-risk
employed dummy
(5) (6)
-0.0071** -0.0074***
(0.0033) (0.0025)
0.0582***
(0.0040)
0.1334***
(0.0076)
0.1951***
(0.0081)
0.3786***
(0.0150)
-0.1256***
(0.0081)
0.0017***
(0.0003)
0.0194***
(0.0034)
0.009 0.117
1,628,903 1,628,903
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality
fixed effects. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 11: Impact of Reform on Prices
Dependent variable: Log Consumer price index
(1) (2)
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0093 -.0070*
(0.0059) (0.0039)
Time span Apr 00 - Dec 04 Apr 00 - May 06
R-squared 0.974 0.979
No. of observations 1,140 1,480
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions
include month and municipality fixed effects. Regressions are for 20 municipalities
only since the price index is only available for 20 of the 34 municipalities in the
main sample. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 12: Impact on Income by Pre-Reform Occupation
Dependent variable:
Log income
Nominal Real
(1) (2) (3)
SARE*Past registered owner -0.0353* -0.0430** -0.0378*
(0.0191) (0.0182) (0.0184)
SARE*Past non-regist. owner -0.0143 0.0062 0.0102
(0.0252) (0.0220) (0.0206)
SARE*Past wage earner -0.0087 -0.0103 -0.0057
(0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0099)
R-squared 0.377 0.383 0.376
No. of municipalities 34 20 20
No. of observations 561,083 411,434 411,434
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past
occupation variables refer to pre-reform occupations when the person was first
observed. The regressions drop all individuals who were initially unemployed or
out of the labor force since their past income is not observed. Regressions include
quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for occupation
interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background
variables. Column 1 includes all 34 municipalities from the main sample. Columns
2 and 3 include only the 20 municipalities for which the price index is available.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 13: Impact on Income of Past Business Owners by (Non-)Tradable Sector
Dependent variable:
Log monthly income (nominal)
SARE*Past registered owner in non-tradable sector -0.0374*
(0.0189)
SARE*Past registered owner in tradable sector -0.0134
(0.0370)
R-squared 0.280
No. of observations 72,917
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation variables refer to pre-
reform occupations when the person was first observed. The regression keeps only past registered business
owners. It includes quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for occupation interacted with
quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background variables. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%
Table 14: Impact on Income by Pre-Reform Occupation
Dependent variable:
SARE*Past registered owner
SARE*Past non-reg. owner
SARE*Past wage earner
SARE*Past not employed
R-squared
No. of counties
No. of observations
Quadratic root of income
Nominal Real
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0841 -0.0653 -0.0586
(0.0665) (0.0734) (0.0711)
0.0416 0.0601 0.0582
(0.0649) (0.0466) (0.0466)
-0.0571* -0.05912* -0.0529*
(0.0311) (0.0300) (0.0297)
0.0561* 0.0430 0.0450
(0.0920) (0.0367) (0.0366)
0.525 0.525 0.525
34 20 20
1,019,402 739,937 739,937
Log income (To
Nominal
(4)
-0.0525
(0.0337)
0.0370
(0.0353)
-0.0448***(0.0140)
0.0497***
(0.0161)
0.146
34
(5)
-0.0282
(0.0376)
0.0454
(0.0395)
-0.0433***
(0.0156)
0.0397**
(0.0179)
0.146
20
1,019,402 739,937 739,937
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation variables refer to pre-
reform occupations when the person was first observed. The past not employed include the unemployed and out of
the labor force. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for occupation
interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background variables. Columns 1 and 4
include all 34 municipalities from the main sample. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 include only the 20 municipalities for
which the price index is available. In the Tobit regressions, log(O) observations are replaced with the value of the
lowest log income in the data. This value is also used as the lower bound for the Tobit. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%
bit)
Real
(6)
-0.0264
(0.0562)
0.0591
(0.0598)
-0.0469*
(0.0233)
0.1351***
(0.0349)
0.165
20
I
Table 15: Impact of Business Registration Reform on Income
Dependent variable:
Quadratic Log agg.
Log income root of Log income municipality
income (Tobit) income
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Nominal income
Reform dummy (SARE)
R-squared
No. of municipalities
No. of observations
Panel B: Nominal income
Reform dummy (SARE)
R-squared
No. of municipalities
No. of observations
Panel C: Real income
-0.0209**
(0.0101)
0.356
34
953,077
-0.0242**
(0.0099)
0.360
20
713,882
-0.0124 0.0063 -0.0350
(0.0428) (0.0184) (0.0252)
0.279 0.058 0.921
34 34 34
1,559,335 1,559,335 645
-0.0242 -0.0005 -0.0495**
(0.0446) (0.0206) (0.0233)
0.272 0.056 0.905
20 20 20
1,159,575 1,159,575 380
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0191* -0.0173 -0.0028 -0.0428*
(0.0100) (0.0429) (0.0126) (0.0224)
R-squared 0.352 0.272 0.052 0.891
No. of municipalities 20 20 20 20
No. of observations 713,882 1,159,575 1,159,575 380
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and
municipality fixed effects, as well as individual background variables. Panel A includes all 34
municipalities from my main sample. Panels B and C include only the 20 municipalities for which the
price index is available. In the Tobit regressions, log(0) observations are replaced with the value of the
lowest log income in the data. This value is also used as the lower bound for the Tobit. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Appendix Table 1. Examples of "Low-Risk to Society" and
"High-Risk to Society"/Regulated Industries
Low-Risk to Society Industries
Most agricultural acitivites
Food production
Textile production
IT production
Wholesale commerce
Retail commerce
Real estate
Professional services
Hotels and restaurants
High-Risk to Society/Regulated Industries
Mineral extraction
Electricity, water, and gas
Production of alcoholic beverages
Paper production
Oil production
Chemical production
Plastic production
Metal production
Machinery production
Vehicle production
Transportation (including taxis)
Financial services
Appendix Table 2. Reform Municipalities by Implementation Date
Municipality
Puebla
Los Cabos
Aguascalientes
Guadalajara
Zapopan
Mexicali
Le6n
Tlalnepantla
Tehuacin
Oaxaca
Torre6n
Pachuca
Chetumal
Apizaco
Culiacin
Mazatlin
Navolato
MWrida
Celaya
Ensenada
Tapachula
Campeche
Queritaro
San Luis Potosi
Morelia
P6njamo
Salamanca
Guanajuato
Guanajuato
19-Oct-2004
19-Oct-2004
Tlaquepaque Jalisco 30-Nov-2004
Irapuato Guanajuato 7-Dec-2004
Boca del Rio Veracruz 16-Dec-2004
Note: Shaded municipalities are not represented in the data set I am using.
State
Puebla
Baja California Sur
Aguascalientes
Jalisco
Jalisco
Baja California
Guanajuato
Estado de M6xico
Puebla
Oaxaca
Coahuila
Hidalgo
Quintana Roo
Tlaxcala
Sinaloa
Sinaloa
Sinaloa
Yucatan
Guanajuato
Baja California
Chiapas
Campeche
Querdtaro
San Luis Potosi
Michoacin
Reform Date
8-May-2002
16-Oct-2002
10-Apr-2003
28-May-2003
28-May-2003
2-Jun-2003
1-Jul-2003
8-Sep-2003
1-Oct-2003
8-Dec-2003
7-Jan-2004
15-Jan-2004
2-Feb-2004
4-Feb-2004
24-Mar-2004
24-Mar-2004
24-Mar-2004
14-Apr-2004
2-Jul-2004
9-Jul-2004
12-Aug-2004
20-Aug-2004
24-Aug-2004
14-Sep-2004
4-Oct-2004
Chapter 2
Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial
Activities: Studying Development
Across the Americas 1
2.1 Introduction
Levels of economic development vary widely between and within countries. In a sample of eight
of the biggest countries in the Americas, the richest country (the US) has six times the GDP
per capita of the poorest country (Venezuela). Similarly, within these countries, the richest
state has on average seven times the GDP per capita of the poorest state2 . Many recent papers
have argued that the variation in economic development across countries is due to differences
in institutions (See Pande and Udry, 2005, for an overview of this literature). However, few
papers have studied why economic development varies so widely within countries3 . At the cross-
country level, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) show that colonial factors can explain differences in
economic development. They argue that, depending on the local conditions, colonizers either
set up extractive or inclusive institutions in a given country. These institutions persisted over
1This chapter is joint work with Francisco Gallego.
2 Comparisons are based on data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, the US, and Venezuela.3Recent papers providing institutions-related explanations for within-country variation in development include
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2005), and Iyer (2005) for India; Rosas and Mendoza
(2004), Bonet and Meisel (2006) for Colombia; and Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Tabellini (2007) for Europe.
time and influence economic outcomes today.
This paper uses a related argument to explain within-country variation in economic devel-
opment across the Americas. Colonizers engaged in different economic activities in different
regions of a country. We claim that some of these activities were "bad" since they tended to
create extractive institutions due to the fact that the production technology was inherently
repressive. These activities are plantation agriculture involving slavery and other forms of co-
erced labor (sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco) and mining. Other activities were "good" and
created inclusive institutions since most individuals performing them stood on an equal foot-
ing. Independent of the economic activity, extractive institutions were also created in areas that
had high pre-colonial population density. In these areas, the colonizers often used the native
population as an exploitable resource (which was an "ugly" activity).
We then argue that institutions created during the colony persisted over time and affect
current economic outcomes. Areas with bad colonial activities should thus have lower levels
of economic development than areas with good colonial activities, which included many other
economic activities that did not rely on coerced labor. Similarly, areas with high pre-colonial
population density should have lower levels of economic development today.
This line of argument is not entirely new and is largely based on Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997 and 2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, and 2005). The contribution of this paper is
mainly two-fold:
1. We extend the previous arguments to explain within-country variation in levels of eco-
nomic development. We present both anecdotal and empirical evidence supporting a
within-country correlation between colonial activities and development today. In addi-
tion, we provide indirect evidence suggesting that institutions are the mechanism through
which history affects current levels of economic development.
2. We argue, in contrast to Engerman and Sokoloff, that having good colonial activities did
not always lead to a good development path. Instead, the technologies used in different
areas with good activities were endogenous to the availability of a local labor force. Areas
suitable for good activities that had low pre-colonial population density followed the
predictions of Engerman and Sokoloff in terms of creating a big middle class based on
a disperse property structure. However, areas suitable for good activities that had high
pre-colonial population density tended to feature exploitation of labor and have a high
concentration of income. Some areas that had good activities thus also had ugly activities.
We collect data on economic activities performed in different regions during the colonial
period for eight countries in the Americas. Each region is assigned three dummy variables
summarizing whether it had predominantly good, bad or no colonial activities. We also collect
data on pre-colonial population density (mainly from Denevan, 1992 and the references therein).
The paper then correlates these historical variables with two current measures of economics
development for states or regions in the eight countries (PPP GDP per capita and poverty
rates). The results show that areas with bad colonial activities have 18 percent lower PPP
GDP per capita than other areas in 2000. They also have about 22 percentage points higher
poverty rates. Pre-colonial population density is negatively and correlated with current GDP
per capita. Going from the 25th percentile in pre-colonial population density (-1.16) to the
75th percentile (1.75) is associated with 16 percent lower GDP.
Next, we study the mechanism that relates history with current development. Our evidence
suggests that formal institutions, and not income inequality or the current ethnic composition
of the population, are an important mechanism to explain the effects of history on current
development.
Overall, the results suggest that the conditions faced by colonizers (in terms of the size of
the native population and the suitability for exploiting some minerals and cash crops) affected
the characteristics of the social and economic institutions established in the past and this affects
current development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical background. Section
2.3 gives historical examples for the theory. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 ana-
lyzes the relationship between colonial activities and development. Section 2.6 investigates the
mediating factors between colonial activities and development today and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Background
In recent years, many studies have investigated the ultimate determinants of economic develop-
ment. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), and Easterly
and Levine (2002) argue that levels of economic development in New World countries go back to
patterns of colonization. In particular, they argue that colonizers shaped the "institutions" of
New World countries. These institutions persisted over time and have thereby affected long-run
levels of economic development 4.
The types of institutions that Europeans set up in the countries they colonized can be
classified into two categories - extractive institutions and extensive "neo-European" or inclu-
sive institutions. Extractive institutions were intended to transfer as much as possible of the
resources of the colony to the colonizer (p. 1370, Acemoglu et al., 2001). This colonization
strategy did not require the introduction of extensive civil rights, protection of property rights,
and checks and balances against government power. It therefore discouraged investment in
physical and human capital and had a negative impact on long run levels of development.
Setting up inclusive institutions, on the other hand, implied putting into place constraints on
government expropriation, an independent judiciary, property rights enforcement, equal access
to education, and civil liberties, thereby allowing Europeans to settle and thrive. Inclusive
institutions lead to high long-run levels of development.
Colonizers established extractive institutions in places where the net benefits of having
extractive institutions exceeded the net benefits of setting up inclusive institutions. Three
factors played a major role in determining the net benefits of institutions. The first factor
was settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001). The higher the expected settler mortality, the
lower the probability of reaping future returns of establishing inclusive institutions. The second
factor was pre-colonial population density (Acemoglu et al., 2002, and Engerman and Sokoloff,
1997 and 2002). The higher the population density, the higher the supply of labor that could
be forced to work in agriculture or mining, the more profitable the extractive institutions,
4There are several reasons why institutions may persist over time. In fact, ruling elites replacing colonial
powers after independence tended to maintain the same institutional setting. As documented in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006) in some cases, the elites controlling political power were the same even well after the
independence. There are a number of mechanisms leading to inertia, even of inefficient institutions, as discussed
in Acemoglu et al. (2005) and modeled in Acemoglu et al. (2007) for the case of the emergence and persistence
of inefficient states.
with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of small elites. Moreover, more
prosperous societies probably had more structured taxes systems (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997
and 2002), implying that colonizers could take control more easily of the systems to extract
resources. The third factor was the natural environment for activities with strong economies of
scale (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997 and 2002). The higher the suitability to exploit economies
of scale, the higher the net returns of extracting current resources.
Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002) present cross-country evidence supporting the first two
factors. They show that potential settler mortality and pre-colonial population density affected
European settlements. European settlements in turn affected the characteristics of early insti-
tutions. These institutions have persisted to the present and have influenced levels of economic
development. The third factor, the natural environment of the colonies, as well as the second
factor, population density, are the subject of Engerman and Sokoloff's studies (1997 and 2002).
Engerman and Sokoloff point out that the New World countries that were the richest in the
early years of colonization have nowadays fallen behind in terms of economic development. They
argue that differences in "factor endowments" led to different degrees of initial concentration in
wealth, in human capital, and in political power. The initial inequality influenced the type of
institutions set up in a given country. Inequality and institutions persisted over time and lead
to different levels of economic development in the longer run.
The factor endowments discussed in Engerman and Sokoloff consist of the natural environ-
ment and pre-colonial population density. More precisely, they can be summarized by three
factors: soil, climate, and the size and density of the native population (labor supply). The
availability of these three factors led to the use of different production processes in different
colonies. Engerman and Sokoloff identify three kinds of countries that used different production
processes as determined by their factor endowments. First, there is a group of colonies that can
be exemplified with Brazil and some Caribbean islands that had soil and climate suitable for
producing sugar and other crops characterized by extensive economies of scale (cotton, rice, and
tobacco). Given the efficiency of large plantations and the extensive use of slaves, economic and
political power became highly concentrated in areas where these crops were grown. They argue
that this concentration of power explains the evolution of institutions that commonly protected
the privileges of the elite and restricted opportunities for the broad mass of the population.
The second group of countries corresponds to a number of Spanish colonies, such as Mexico
and Peru, characterized both by the concentration of claims on assets in the hands of a privileged
few (especially valuable natural resources) and abundant native labor. The consequent large-
scale properties were to some degree based on pre-conquest social organizations in which the
elites charged taxes. These large-scale structures, legitimated by the Spanish Crown (through
the so-called encomiendas), survived even when the main production activities did not display
economies of scale. The key aspect was that the rights to operate the tax systems were assigned
to a small group of people. Hence, as in the previous group of countries, these economies featured
highly concentrated political and economic power that translated into exclusive institutions
preserving the power of the elite.
Finally, the third group of countries is composed of the colonies of the North American
mainland (Canada and United States). These economies were neither endowed with crops
that displayed economies of scale nor with an abundant native population. Therefore, their
development was related to small units of production in a relatively competitive environment.
The existence of abundant land and low capital requirements implied that most adult men
operated as independent proprietors creating a relatively egalitarian society in economic and
political terms.
Engerman and Sokoloff illustrate with a number of examples and summary statistics that
the differences in productive processes across New World countries translated into very different
patterns of suffrage, public land, schooling policies, financial policies, and innovation policies
among these countries. Easterly (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2002) provide econometric
evidence linking factor endowments to institutional development. Both papers use a group of
11 dummy variables indicating whether a country produced any of a given set of leading com-
modities (crops and minerals). Easterly (2001) uses cross-country data to relate these measures,
jointly the settler mortality variable from Acemoglu et al. (2001), to a variable measuring the
"middle-class consensus" (i.e. the share of the three middle quantiles in total income). He shows
that factor endowments and settler mortality are correlated with the middle class consensus.
The middle class share subsequently affects the level of schooling, institutional quality, and
openness of countries, and these variables affect per-capita income. In a related cross-country
study, Easterly and Levine (2002) correlate factor endowments and settler mortality with the
development of institutions. They find evidence that these variables affect income only through
institutions.
Overall, the existing literature indicates that colonial factors can explain differences in
economic development across countries. However, they are relatively silent about the effects of
colonial factors on institutions and development at the sub-national level. In particular, if one
takes the papers by Acemoglu et al. literally, colonial factors created homogeneous national
institutions. In turn, Engerman and Sokoloff stress institutional differences between the North
and the South of the US, but they do not generalize the argument for other countries in the
Americas 5. Levels of economic development, however, vary as widely across regions within a
country as they vary across country. Table 1 shows summary for GDP per capita (PPP) in
different regions within eight of the biggest countries in the Americas. The standard deviation
of GDP per capita within country is in some cases almost as big as the standard deviation of
GDP per capita across countries, which is equal to 0.65 in our sample.
This paper builds on the arguments developed by Acemoglu et al. and Engerman and
Sokoloff to explain differences in economic development across regions within countries. We
point out that the local conditions faced by colonizers typically varied across regions within a
country. The productive activities performed by colonizers thus also varied across regions. In
fact, the three types of scenarios that Engerman and Sokoloff describe for countries where often
present in different regions within the same country. Based on this, we argue that current levels
of development within-country can be explained by differences in colonial activities6.
We classify the colonial activities performed in a region into four possible categories. First,
some areas had "bad" colonial activities. These activities were mining and sugar, cotton,
SEngerman and Sokoloff briefly mention that countries with good endowments tend to have more dencen-
tralized political institutions (Gallego, 2006 present evidence supporting this idea). But they do not discuss the
implications that decentralization of political power may have for development at the sub-national level.
6A number of recent studies present evidence that different historical events affect long-run development
within countries. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that land revenue systems established in the colony affect long-
run property ownership and development across Indian districts. In a related paper, Iyer (2005) shows that the
form of British administration in different Indian areas has significant effects on current levels of development.
Similarly, Rosas and Mendoza (2004) and Bonet and Meisel (2006) present evidence that the patterns of (forced)
settlement of slaves during the colony in Colombia are correlated with current patterns of development. In
addition, as previously discussed, many papers discuss differences of development between the North and South
of the US (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff). Interestingly, the effects of historical factors on development seem
to be relevant not only among former colonies, but also in Europe. Acemoglu et al. (2005 and 2007) present
evidence that both the expansion of transatlantic trade and the Napoleonic invasions have a long-run effect on
development at the regional level in Europe.
rice and tobacco plantations. They were bad in the sense that they depended heavily on
the exploitation of labor and created extractive institutions. Second, other areas had "good"
colonial activities. Third, some areas were not reached by the colonizers and therefore had
no colonial activities. Fourth, some areas had "ugly" colonial activities, in the sense that the
colonizers heavily subjugated and exploited the local pre-colonial population.
Our argument differs from Engerman and Sokoloff in that we claim that having good colonial
activities did not always lead to a good development path. Instead, the technologies used in
different areas with good activities were endogenous to the availability of a local labor force.
Areas suitable for good activities that had low pre-colonial population density followed the
predictions of Engerman and Sokoloff in terms of creating a big middle class based on a disperse
property structure (as in the textiles or cattle areas in New England). However, areas suitable
for good activities that had high pre-colonial population density tended to be dominated by
exploitation of labor creating a high concentration of income. Examples are textiles production
in obrajes in Arequipa or cattle raising in many haciendas in Latin America.
Some areas that had good activities thus also had ugly activities. In contrast, bad activities
such as mining or sugar production were highly profitable and had less flexibility in terms of
technology adoption since the technologies depended heavily on economies of scale. In these
cases the technologies used depended less heavily on the availability of local labor because labor
could be imported from other areas, using slavery, personal service or the mita system.
In sum, the main hypotheses we test in this paper are the following
* Differences in current levels of development within countries can be explained by differ-
ences in colonial activities.
* More specifically, the abundance of local labor (measured by pre-colonial population den-
sity) and the existence of bad activities (such as mining and cultivation of cash crops)
have a negative impact on current levels of development.
* The link between colonial activities and current levels of development are institutions.
Colonial elites created institutions that benefitted predominantly the elites and not the
population at large. These institutions persisted over time, and account for the lower
level of economic development today.
2.3 Historical Background
This section illustrates the hypotheses put forward in Section 2.2 with specific examples. First,
we consider examples that compare states within the same country in terms of their colonial
activities and their current economic outcomes. These examples also discuss the institutional
framework that may link current levels of development to colonial activities. Second, we consider
an example in which the same activity (textile production) was developed in different regions
using completely different technologies depending on the availability of labor. And, finally, we
provide an example in which the initial development of an activity, (gold mining) using slaves
led to the development of another activity (sugar cultivation) using the same slaves.
In Section 2.2 we argue that plantation agriculture (sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco) per-
formed by colonizers lead to extractive institutions and to lower levels of development today.
An example for this mechanism is the north-eastern region of Brazil which grew sugar during
the colony. Nowadays this region corresponds to the states of Alagoas and Pernambuco. These
states had very unequal societies during colonial times for two reasons. First, sugar plantations
required slaves, leading to the importation and subjugation of many Africans. Second, since
sugar areas were rich areas, they attracted more rich people from the European elites. The
sugar regions developed societal norms (institutions) that benefited only the elites and that did
not leave room for the natives or slaves. The following quote from Colonial Brazil describes
society in the sugar regions
"While the old planter families tended to intermarry, room was always found for sons-in-law
who were merchants with access to capital or high-court judges and lawyers bringing prestige,
family name, and political leverage. Obviously, the arranged marriage was a key element in the
strategy of family success." (Bethell, 1987, p. 89)
In contrast to this elite dominated society stood Sio Paulo (formerly Sio Vicente), a region
that was not favorable to growing sugar. The region was poor during the early years of the colony
and displayed a very different societal structure. "Few Portuguese women were attracted to the
area and the Portuguese households and farms were filled with captive and semi-captive Indians.
Illicit unions between Portuguese men and Indian women were common and a large number of
mamelucos (the local term for mestigos 7) resulted. [...] In the early period of Sio Vicente's
history, little discrimination was made between mamelucos and Portuguese so long as the former
were willing to live according to what passed in the region for European norms." (Bethell, 1987,
p.111-112) Colonial society in Sao Paulo was thus comparatively inclusive. Societal norms
(institutions) benefitted a larger set of people than in the sugar regions.
Although Alagoas and Pernambuco were rich states during colonial times and Sho Paulo
was poor, their fortunes are now reversed. In 2000, PPP GDP per capita in Alagoas was US$
2,809 and US$ 3,531 in Pernambuco. In S5o Paulo, on the other hand, GDP per capita was US$
11,718. Poverty rates show a similar pattern. In 2000, they stood at 46.5 percent in Alagoas
(57.4 percent in Pernambuco) and 12.3 in Sio Paulo.
Section 2.2 also argues that areas with high pre-colonial population density developed ex-
tractive institutions during the colony and are therefore less developed today. This pattern is
well illustrated by comparing two Mexican states, Aguascalientes and Tlaxcala. These states
have similar background characteristics, but they had different pre-colonial population densi-
ties. Both states are landlocked and have similar average yearly temperatures and total rainfall.
Aguascalientes had a pre-colonial population density of about 14, while Tlaxcala had a pre-
colonial population density of more than five times this number (about 80). In 2000, PPP GDP
per capita in Aguascalientes was US$ 11,558. In Tlaxcala it was US$ 4,873. In Aguascalientes,
13 percent of the population lived under the poverty line in 2000, but it was 26 percent in
Tlaxcala.
The link between colonial activities and current level of development may be institutions.
The Aguascalientes and Tlaxacla example is consistent with this hypothesis. A 2004 Moody's
study creates an index of institutional quality (with respect to contract enforcement) for Mex-
ican states. The index runs from 0 (weakest) to 5 (strongest). In this study, Aguascalientes
obtained a value of 3.05, while Tlaxcala obtained 1.93. Similarly, according to the World Bank's
Doing Business in Mexico 2007 report, Aguascalientes ranked number one for ease of doing
business. Tlaxcala, on the other hand, ranked number 22.
The contrasting organizational form in textile production in different regions provides an
example of the mechanisms at work in our theory. Textile production in the colonial United
7Mesitqos are people of mixed Indian and European decent.
States was organized in many small scale mills and shops under property ownership (McGaw,
1994, p. 396). In contrast, textile production in many Spanish colonies was organized in obrajes
de pai~o8 . Obrajes were large workshops that "integrated every part of the cloth production
process" (G6mez-Galvarriato, 2006, p. 377) These workshops have been likened to modern day
"sweat shops," and the labor force was based on coerced labor (slavery, mita, etc.). Interestingly,
obrajes did not exist in Spain itself and were developed particularly for the colonies "with the
techniques and experience of Spanish masters and artisans" (G6mez-Galvarriato, 2006, p. 377).
Textile production in Spain was mainly organized in small shops, similarly to the United States.
People from the same nation thus chose a very different production technology for producing the
same product in different areas. Our hypothesis is that this technological choice was influenced
by the availability of a coercible native population.
The obraje system had negative consequences for long-run development. G6mez-Galvarriato
(2006) claims that the strong dependence on coerced labor destroyed incentives for the accumu-
lation of human capital among workers and increased income inequality. It thereby contributed
to the low levels of industrial development in many areas in Latin America over the XIX century.
Finally, the history of sugar cultivation in certain areas of Colombia provides an example
for persistence of economic and social institutions. The Pacific lowlands of the Choc6 region
had significant gold mining activities during the early colonial period. Gold production relied
strongly on slaves. McFarlane (2002) and Ocampo (1997) document that, after many of the gold
reserves were depleted, slave owners moved slaves from the Choc6 region to sugar plantations
in the neighboring Valle del Cauca and Cauca regions. In this case, an activity that involved
the importation of slaves seems to have affected the development of another activity using the
same labor intensive technology.
Nowadays, Colombian regions that had mining activity or sugar cultivation during the
colony have an average PPP GDP per capita of US$ 5090. Regions that had other activities,
not using slave labor, or that had no activities today have an average PPP GDP per capita of
US$ 13,324.
"Accordingly to G6mez-Galvarriate, obrajes were widely present in Latin America since the mid XVI century,
including places such as Puebla and MichoacAn in M6xico, Cuzco, Cajamarca, and Huanuco in Pert, Quito in
Ecuador, La Paz in Bolivia, and C6rdoba in Argentina.
2.4 Data
We constructed a data set that covers 217 regions from 8 countries in the Americas. This
section discusses general features of the data and data sources. A more detailed description of
the data is in the appendix. Appendix A presents the definitions of all variables. The sources
for each variable are listed in Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table 2 reports the values of the
pre-colonial population density and colonial activities data for each region.
The main outcome variable of our analysis is the current level of economic development of
each department, province, region, or state in the data set 9. This paper uses two indicators
to measure economic development - GDP per capita and poverty rates. Summary statistics
for these two variables are in Table 2. The data on GDP per capita and poverty rates comes
from country specific sources. GDP by state comes mostly from the statistical agency of each
country, which reports GDP by region. Data on population and poverty rates comes from
a country's demographic census or from household surveys. We try to use definitions that
are compatible across countries to the largest extent possible. Here we briefly mention some
exceptions, which are discussed in detail in Appendix A. In terms of per-capita GDP, the most
important deviation occurs for Venezuela. To our knowledge, GDP is not available at the region
level. Thus, we use per-capita income at the region level from a household survey.
We define poverty rates according to the national definition of poverty lines. This may
produce poverty rates that are not comparable across countries. To deal with this potential
problem, we run regressions using the log of our measures of development, and we include
country fixed effects. This way, the variables used in the regressions (and the estimated effects)
can be interpreted as log deviations from country means.
In addition to measures of current economic development, we also use a proxy for pre-
colonization levels of development. This proxy is a pre-colonization health index that comes
from the Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002). Steckel and Rose estimate a
health index that goes from 0 to 100 based on archeological data. For this paper, we match the
location of the archeological sites to regions within countries. In this way, we are able to obtain
9For Brazil, Mexico, the US, and Venezuela, the data is by state. For Argentina it is by province, for Chile it
is by region, and for Colombia and Perd by department. In this paper, we use department, province, state, and
region interchangeably.
information for 49 regions in our sample. As explained in more detail in the empirical section
below, we also include information on the estimated year to which the archeological samples
belong.
We construct three variables capturing colonial activities. First, we construct a measure of
population density before colonization at the region level using several sources. The information
comes mainly from the chapters and references in Denevan (1992). At a first level, Denevan
(1992) provides estimates of the total native population for each country. Thus, at a first
level, we use estimates that are comparable across countries. In a second stage, we use several
sources to estimate measures of population density at the region level. Here, we lay out the main
features of this variable. Appendix B presents a more detailed description of the construction
procedure.
The quality of the information on pre-colonial population density at the regional level varies
across countries and regions. For Argentina and the United States, Denevan (1992) provides
detailed information that allows us to construct measures at the state level. For Brazil and
Mexico, Denevan presents information for the main geographic regions of the countries, and we
match all current states to those regions. For Colombia and Perul, we use a similar procedure,
but the basic information comes from Ocampo (1997) and Villamarfn and Villamarfn (2000) for
Colombia and Cook (1981) for Perd. For the remaining countries, the information is sparser,
and we have to rely on complementary sources. For Chile, Denevan provides information for
the main native group, the Araucarians. We complement this with information for other main
groups imputing population density estimates for a) the border regions of Argentina, for some
groups that lived in the North (the Diaguitas) and the South (several peoples living in and to
the South of Patagonia) and b) the border regions of Perdi, for some groups that lived in the
North (some groups linked to the Incas). Finally, the procedure for Venezuela is similar. Here,
we use some information available from Denevan and Villamarin, and we impute information
for regions in Colombia (for the Andes and the Caribbean Coast) and Brazil (for the Coastal
Amazonas). The estimated native population density varies from 0.01 people per square meter
in the Southern regions of Argentina and Chile to 392 in Mexico City.
Our other two colonial variables are dummy variables related to the main economic activity
performed during colonial times in difference regions. We first identify the main economic
activity using history books for each country 10. Next, we classify the activities in good and
bad activities following Engerman and Sokoloff. Bad activities include mining, rice, sugar and
tobacco cultivation. Good activities include all other agricultural activities, cattle, livestock,
fishery, trade, naval stores, ports, textiles, and wine production. Based on this classification,
we construct two dummy variables. The first one indicates whether a region had good colonial
activities. The second one indicates whether a region had bad colonial activities. Some regions
did not have any activities since the colonizers did not reach them. The category "no activities"
is the omitted category in our regressions. The summary statistics in Table 2 show that 49
percent of all areas had good colonial activities, 25 percent had bad colonial activities and 26
percent had no colonial activities.
This paper considers a number of current variables that may have been affected by colonial
activities and that may be the link between those activities and current levels of economic
development. The first variable is a measure of income inequality, the Gini index. Data on
the Gini index comes from local statistical agencies and in some cases from household surveys.
The second variable is the share of the population that is native or black. Data on the ethnic
composition of the population typically comes from the demographic census of each country.
However, there is heterogeneity in the way this variable is measured in different countries and
surveys. For example, in most countries, the surveys ask the respondents about their ethnicity.
For Mexico and Peru, however, the census instead asks whether the respondent speaks a native
language. We take this as a proxy for the share of the native population. Other differences in
the data across countries are discussed in Appendix A.
Finally, we also include control variables in the regressions to control for regional differences
in climate and geography. The climate variables are average temperature and rainfall at the
region level. The climate data typically comes from each country's statistical agency or meteo-
rological institute. The geography variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the region
is landlocked.
Table 3 shows how the colonial activities dummies are correlated with pre-colonial pop-
ulation density and with the control variables. Areas that had high pre-colonial population
density are more likely to have good activities and are less likely to have no activities. Average
10The Appendix presents a detailed description of the sources by country.
temperature is positively correlated with good activities and negatively correlated with bad
activities. Average rainfall and the landlocked dummy show no relationship with any of the
colonial activities dummies.
2.5 The Effects of Historical Factors on Development
Section 2.2 argues that high pre-colonial population density and bad colonial activities are
correlated with lower levels of current economic development. We test these hypotheses by
running the following reduced form regression
Yrc = Zrca + X + 77c + erc, (2.1)
where c refers to country, r refers to region, Y is a measure of development, Z is a vector of
historical variables, X is a vector of control variables, q is a country fixed effect, and e is the
error term.
The set of historical variables, Z, includes pre-colonial population density and dummies for
colonial activities that were, according to our hypothesis, more or less favorable to development
("good" and "bad" colonial activities). The control variables, X, consist of climate variables
and a dummy for the region being landlocked. The standard errors are clustered at the pre-
colonial population density level. The reason for clustering at this level is that, as discussed in
Section 2.4, in some cases, we impute the same value for more than one region due to missing
information.
If the hypotheses stated in Section 2.2 are correct, the coefficient vector a should have the
following signs. The coefficient on pre-colonial population density should be negative. The
coefficient on good colonial activities should be zero. Finally, the coefficient on bad colonial
activities should be negative.
The first measure of economic development we consider is log GDP per capita (PPP). The
regressions of current log GDP per capita on historical variables are in Table 4. Column 1
of Table 4 includes only pre-colonial population density as a regressor, without control vari-
ables. Pre-colonial population density is negatively and significantly related to current GDP
per capita. The coefficient of -0.056 implies that going from the 25th percentile in log pre-
colonial population density (-1.16) to the 75th percentile (1.75) is associated with 16 percent
lower GDP.
Column 2 of Table 4 includes only the good colonial activities and bad colonial activities
dummies. The omitted dummy is no colonial activities. Areas that had good activities are not
significantly different from areas with no activities in terms of current GDP per capita. Areas
that had bad colonial activities, however, have 18.6 percent lower GDP per capita today than
other areas.
The next column of Table 4, Column 3, includes all historical variables together as regres-
sors. The coefficient on pre-colonial population density remains largely unchanged. The good
activities dummy is still not significant. The coefficient on bad colonial activities becomes
smaller and loses significance. This changes when we add control variables to the regression.
Columns 4 and 5 add the set of controls to the regression step by step. First, Column 4
includes climate variables - average yearly temperature and total rainfall and both of these
variables squared. The temperature variables are not statistically significant. Rainfall, on the
other hand, is negatively correlated with GDP per capita. When including the temperature
variables, the coefficient on pre-colonial population density remains significant and negative.
The coefficient on good activities is still not significant and the coefficient on bad activities
now has the same magnitude as in Column 2 and is statistically significant. This is also is true
when we add a dummy for the region being landlocked to the regression, on top of the climate
variables. Column 5 shows this regression. Areas that are landlocked have 19.4 percent lower
GDP per capita on average. This variable controls for access to the sea and therefore works
as a proxy for transportation costs that could generate a number of negative effects on trade
and development (See Frankel and Romer, 1999, Irwin and Tervio, 2000, and Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2005).
Overall, the different columns of Table 4 show that the estimated relationship between
current day GDP per capita and colonial activities confirms our hypotheses. Moreover, this
relationship is fairly robust to including different control variables.
Figures 1 through 3 further illustrate the relationship between current levels of economic
development and colonial activities. These figures are partial regression leverage plots for the
regression in Column 5 of Table 4, which includes pre-colonial population density, colonial
activities dummies and all control variables.
Figure 1 shows the partial correlation between log GDP per capita and log pre-colonial
population density. Figures 2 and 3 show the partial correlation between log GDP capita and
good and bad colonial activities. These figures show that the identified relationship is fairly
robust and is not driven by some extreme observations or observations belonging to only some
countries.
Table 5 considers poverty rates as an alternative measure of economic development. The
data set for poverty rates is slightly smaller than for GDP per capita since data on poverty rates
is not available for eight Colombian regions and one Argentinean region. Similarly to Table
4, Table 5 first considers the relationship between poverty rates and pre-colonial population
density alone. Then it investigates the correlation between poverty rates and good and bad
activities alone. Finally it includes all historical variables in the same regression and also adds
control variables to the regressions.
All columns unambiguously show that current poverty rates are positively correlated with
pre-colonial population density. The coefficients imply that going from the 25th percentile in
log pre-colonial population density (-1.16) to the 75th percentile (1.75) is associated with a 22
percentage points higher poverty rate.
Areas that had good colonial activities in the past do not have higher poverty rates than
areas that had no colonial activities. This result mirrors the finding from Table 4 that good
colonial activities do not have higher GDP per capita than areas with no colonial activities.
Also in line with the results from Table 4, areas with bad colonial activities have a least a 21
percent higher poverty rate than other areas.
Our argument relies on the fact that colonial activities changed the economic fortunes of
certain areas. Before colonization, areas with higher population density and areas where bad
colonial activities were to take place should not have been worse off than other areas. If those
areas were worse off even before colonization, then there must be something else other than
colonization patters that explains these differences. We would thus like to verify that population
density and the type of future colonial activity were not correlated with economic development
before colonization. This check is, however, not easily done since there are no measures of
pre-colonial GDP per capita or other conventional measures of development at the region level.
To get a proxy measure of economic development, we use a health index which is available
for 49 regions in five of the eight countries in the sample, for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and
the US. For some countries, the index exists only for some of the regions. Moreover, some
regions within the same country have the same values, since the index is not always available
at the region level. For these reasons, we do not include country fixed effects in the falsification
exercise. The health index was calculated based on different skeletons found in each region.
These skeletons often come from different centuries. To control for possible differences in the
quality of the data arising from the of age the skeletons, we add the variable "year" to the
health index regression. "Year" is the average of all the estimated years in which the found
bodies lived.
Table 6 shows the results of the falsification exercise. Pre-colonial population density is
not correlated with our measure of pre-colonial development. HoWever, areas with high pre-
colonial population density have lower levels of economic development today. Similarly, bad
colonial activities are not significantly associated with pre-colonial development (if anything, the
coefficient suggests a positive correlation). The correlation between bad colonial activities and
current levels of economic development is negative, although the coefficient is not statistically
significant.
Overall, evidence in this section shows a strong correlation between colonial activities and
current levels of development. The effect of these colonial activities may operate through specific
factors such as inequality, institutions, or the current ethnic composition of the population. The
next section investigates this channel empirically.
2.6 History and Development: Looking Inside the "Black Box"
What is the channel through which colonial activities influence current levels of economic de-
velopment? The hypotheses in Section 2.2 suggest that extractive colonial activities went along
with the creation of an economic and political elite. As a result, society came to be dominated
by relatively few individuals, making it difficult for others to prosper. Based on this theory, we
look at two different measures, that are both related to elite dominance, as possible channels
linking colonial activities to current levels of development.
The first possible channel is that extractive colonial activities led to higher inequality which
led to lower GDP per capita (see also Engerman and Sokoloff who develop this argument in
detail). To examine this potential mechanism, we estimate the following equation
Irc = ZcaI + X'c I + Oc + er, (2.2)
where I is a measure of inequality. This regression also includes the vector of historical variables,
Z, and control variables, X, as well as a country fixed effect, 0. We then assess whether variable
I could explain the effects of colonial factors on development by verifying wether
sign ('i) = sign (a) * sign ,
where oY is the theoretical partial effect of variable I on economic development (Y). Engerman
and Sokoloff argue that more inequality leads to lower levels of development, implying that
-- < 0. Therefore, the correlation of inequality and colonial activities should have the opposite
sign from the correlation of economic development and colonial activities, such that sign (PI) =
-sign (a).
Table 7 shows regressions of the log Gini index on colonial activities. Higher pre-colonial
population density is weakly associated with higher inequality today. Areas that had bad colo-
nial activities are more unequal today. The correlation between colonial activities and inequality
thus has the correct sign for being a possible link between colonial activities and current levels
of economic development. However, the relationship between pre-colonial population density
and inequality is not robust to the inclusion of different control variables. Moreover, the mag-
nitude of the correlation between bad colonial activities and inequality is small. If this were
the correct channel, it would mean that areas with bad colonial activities have a five percent
higher inequality which implies 18 percent lower GDP per capita.
The second possible link between colonial activities and current economic outcomes are
institutions. As discussed in Section 2.2, it is possible that colonial elites created institutions
that benefitted predominantly the elites and not the population at large. If these institutions
persisted over time, they may account for the lower level of economic development today. For
example, less secure property rights may lead to less investment in physical and human capital
and thus to lower output (See Acemoglu et al., 2001).
In order to explicitly test this argument, we need a measure of institutions at the sub-
national level. To our knowledge, such a measure does not yet exist for the set of countries
in our analysis. Some of the countries, such as Mexico, have some measures or proxies for
institutions at the state level. However, these measures differ from country to country and the
coverage within country is often limited.
This paper thus uses an indirect approach to test whether institutions are a plausible link
between colonial activities and current levels of economic development. If institutions explain
the effect of colonial activities on development, then local colonial activities should have less
effect on development in countries that have better institutions at the national level. Put differ-
ently, local elites in countries with good average institutions should have binding limitations on
exploiting their political power. Testing this claim amounts to running the following regression
Yrc = Zrca + ZrcNe + X + c c + erc.
This regression is the same as Equation (2.1), except that it includes the interaction term
Z'N, which interactions local colonial activities, Z, with a measure of national institutions,
N. If the reasoning above is correct, the coefficients in a should have the same sign as before,
and the coefficients in -y should be positive. To facilitate the interpretation of the effects, we
measure institutions as deviations from the mean value of institutions.
Table 8 presents the regressions with interaction terms. The measure of country level
institutions in Column 1 is average protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, from the
IRIS Center (University of Maryland), formerly Political Risk Services. Acemoglu et al. use the
same measure of institutions. The measure runs from 0 to 10, with higher values denoting more
protection against expropriation and thus better institutions. The main effects in Column 1
show that both pre-colonial population density and bad colonial activities are negatively related
to GDP per capita. The coefficients on the interaction terms are positive and significant,
indicating that the magnitude of the negative relationship becomes smaller when institutions
at the country level are better. This suggests that institutions are a possible channel that links
colonial activities to current economic outcomes.
Column 2 of Table 8 addresses the concern that current institutions at the country level
may be endogenous to levels of economic development. Instead of using a measure of current
institutions, we use settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. in the interaction terms. As argued in
Acemoglu et al., settler mortality is an exogenous proxy variable for current institutions, where
lower settler mortality implies better institutions. The results in Column 2 mirror the findings
from Column 1. They add to the evidence that the negative correlation between extractive
colonial activities and current levels of development is mitigated by good institutions at the
country level".
Although we argue that colonial activities and current levels of development are linked
through elite dominance and institutions, there is another possible channel. Areas with bad
colonial activities also had black and native slaves and areas with high pre-colonial population
had a high share of natives. These areas may thus have a higher percentage of native or black
population today. This could imply that these areas have lower levels of economic development
if natives and blacks face discrimination which prevents them from achieving higher levels of
production.
Table 9 investigates this possible channel. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the
percentage of natives and blacks combined. The coefficients show that areas with high pre-
colonial population density have a lower share of natives or blacks today. Areas with bad
colonial activities have a much higher share of natives and blacks than other areas. To better
explain this pattern, Columns 2 and 3 split up the dependent variable into percent natives and
percent blacks. The regression in Column 3 only includes 105 observations, since five countries
in our sample don't report which fraction of the population is black, presumably because they
have very few black inhabitants. The percentage of blacks is only available for Brazil, Colombia
and the US, which are the countries where black slaves were more prevalent.
Columns 2 and 3 show that areas with high pre-colonial population density have both fewer
"1An additional implication of this hypothesis is that we should observe a negative effect of institutions on
within-country differences of per-capita GDP, i.e. countries with good institutions should have less within country
differences in development. We do not have a big data set to test this claim econometrically, but informal analyses
including our 8 countries (and bigger samples) show a negative and significant correlation between the standard
deviation of log GDP for the regions of a country and our country measure of institutions. Moreover, to deal with
potential endogeneity problems, we run IV regressions using settler mortality as an instrument for institutions and
the results imply an even bigger negative impact of institutions on the within-country variability in development.
The regressions are available upon request.
natives and blacks today. These estimated effects probably capture two different mechanisms:
(i) for natives, the intensity of colonizer exploitation of native labor was stronger in areas with
many natives leading to a bigger decline in native population in these areas (as documented
by Newson, 2006) and (ii) for blacks, a bigger native population implied a lower demand for
African slaves (as documented by Monteiro, 2006). This result contradicts the argument that
areas with higher pre-colonization population density are poorer today since they have a large
share of ethnic groups that face discrimination.
The results further show that areas with bad colonial activities have a higher share of blacks.
Areas with good colonial activities, however, also have a higher share of blacks. If the share of
blacks were the link between colonial activities and current levels of development, then areas
with good activities should not have a higher share of blacks today.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that institutions seem to explain the effect of
colonial factors on current levels economic development. Explanations only based on inequality
or direct effects of the ethnic composition of different countries are not supported by the data.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that within-country differences in levels of economic development in the
Americas can be explained by colonial activities. In particular, it provides evidence that areas
with a high supply of native labor and areas that were suitable for the exploitation of mining
and cash crops have lower levels of current economic development. The estimated effects are
economically relevant. Our estimates imply that going from the 25th percentile in log pre-
colonial population density (-1.16) to the 75th percentile (1.75) is associated with 16 percent
lower GDP than the country mean and that areas that had "bad" colonial activities (i.e. mining
and cash crops), have 18.6 percent lower GDP per capita today than other areas within the
same country.
We also show that a key channel behind the correlation between colonial activities on de-
velopment today is related to institutions, and not to income inequality or the current ethnic
composition of the population. These results extend theoretical and empirical findings of a
recent literature that investigates the effects of historical factors on institutions and develop-
ment at the country level. Moreover, our within-country findings show that it is not only the
identity (nationality) of the colonizers that matters for subsequent development, as argued by
some papers. The identity of the colonizer varies across countries, but we control for country
effects.
In general, our results support Engerman and Sokoloff's (1997 and 2002) argument who
claim that the type of colonial activity preformed in a region mattered greatly for the institutions
in that region. Institutions in turn influence current levels of economic development. While we
show that colonial activities are correlated with current economic development, it remains to
investigate the channel connecting them in more detail. For the lack of measures of institutions
at the region level, we use interactions with country level data on institutions to investigate
the link. The results suggest that institutions are the channel. However, for future research we
plan to construct region-level measures of institutions and elite dominance. This will allow us
to study the link between colonial activities and current levels of development more extensively.
2.8 Appendix A: Variable Definitions
* PPP GDP per capita: Gross state product for each state divided by the contemporaneous
population of that state and converted to PPP values using the 2000 value from the World
Development Indicators. Due to data limitations, the data for Venezuela corresponds to
household income.
* Poverty rate: Percentage of the population living below the poverty line, according to
each country's definition of the poverty line.
* Gini index: Gini measure of income inequality for households.
* Health index: The health index measures the quality-adjusted-life-years (QALY) based on
the health status attributed to skeletal remains, which display chronic health conditions
and infections. The health index is adjusted for the age distribution of the population
and is a simple average of seven health indicators: stature, hypoplasias, anemia, dental
health (teeth and abscesses), infections, degenerative joint disease, and trauma.
* Pre-colonial population density: The ratio of the estimated pre-colonial population to the
area of modern states.
* Colonial activities: Predominant economic activity performed during the colony in the
region that matches the current day state.
* Average temperature: Average yearly temperature (oC)
* Total rainfall: Total yearly rainfall (mm)
* Landlocked dummy: This dummy is equal to one if the state does not have a sea coast.
* Percent indigenous: Percentage of the population that is indigenous (for Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Brazil, US, Venezuela). Percentage of the population speaking an indigenous
language (for Mexico). For Peru, the values are the percentage of indigenous or black
(not only indigenous) since they are not reported separately.
* Percent black: Percentage of the population that is black (exists only for Brazil, Colombia,
US)
* Percent indigenous or black: The sum of the pervious two variables
2.9 Appendix B: Pre-Colonial Population Density
This appendix describes in detail how we construct the pre-colonial population density variable.
We use data from several sources to estimate pre-colonial population density at the state level.
The main sources of information are region-specific chapters in Denevan (1992) and references
cited in that book. This section presents the main sources for each country and explains the
assumptions we used to impute population estimates for the different regions of each country.
In each case we adjust the estimated size of the native population in each country to match
the numbers presented in Denevan (1992, Table 00.1). Appendix Table 2 lists our pre-colonial
population estimates for each region.
2.9.1 Argentina
The only source of information we use corresponds to Pyle (1992), a chapter in Denevan (1992).
This paper includes several estimates of the native population for different regions of Argentina.
We take the average of the number of natives in each region as our estimate of the denominator.
In addition, using maps from the same paper, we allocate different tribes or groups to the
different modern states. As some of the Argentinean regions identified in Pyle (1992) correspond
to clusters of more than one modern Argentinean states, we estimated population density for
the regions presented in Pyle (1992) and we impute the same population density for all the
states in the same region. In particular, the regions that include more than one state are: (i)
Buenos Aires and Capital Federal, (ii) Chubut, La Pampa, Neuqu6n, Rfo Negro, Santa Cruz,
and Tierra del Fuego.
2.9.2 Brazil
The main source of information is Denevan (1992, p. 226 and 231). Denevan presents estimated
population density at time of contact for different habitats in Greater Amazonia, which includes
most of the Brazilian states except for portions of the coastal states in the South (Parand, Rio
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Sao Paulo). The habitats (estimated population density
at contact time) considered by Denevan are: Central coast (9.5 people per square kilometer),
Floodplain (14.6), Lowland-Amazon Basin (0.2), Mangrove coasts (4.75)12, Upland and Central
savannas (0.5). Using these estimates we classify each Brazilian state in each habitat and we
estimate population density for the states. In the cases that a state has more than one habitat
we use a weighted average considering the different habitats. In order to identify the habitats
of the different regions we use information from the Natural Vegetation Map from the Perry-
Castafieda Library Map Collection of the University of Texas.
For the Southern states we also use information from Denevan (1992, Table 00.1) on the
total population for Southern Coastal Brazil combined (which implies a population density of
4 people per square kilometer) with the previous information on the density for the different
habitats of the Greater Amazonia. Finally, we impute the population density of the state of
Goias to the Federal District (Brasilia).
12For Mangrove coasts, Denevan states "probably considerably less than 9.5 per square kilometer". We use
50% of 9.5.
2.9.3 Chile
In the case of Chile there are no detailed estimates of population by state. Instead, there is
some information on the location of several native groups, except for the Mapuche people. In
this case, Cooper (1946) quoted in Denevan (1992) estimates a pre-contact population of the
Mapuche people of between 500,000 and 1,500,000, and we use the mean point of 1,000,000.
We also know that these people were located between the fifth and the tenth region. So we
estimate a pre-contact population density of 4.7. For the other regions in the country, we know
the location of other people and we take the estimates of population density for these tribes
in neighboring countries. In particular, we know about half of the modern first region was
populated by tribes linked to the Inca empire. So we use half of the estimate we have for the
Tacna region in Peril, which is equal to 1.3. For the second region, we know it was just sparely
unpopulated so we use an estimate of 0.1 (similar to the estimate used by Denevan, 1992 for
other sparely populated regions in Latin America). The third region was populated in part
by the Diaguita people, which also lived in the Catamarca region in Argentina. So we use
half of the estimate for 0.13 for the region and 0.1 for the remainder area of the region. The
fourth region was populated by the Diaguita people, so we use in this case the same estimate
as for Catamarca, equal to 0.17. Finally, the peoples living to the South of the tenth region
were basically the same as those living in the Argentinean Patagonia, so we assume the same
population density, equal to 0.01 people per square kilometer.
2.9.4 Colombia
We take the information on total pre-contact population for Colombia from Denevan (1992,
Table 00.1). He estimates a total population of 3 million people. Using information from
Ocampo (1997) and Villamarin and Villamarin (1999), we estimate population densities for 8
regions: Eastern Cordillera (13 people per square kilometer), Cauca Valley (9.2), the Caribbean
Coast (2.8), Upper Magdalena (4.9), Lower Magdalena (4.3), Pasto (7.7), and Llanos (1.3). In
the case of the Amazonas region, we use estimates for the Brazilian amazonas from Denevan
(1992), which are equal to 0.2 people per square kilometer. Next, we classify each modern state
in one of these regions accordingly to the Colombian maps of the Perry-Castafieda Library Map
Collection of the University of Texas. Finally, the San Andr~s, Providencia and Santa Catalina
islands we use population density for the Caribbean islands from Denevan (1992).
2.9.5 Mexico
Estimates for Central Mexico come from Sanders (1992), in particular for Mexico, DF, Hidalgo,
Puebla, Tlaxcala, Tamaulipas, and Morelos. In addition, Denevan (1992) presents population
estimates for the following regions: (i) Baja California Norte and Sur; (ii) Campeche, Quintana
Roo, and YucatAn; (iii) Chiapas; (iv) Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, and Sonora; (v) Coahuila
de Zaragoza and Nuevo Le6n; (vi) Colima, (vii) and Tabasco. In the cases in which a region
includes more than one state, we impute the same population density for each region. As in all
the other cases, we adjust the population estimates so to match the total estimate for Mexico
from Denevan (1992, Table 00.1).
2.9.6 Peril
The information for Perd comes from Cook (1981) for most of the regions in the country and
from Denevan (1992) for the East of the country. In particular, Cook (1981, p. 96) presents his
preferred estimated population figures for six different Peruvian regions: North coast, Central
coast, South coast, North sierra, Central sierra, and South sierra. From Denevan (1992, pp.
228), we estimate the population density for six regions located in the East of the country:
Amazonas (50% of the area), Loreto, Madre de Dios, Puno (50% of the area), and Ucayali.
2.9.7 United States
The raw information on the native population of the United States comes from Ubelaker (1992).
This paper presents information on the native population of all the tribes in the United States
and the location of these tribes (see Map 8.1, p. 244). Using this information we assign each
tribe to the modern US states and in this way we estimate pre-contact population densities. In
some cases it was impossible to estimate population densities for specific states because some
tribes lived in more than one state so we present population density estimates for groups of
modern states. This is the case for: 1. Arizona and New Mexico; 2. Delaware and New Jersey;
3. Rhode Island and Massachusetts; 4. Maryland and Washington D.C.; and 5. Virginia and
West Virginia.
2.9.8 Venezuela
Denevan (1992) presents estimates for the total pre-contact population of Venezuela and gives
pre-contact population densities for the Orinoco llanos (1.3 people per square kilometer), Ama-
zon Basin (0.2), and Guiana Highlands (less than 0.5 people per square kilometer, we use 0.4).
In order to get estimates for the other regions of Venezuela, first we use estimates available
from other countries with similar habitats and native groups in the region (in particular, from
North and East Colombia and the Caribbean) in the following way: 1. the Caribbean Coast:
we use estimates for the same habitat in the Colombian Caribbean Coast; 2. the Selva: we
use estimates for the same habitat in Colombia, and 3. the Caribbean (the Dependencias Fed-
erales region): we use estimates from Denevan for the Caribbean islands. Finally, we estimate
population density for the Coastal Ranges and the Eastern Andes by choosing a pre-contact
population density that matches the total population of about 1,000,000 people for Venezuela,
as presented in Denevan (1992, Table 00.1).
Figure 1 - Partial Correlation between Log GDP per Capita
and Log Pre-colonial Population Density (All Controls)
Figure 2 - Partial Correlation between Log GDP per Capita
and Good Activities (All Controls)
Figure 3 - Partial Correlation between Log GDP per Capita
and Bad Activities (All Controls)
Table 1: Regional PPP GDP per Capita Across the Americas
Country Obs Mean Log S.D. Min Max
Argentina* 24 11706 0.553 4578 40450
Brazil 27 5754 0.576 1793 17596
Chile 13 8728 0.423 4154 19820
Colombia 30 5869 0.489 2368 22315
Mexico 32 8818 0.461 3664 23069
Peru 24 3984 0.570 1287 13295
US 48 32393 0.179 22206 53243
Venezuela** 19 5555 0.231 3497 9088
*Data for 1993, **Income data
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Outcome variables
Log PPP GDP per capita
Log poverty rate
Health Index
Log Gini
Percent native or black
Percent native
Percent black
Historical variables
Log pre-colonial population density
Good activities dummy
Bad activities dummy
Control variables
Avg. temperature
Total rainfall
Landlocked dummy
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min
217
208
49
207
217
217
105
217
217
217
217
217
217
9.06
2.51
75.86
-0.72
9.58
6.75
6.60
0.22
0.49
0.25
19.30
1.19
0.53
0.88
0.84
11.09
0.13
14.30
14.12
9.85
2.07
0.50
0.44
6.34
0.93
0.50
7.16
0.21
55.40
-1.07
0.08
0.01
0.00
-4.71
0
0
2.38
0.00
0
Max
10.88
4.12
91.80
-0.46
77.40
77.40
65.66
5.97
1
1
29.00
8.13
1I
Table 3: Predicting Colonial Activities
Dependent variable:
Log pre-colonial pop dens
Avg. temperature
Avg. temp. squared
Total rainfall
Total rainfall squared
Landlocked dummy
Observations
Good acivities
(1)
0.11***
(0.027)
-0.09**
(0.034)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.056
(0.074)
0.001
(0.009)
0.083
(0.084)
217
0.16
Bad activities
(2)
0.026
(0.024)
0.08***
(0.030)
-0.002***
(0.001)
-0.029
(0.071)
0.012
(0.010)
-0.105
(0.066)
217
0.13
No activities
(3)
-0.136***
-0.024
0.01
(0.025)
0.000
(0.001)
0.084
(0.075)
-0.013
(0.010)
0.0022
(0.075)
217
0.21
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level)
in brackets. Regressions include country fixed effects. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 4: Colonial Activities and Current GDP per Capita
Dependent variable: Log PPP GDP per capita
(1)
Log pre-colonial pop density
Good activities dummy
Bad activities dummy
-0.056**
(0.028)
(2) (3)
-0.055*
(0.028)
-0.038 0.036
(0.102) (0.090)
-0.185* -0.115
(0.095) (0.088)
Avg. temperature
Avg. temp. squared
Total rainfall
Total rainfall squared
Landlocked dummy
Observations
R-squared
217
0.76
217
0.76
217
0.76
(4)
-0.057**
(0.025)
-0.007
(0.090)
-0.161*
(0.087)
0.026
(0.038)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.228***
(0.068)
0.015*
(0.008)
217
0.79
(5)
-0.067***
(0.025)
-0.004
(0.084)
-0.184**
(0.080)
0.034
(0.033)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.194***
(0.072)
0.01
(0.009)
-0.195***
(0.070)
217
0.8
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets.
Regressions include country fixed effects. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 5: Colonial Activities and Current Poverty Rates
Dependent variable: Log poverty rate
Log pre-colonial pop density
Good activities dummy
(1)
0.076*
(0.040)
Bad activities dummy
Avg. temperature
Avg. temp. squared
Total rainfall
Total rainfall squared
Landlocked dummy
Observations
R-sQuared
208
0.63
0
(0
0.3(0
(2) (3)
0.066*
(0.038)
.088 -0.001
).128) (0.111)
:37*** 0.254**
).121) (0.108)
208 208
0.64 0.65
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets.
Regressions include country fixed effects. The data set is smaller than in Table 4 since data on
poverty rates is not available for eight Colombian regions and one Argentinean region.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 6: Colonial Activities and Pre-Colonial Development
Log pre-colonial pop dens
Good activities dummy
Bad activities dummy
Log data year
Observations
R-sauared
Log health i(1)
-0.002(0.013)
0.01(0.049)
0.052
(0.063)
0.056*
(0.030)
49
0.46
Dependent variable:
ndex Log PPP GDP per capita(2)
-0.16**
(0.069)
-0.128
(0.313)
-0.301
(0.382)
49
0.68
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in
brackets. Regressions include control variables. Health index is a proxy of pre-colonial
development. The health index regression controls for the year for which the health
index is observed to control for differences in the quality of the index. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(4)
0.056*
(0.034)
0.052
(0.108)
0.299***
(0.105)
-0.004
(0.048)
0.001
(0.001)
0.360***
(0.087)
-0.034***
(0.013)
208
0.7
(5)
0.069**
(0.034)
0.057
(0.098)
0.341***
(0.101)
-0.017
(0.039)
0.001
(0.001)
0.317***
(0.087)
-0.027**
(0.013)
0.303***
(0.090)
208
0.73
III
Table 7: Colonial Activities and Current Income Inequality
Dependent variable: Log Gini
Log pre-colonial pop density
Good activities dummy
(1)
0.009**
(0.004)
Bad activities dummy
Avg. temperature
Avg. temp. squared
Total rainfall
Total rainfall squared
Landlocked dummy
Observations
R-squared
0(o
0.0
(0
207
0.67
(2) (3)
0.007*
(0.004)
.007 -0.002
'.013) (0.011)
154*** 0.045***
).017) (0.016)
207
0.69
207
0.7
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level) in brackets.
Regressions include country fixed effects. The data set is smaller than in Table 4 since data
on poverty rates is not available for eight Colombian regions and two Argentinean regions.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(4)
0.005
(0.004)
0.002
(0.011)
0.045***
(0.015)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
0.034***
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.002)
207
0.71
(5)
0.005
(0.004)
0.002
(0.011)
0.045***
(0.015)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
0.035***
(0.012)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.011)
207
0.71
; ;
Table 8: Colonial Activities and Institutions
Log pre-colonial pop dens
Good activities dummy
Bad activities dummy
Log pop dens*Country institutions
Good activities*Country institutions
Bad activities* Country institutions
Log pop dens*Country settler mortality
Good activities*Country settler mortality
Bad activities*Country settler mortality
Dependent variable:
Log PPP GDP per capita
(1) (2)
-0.056* -0.063**
(0.029) (0.029)
-0.022 -0.015
(0.099) (0.098)
-0.2* -0.196*
(0.105) (0.100)
0.034**
(0.015)
0.035
(0.045)
0.118*
(0.060)
-0.068**
(0.027)
-0.078
(0.084)
-0.192*
(0.105)
Observations 217 217
R-squared 0.81 0.81
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density
level) in brackets. Regressions include country fixed effects and control
variables. Country institutions is a measure protection against expropriation
risk. Settler mortality is an instrument for country instiutions, from Acemoglu
et al (2001). Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 9: Colonial Activities and Ethnicity of Current Population
Dependent variable:
Percentage Percentage Percentage
native or black native black
(1) (2) (3)
Log pre-colonial pop density
Good activities dummy
Bad activities dummy
Observations
R-squared
-1.117**
(0.534)
0.277
(1.803)
8.466***
(2.445)
217
0.49
-0.613
(0.493)
-1.414
(1.709)
2.972
(2.179)
217
0.41
-0.807
(0.653)
3.523***
(1.227)
8.145***
(1.493)
105
0.77
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at pre-colonial population density level)
in brackets. Regressions include country fixed effects and control variables.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Appendix Table la: Data Sources
Argentina
INDEC - Direcci6n de
Cuentas Nacionales - PBG
por provincia y
sector de actividad
econ6mica
INDEC - Censo Nacional de
Poblaci6n,
Hogares y Viviendas 2001
INDEC - EPH - May 2001
Own calculations from 1998
EPH
Backbone of History Project
Pre-colonial Own calculations from Pyle
population density (1992)
Colonial acitvities
Temperature
Rainfall
Indigenous or
black population
Brown (2003), Rock (1987)
Servicio Metereol6gico
Nacional
Servicio Metereol6gico
Nacional
INDEC - Censo Nacional de
Poblaci6n,
Hogares y Viviendas 2001
IBGE - Contas Regionais
IBGE -
Censo DemogrAfico 2000
Central Bank of Chile
MIDEPLAN projections
based on 2002 Census
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/ MIDEPLAN - 2000
cgi/idb2004/b05uf.htm CASEN Survey
GDP
Population
Poverty rate
GINI index
Health index
Own calculations from
2000 CASEN
Own calculations from
Denevan (1992)
Collier and Sater (2004)
Direcci6n Metereol6gica
de Chile
Direcci6n Metereol6gica
de Chile
Own calculations from
2000 CASEN
Brazil ChileVariable
IBGE -
Censo Demogrifico 2000
(Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Own calculations from
Denevan (1992)
Bethell (1987),
Burns (1993)
IBGE -
Annudrio estatistico do
Brazil.
IBGE -
AnnuArio estatistico do
Brazil.
IBGE -
Censo Demogrifico 2000
Appendix Table Ib: Data Sources
Variable Colombia Mexico Peru
DANE - Cuentas
Departamentales
DNP projections - 2000
SISD
SISD
INEGI - Producto
Interno Bruto por Entidad
Federativa
INEGI - Censo General de
Poblaci6n y Vivienda 2000
SEDESOL
INEI - Direcci6n
Nacional de Cuentas
Nacionales - PBI por
departamento.
INEI
INEI
Own calculations from 2000 Own calculations from
ENE 2000 ENAHO
Backbone of History Project (Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Pre-colonial
population density
Colonial acitvities
Temperature
Rainfall
Indigenous or
black population
Own calculations from
Denevan (2002), Ocampo
(1997), and Villamarin
(1999)
McFarlane (1993), Ocampo
(1997)
IDEAM
IDEAM
DANE
Own calculations from
Denevan (2002)
and Sanders (2002)
Cumberland (1968),
Gerhard (1979),
Hamnett (1999),
Knight (2002),
Zabre (1969)
INEGI
INEGI
INEGI - Censo General de
Poblaci6n y Vivienda 2000
Own calculations from
Denevan (2002) and
Cook (1981)
Fisher (1970), Dobyns
and Doughty (1976)
INEI
INEI
INEI
100
GDP
Population
Poverty rate
GINI index
Health index
Appendix Table Ic: Data Sources
US
BEA - Gross Domestic
Product by State
Venezuela
Own calculations from 1998
EHM (household income)
Population
Poverty rate
GINI index
Health index
Pre-colonial
population density
Colonial acitvities
Temperature
Rainfall
Indigenous or
black population
U.S. Census Bureau
State and Metropolitan Area
Data Book 1997-1998
U.S. Census Bureau, Table
S4
Backbone of History Project
Own calculations from
Ubelaker (2002)
Andrews (1914),
Eccles (1972),
McCusker and Menard
(1985)
http://www.met.utah.edu/jhor
el/html/wx/climo.html
http://www.met.utah.edu/jhor
el/html/wx/climo.html
U.S. Census Bureau,
Population Division
INE
INE
Own calculations from 1998
EHM
(Steckel and Rose, 2002)
Own calculations from
Denevan (2002)
Lombardi (1982)
INE
INE
INE - 2001 Census
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Variable
GDP
Appendix Table 2: Pre-Colonial Population Density and Colonial Activities Data
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Country
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
State
Buenos Aires
Catamarca
Chaco
Chubut
Ciudad de Buenos Aires
(Capital Federal)
Corrientes
C6rdoba
Entre Rios
Formosa
Jujuy
La Pampa
La Rioja
Mendoza
Misiones
Neuqu6n
Rio Negro
Salta
San Juan
San Luis
Santa Cruz
Santa Fe
Santiago del Estero
Tierra del Fuego
Tucumin
Acre
Alagoas
AmapA
Amazonas
Bahia
Ceard
Distrito Federal
Espirito Santo
Goids
Maranhdo
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso do Sul
Minas Gerais
Parand
Paraiba
Pard
Pernambuco
Piaui
Rio Grande do Norte
Rio Grande do Sul
Rio de Janeiro
Population Density
0.0510
0.1669
0.6300
0.0090
0.0510
1.7674
0.4375
1.1318
0.1974
0.2585
0.0090
0.1669
0.0908
2.5539
0.0090
0.0090
0.3666
0.0787
0.0726
0.0090
1.1074
0.8406
0.0090
0.6107
0.2000
6.0396
2.6201
0.4880
1.8409
3.3729
0.5000
7.4982
0.5000
2.3655
0.9333
2.1250
0.5000
2.9500
2.4100
1.2246
2.1005
0.8093
6.0970
1.5500
8.5768
Main Activity
cattle
textiles
agriculture
none
port
sugar-tobacco
cattle
cattle
agriculture
trade
cattle
textiles
wine
sugar-tobacco
none
none
trade
wine
cattle
none
cattle
textiles
none
textiles
none
sugar
none
cacao
sugar
none
none
sugar
mining
cotton
cattle
none
mining
mining
sugar
cacao
sugar
none
cattle
cattle
sugar
bad
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
good
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
none
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Brazil RondBnia 0.2000 none 0 0 1
Brazil Roraima 0.4880 none 0 0 1
Brazil Santa Catarina 2.9500 cattle 0 1 0
Brazil Sergipe 7.7659 sugar 1 0 0
Brazil Sio Paulo 2.2500 indians 0 1 0
Brazil Tocantins 0.5000 mining 1 0 0
Chile 1 1.3319 none 0 0 1
Chile 2 0.1000 none 0 0 1
Chile 3 0.1335 mining 1 0 0
Chile 4 0.1669 mining 1 0 0
Chile 5 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Chile 6 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Chile 7 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Chile 8 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Chile 9 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Chile 10 4.6642 none 0 0 1
Chile 11 0.0090 none 0 0 1
Chile 12 0.0090 none 0 0 1
Chile RM 4.6642 wheat 0 1 0
Colombia Amazonas 0.4880 none 0 0 1
Colombia Antioquia 7.9096 mining 1 0 0
Colombia Arauca 1.3000 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia Atlintico 2.7816 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia Bolivar 4.2197 port 0 1 0
Colombia Caldas 9.1916 ranching 0 1 0
Colombia Caqueti 1.1154 none 0 0 1
Colombia Casanare 1.3000 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia Cauca 7.0652 mining 1 0 0
Colombia Cesar 3.4288 ranching 0 1 0
Colombia Choc6 0.7282 mining 1 0 0
Colombia Cundinamarca 10.6061 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia C6rdoba 2.7816 ranching 0 1 0
Colombia Guainia 1.3000 none 0 0 1
Colombia Guaviare 0.4880 none 0 0 1
Colombia Huila 4.3243 cacao 0 1 0
Colombia La Guajira 2.7816 ranching 0 1 0
Colombia Magdalena 2.9973 ranching 0 1 0
Colombia Meta 1.8868 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia Norte de Santander 13.0350 cacao 0 1 0
Colombia Quindio 9.1916 none 0 0 1
Colombia Risaralda 9.1916 ranching 0 1 0
San Andr6s, Providencia
Colombia y Santa Catalina 12.9269 none 0 0 1
Colombia Santaf6 de Bogoti, D. C. 10.6061 cattle 0 1 0
Colombia Santander 8.9869 sugar 1 0 0
Colombia Sucre 2.7816 none 0 0 1
Colombia Tolima 4.3243 sugar 1 0 0
Colombia Valle del Cauca 9.1916 mining 1 0 0
Colombia Vaupes 0.4880 none 0 0 1
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Colombia Vichada 1.3000 cattle 0 1 0
Mexico Aguascalientes 14.2443 trade 0 1 0
Mexico Baja California 0.4073 none 0 0 1
Mexico Baja California Sur 0.4073 none 0 0 1
Mexico Campeche 5.7360 trade 0 1 0
Mexico Chiapas 2.4378 encomiendas 0 1 0
Mexico Chihuahua 0.4040 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Coahuila de Zaragoza 2.3470 none 0 0 1
Mexico Colima 2.6678 none 0 0 1
Mexico Distrito Federal 392.3369 trade 0 1 0
Mexico Durango 2.6678 cattle 0 1 0
Mexico Guanajuato 14.2443 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Guerrero 14.2443 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Hidalgo 32.7723 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Jalisco 14.2443 textiles 0 1 0
Mexico Michoacan de Ocampo 14.2443 cattle 0 1 0
Mexico Morelos 210.8860 sugar 1 0 0
Mexico Mdxico 40.3006 maize 0 1 0
Mexico Nayarit 14.2443 none 0 0 1
Mexico Nuevo Le6n 2.4378 none 0 0 1
Mexico Oaxaca 14.2443 textiles 0 1 0
Mexico Puebla 25.2709 textiles 0 1 0
Mexico Querdtaro de Arteaga 14.2443 textiles 0 1 0
Mexico Quintana Roo 5.7360 none 0 0 1
Mexico San Luis Potosi 14.2443 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Sinaloa 2.6678 wheat 0 1 0
Mexico Sonora 2.6678 mining 1 0 0
Mexico Tabasco 31.3272 maize 0 1 0
Mexico Tamaulipas 15.5214 none 0 0 1
Mexico Tlaxcala 79.5110 textiles 0 1 0
Veracruz de Ignacio de la
Mexico Llave 14.2443 sugar 1 0 0
Mexico Yucatan 5.7360 trade 0 1 0
Mexico Zacatecas 14.2443 mining 1 0 0
Peru Amazonas 3.6363 none 0 0 1
Peru Ancash 3.3779 mining 1 0 0
Peru Apurimac 17.3105 sugar 1 0 0
Peru Arequipa 5.9435 textiles 0 1 0
Peru Ayacucho 14.3126 mining 1 0 0
Peru Cajamarca 6.4916 sugar 1 0 0
Peru Cusco 17.3105 mining 1 0 0
Peru Huancavelica 11.3148 mining 1 0 0
Peru Huinuco 6.4916 coca 0 1 0
Peru Ica 43.5010 wine 0 1 0
Peru Junin 11.3148 wheat 0 1 0
Peru La Libertad 47.3276 sugar 1 0 0
Peru Lambayeque 100.1516 sugar 1 0 0
Peru Lima 44.0456 trade 0 1 0
Peru Loreto 0.7809 none 0 0 1
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Peru Madre de Dios 0.7809 none 0 0 1
Peru Moquegua 2.5638 wine 0 1 0
Peru Pasco 11.3148 mining 1 0 0
Peru Piura 32.5921 trade 0 1 0
Peru Puno 9.0457 mining 1 0 0
Peru San Martin 6.4916 none 0 0 1
Peru Tacna 2.5638 agriculture 0 1 0
Peru Tumbes 17.2785 trade 0 1 0
Peru Ucayali 0.7809 none 0 0 1
US Alabama 0.3506 cotton 1 0 0
US Arizona 0.3798 none 0 0 1
US Arkansas 0.0915 rice 1 0 0
US California 2.0341 none 0 0 1
US Colorado 0.0730 fur 0 1 0
US Connecticut 1.0761 naval stores 0 1 0
US Delaware 0.9371 wheat 0 1 0
US Florida 0.1452 rice 1 0 0
US Georgia 0.4025 rice 1 0 0
US Idaho 0.0876 none 0 0 1
US Illinois 0.1989 wheat 0 1 0
US Indiana 0.1280 wheat 0 1 0
US Iowa 0.2106 fur 0 1 0
US Kansas 0.0710 fur 0 1 0
US Kentucky 0.0231 none 0 0 1
US Louisiana 0.4097 rice 1 0 0
US Maine 0.1105 fishery 0 1 0
US Maryland 0.0728 tobacco 1 0 0
US Massachusetts 2.1720 naval stores 0 1 0
US Michigan 0.1350 wheat 0 1 0
US Minnesota 0.2442 wheat 0 1 0
US Mississippi 0.8010 cotton 1 0 0
US Missouri 0.0178 cotton 1 0 0
US Montana 0.1190 fur 0 1 0
US Nebraska 0.2185 fur 0 1 0
US Nevada 0.0584 none 0 0 1
US New Hampshire 0.4519 fishery 0 1 0
US New Jersey 0.9371 merchants 0 1 0
US New Mexico 0.3798 none 0 0 1
US New York 0.2705 merchants 0 1 0
US North Carolina 0.1298 tobacco 1 0 0
US North Dakota 0.1317 fur 0 1 0
US Ohio 0.1178 wheat 0 1 0
US Oklahoma 0.2439 fur 0 1 0
US Oregon 0.5966 none 0 0 1
US Pennsylvania 0.1349 wheat 0 1 0
US Rhode Island 2.1720 naval stores 0 1 0
US South Carolina 0.0717 rice 1 0 0
US South Dakota 0.1870 fur 0 1 0
US Tennessee 0.0221 none 0 0 1
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US Texas 0.1552 none 0 0 1
US Utah 0.0624 none 0 0 1
US Vermont 0.1777 lifestock 0 1 0
US Virginia 0.2820 tobacco 1 0 0
US Washington 0.8050 none 0 0 1
US West Virginia 0.2820 none 0 0 1
US Wisconsin 0.3754 wheat 0 1 0
US Wyoming 0.1108 fur 0 1 0
Venezuela Amazonas 0.3500 none 0 0 1
Venezuela Anzodtegui 1.7445 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela Apure 1.3000 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela Aragua 2.2806 sugar 1 0 0
Venezuela Barinas 1.3480 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela Bolivar 0.3800 none 0 0 1
Venezuela Carabobo 2.7816 port 0 1 0
Venezuela Falc6n 2.7816 mining 1 0 0
Venezuela Guirico 1.3981 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela Lara 2.2806 mining 1 0 0
Venezuela Miranda 2.2806 sugar 1 0 0
Venezuela Monagas 1.1700 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela M6rida 1.7795 wheat 0 1 0
Venezuela Nueva Esparta 2.7816 pearls 0 1 0
Venezuela Portuguesa 1.4439 cattle 0 1 0
Venezuela Sucre 2.7816 none 0 0 1
Venezuela Trujillo 1.7795 wheat 0 1 0
Venezuela Tdchira 1.5398 wheat 0 1 0
Venezuela Zulia 1.6408 none 0 0 1
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Chapter 3
More Bang for the Peso?
Comparing the Cost-Effectiveness of
Public Development Programs
3.1 Introduction
How should a government with a limited budget choose which public development program to
implement? An economic answer to this question is to choose the most cost-effective program.
Calculating cost-effectiveness requires knowledge of the impacts and of the social costs of a
program. Although there is now a large literature on how to best measure impacts of a program',
much less has been said on how to correctly measure costs. Despite the relative lack of research
on measuring social costs, this task is an important one for policy purposes, and it is also quite
a challenging task that deserves more attention. This paper uses the example of two public
development programs recently implemented in Mexico to illustrate that even if the impacts of
the programs are known it is hard do conduct a conclusive cost-effectiveness comparison since
social cost calculations rely heavily on assumptions. This paper is thus a call for more research
in this area.
The first program discussed in this paper is the widely-known Progresa program, a con-
1See for example Duflo (2004) and Glazerman et al. (2003).
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ditional cash transfer program that distributes cash to mothers conditional on their children
being enrolled in school and engaging in a series of health-promoting activities. The second pro-
gram is the Microrregiones program (MRP), which invests in public and private infrastructure
in marginalized (rural) areas. The most common infrastructure investments include concrete
floors in houses, community computer centers, and school facilities. In many ways, the MRP
is like a social fund which provides public funds for local investments in education, health, and
water and sanitation related projects. Similarly to a social fund, project choice is determined
by the community or by elected leaders.
Using Progresa and the MRP for the cost-effectiveness comparison exercise is attractive for
two reasons. First, both programs are notionally comparable since they have essentially the
same goal. They are both aimed at providing Mexico's poor with a way out of poverty by
equipping them with human and physical capital. Second, conditional cash transfer programs
and social funds are among the most popular types of development programs and have been
implemented in many different countries. Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica
and Nicaragua all have conditional cash transfer programs. Social funds have been set up in
Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Zambia. The prevalence of both types of
programs makes the task of comparing their cost-effectiveness even more salient.
The cost-effectiveness calculations in this paper have three ingredients: the number of ben-
eficiaries, impact estimates, and social costs. Data on the number of beneficiaries comes from
administrative records for both programs. This paper takes the impact estimates of Progresa
from previous research, but it calculates the impact of the MRP. The MRP has a clear eligibil-
ity rule, based on a 2000 marginalization index. Only municipalities with a value of this index
above a certain cutoff level were eligible for the program. This allows me to use regression
discontinuity design to measure the effects of the MRP. Within a fuzzy regression discontinuity
setup, this paper estimates the effects of the MRP using non-parametric, as well as parametric
RD techniques.
The evaluation of Progresa considered the impact on many different outcomes, such as
education, health, nutrition, consumption, and labor force participation. For the MRP, data
is only available on three of the Progresa outcome variables: primary and secondary school
enrollment rates and infant mortality. These are thus the variables considered in this paper.
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The impact estimates show that the MRP had basically no effect on primary and secondary
school enrollment rates. Infant mortality, however, fell by 17 percent, corresponding to 2
deaths per 1000 live births2. Progresa had a positive impact on primary and secondary school
enrollment (Schultz, 2000) and it reduced infant mortality by 2 deaths per 1000 live births
(Barham, 2005).
For the cost-effectiveness calculations I focus only on the impact of the programs on infant
mortality and calculate the social cost per beneficiary required to achieve this impact. The
goal of this paper is not to measure all possible impacts of Progresa and the MRP. Instead, the
paper tries to illustrate that even if we consider only the impact of these two programs on one
outcome it is still very difficult to compare their cost-effectiveness because calculating the social
costs requires very strong assumptions. Focusing on infant mortality has the advantage that
the estimated impacts are the same, highlighting the importance of considering social costs.
This paper develops a framework for calculating social costs and shows that the final cost
estimates vary widely depending on the assumptions made. The framework conceptually divides
social costs into costs incurred due to actions by a) the government, b) the community and c)
private individuals. Social costs incurred due to government actions are administrative costs
times the marginal cost of funds (to account for the dead-weight loss of taxation) and the
dead-weight loss generated by the collection of funds to be disbursed through the programs.
Social costs due to community actions are zero for Progresa since the program targets
individuals. Social costs due to individual actions for both programs include the financial cost
and opportunity cost of participating in the program, which can be estimated with sufficiently
detailed information. Social costs due to community actions for the MRP include the amount
spent on the different projects constructed under the MRP and social cost due to individual
actions for Progresa are the cash handouts. Estimating the correct cost for these last two
components is not straightforward.
Cost-effectiveness studies often count the whole amount spent on these items as a resource
cost (See for example Coady's, 2000, cost-effectiveness study for Progresa). Initially also fol-
lowing this approach here implies that the amount of US$ required to save one life per 1000
2 This result is not robust, but I take it to be the correct estimate for the sake of the cost-effectivness comparison
exercise.
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live births is 38.6 for Progresa and 29 for the MRP. This approach is, however, not necessar-
ily correct. The traditional cost-benefit literature defines the social cost of a program as the
opportunity cost of the resources used in the program3 . The cash handouts given out under
Progresa are not payments for an opportunity cost 4 . Instead, they are pure transfers and should
therefore not be counted as a social cost for Progresa5 . The amount of US$ required to save
one life per 1000 live births then is only 14.1 for Progresa.
For the MRP it is also not clear that all construction spending should be counted as a social
cost. If there are market failures, such as involuntary unemployment or monopoly, then the
amount spent on construction is not necessarily the opportunity cost of the labor and materials
used 6. In fact, the opportunity costs could be zero or close to zero, in which case the payments
would essentially be pure transfers (e.g. monopoly rents). Assuming that construction costs
are pure transfers gives an estimate of US$7.6 required to save one life per 1000 live births for
the MRP.
The paper shows that without ad-hoc assumptions, is it not possible to determine whether
US$7.6 or US$29 is the most appropriate estimate for the MRP. The true estimate probably
lies somewhere between the two numbers. Since the range spans the estimate for Progresa
(US$14.1) we cannot conclude which program is more cost-effective in terms of saving infants
live. Pinning down a number for the MRP would require knowing the true opportunity cost of
all resources used in the MRP. Although the theoretical literature on cost-benefit analysis points
to the challenges involved in determining the opportunity cost, there are no good guidelines for
addressing these challenges in practice. This paper is thus an invitation for further research on
how to best measure social costs in applied work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly lists the main features of
Progresa and describes the MRP in more detail. Section 3.3 lays out the identification strategy.
Section 3.4 describes the different types of data used in the analysis. Section 3.5 presents the
estimated impacts of the MRP. Section 3.6 discusses the cost-effectiveness calculations for both
programs. Section 3.7 concludes.
3See for example Dasgupta and Pearce (1974), Dr6ze and Stern (1987), and Pearce (1983).
4The opportunity cost of participating in the program is accounted for separately.
5This paper abstracts from any distributional consequences of the program.
6See Layard and Glaister (1994) and Stiglitz (1973).
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3.2 Two Development Programs
Both Progresa and the MRP are being administered by the same agency, the Mexican Secretary
for Social Development (SEDESOL). Although the content of both programs is quite different,
their stated goals are very similar. Progresa aims to break the inter-generational transmission of
poverty by improving the educational, health and nutritional status of poor families, particularly
of mothers and children. The MRP aims to fight poverty, improve living conditions, and pave
the way for economic development in marginalized (rural) municipalities. In general, both
programs are targeted at providing the poor with the "necessary" conditions to escape poverty.
The remainder of this section first briefly reviews the main features of Progresa and then
gives a more detailed overview of the MRP. A more extensive description of Progresa can be
found in many pervious studies, such as Skoufias (2005).
3.2.1 Progresa
First implemented in 1997, Progresa provides a monthly cash payment to mothers conditional
on children's school enrollment and regular school attendance, as well as health related require-
ments. The health component of Progresa involves regular check-ups, immunizations, health
hygiene education programs for mothers, and nutritional supplements for children up to age
five and pregnant and lactating mothers.
Progresa initially reached rural 140,544 households in 3,369 localities and was then expanded
across rural localities in different phases, reaching 2.6 million families in 72,345 localities in 2000.
This number corresponds to 40 percent of rural households in Mexico. The total amount of
transfers given out under Progresa increased from US$29 million in 1998 to in US$838 million
in 2000. After 2000, the program expanded into urban areas.
A well-known feature of Progresa is that 506 rural localities were part of a randomized ex-
periment, such that treatment localities received the program immediately and control localities
received the program two years later. This experiment included base-line and follow-up surveys,
allowing for a rigorous impact evaluation of Progresa. Based on this randomized experiment,
the official evaluation of Progresa examines the impact of the program on human capital (ed-
ucation, health, nutrition), on consumption, on labor force participation, and on household,
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community relations and women's status. The evaluation finds that Progresa increased school
enrollment (Schultz, 2000) 7 , lowered disease incidence (Gertler, 2000) and led to less stunt-
ing for children 12-39 months (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2000). Adding to the evidence on
Progresa's impact on health, Barham (2005) uses the variation generated by the phase-in of
Progresa 1997-2001 to show that Progresa reduced infant mortality by 11 percent (2 deaths per
1000 live births).
The randomized evaluation of Progresa also shows that the program increased average
consumption by 14.53 percent (Hoddinott et al., 2000), with the increase falling mostly on
fruit, vegetables and animal products. Moreover, Progresa reduced labor force participation for
children, but not for adults (Parker and Skoufias, 2000). It also improved women's status and
their participation in household decision making (Adato et al., 2000).
3.2.2 The Microrregiones Program (MRP)
The MRP was established in 2001. It consists in building public and private infrastructure in
marginalized municipalities. In particular, the MRP features fourteen different types of projects
that are being undertaken in eligible municipalities. Examples of these projects are building
concrete floors in houses, community computer centers, and school facilities.
Table 1 provides a complete list of all possible projects, which SEDESOL calls "white flags"
(banderas blancas). For every type of white flag, Table 1 lists the number of white flags im-
plemented each year. The most common white flag was concrete floors with a total number
of 1,460, corresponding to 15.5 percent of all white flags. According to SEDESOL, the new
concrete floors benefitted 145,000 houses and should prevent the spread of contagious illness,
particularly for infants. The second most common white flag, with 15.3 percent, were public
computer and internet centers. Improvement of basic education services was the third most
commonly implemented white flag, with 9.9 percent. Education related white flags typically
involve building new classrooms or improving existing classrooms. Another frequently under-
taken white flag increased access to the public water network. This white flag resulted in the
construction or rehabilitation of more than 840 km of distribution network and 640 storage
7 The Progresa evaluation also considered other education-related outcomes, such as dropout rates. For
simplicity, these are not discussed or considered in this paper.
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tanks, benefitting more than 726,000 people8 .
Eligibility for the MRP is based on a 2000 index that measures a municipality's degree of
marginalization. This index was constructed by CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n)
using data from the 2000 Demographic Census. Table 2 contains a list of the nine components
that make up the index 9. The components include variables indicating the level of education,
quality of housing and public services, urbanization and income of a municipality. Taking the
values of the 2000 marginalization index, CONAPO classified municipalities into five levels of
marginalization - very low, low, medium-range, high, and very high, using the Dalenius and
Hodges stratification method (Dalenius and Hodges, 1959)10. Table 3 reports the number of
municipalities that fall into every category, as well as the cutoff values. The largest category is
the high level of marginalization category, encompassing 37.1 percent of municipalities.
All 1,292 municipalities that have a high or a very high level of marginalization are eligible for
the MRP. Municipalities with very low, low or medium-range levels of marginalization are not
eligible for the program. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. First, municipalities
that have a very low, low or medium-range level of marginalization, but where more then 40
percent of the population was indigenous in 2000, are eligible for the program. There are 27
of these "predominantly indigenous" municipalities. Second, the relatively most marginalized
counties in states that contained no highly or very highly marginalized counties are also eligible
for the MRP. This is the case for five states, Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California
Sur, Coahuila and Colima"1 . There are 13 eligible "relatively marginalized" municipalities.
Table 4 shows the number of relatively marginalized municipalities by state and the cutoff
values within each state.
Not all 1,292 eligible municipalities implement white flags at the beginning of the program.
8A Mexican university (the TEC de Monterrey) did an independent evaluation of the impact of the MRP on
some infrastructure related variables (see Soto Romero et al., 2007a) using data from the 2005 Population Count.
This evaluation shows a significant decrease in the fraction of households without piped water. It also shows a
decrease in the fraction of households without a concrete floor and without electricity, but these decreases are
not statistically significant.
9The index was costructed using the principal components method. For details on the construction of the
index please refer to CONAPO (2000).
1oThis is a widely-use stratification method which consists in equalizing intervals in cumulative V7 where f
denotes the frequency distribution of the variable to stratify.
11In Baja California, which had five municipalities in total, this rule was violated since only one out of the two
eligible municipalities is the among the most marginalized ones.
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Table 5 shows that the total number of municipalities that had a least one white flag increased
every year, going from 132 in 2001 to 1,182 in 2005. On average, by 2005, a municipality had
implemented four different white flags, with a standard deviation of three.
Within each eligible municipality, SEDESOL identified several localities where the white
flags would be concentrated, calling them Strategic Community Centers (CECs for their Mex-
ican name). These localities are typically centrally located and accessible from a number of
other localities, so that white flags such as computer centers, health centers and schools would
benefit not only the CECs, but also the localities in the area of influence. A CEC and their
area of influence make up a "micro-region."
The choice of which white flag(s) to implement in a given CEC can be either taken by the
federal, state or municipal government, or by the communities. In fact, similarly to a social
fund, the MRP stresses the importance of community participation. The MRP's operational
rules allow communities to propose which projects to implement, and community groups may
directly receive funding. In practice, however, it is most commonly the municipal government
that chooses and implements white flags. About 90 percent of CECs hold community meetings
related to the MRP. In some of these meetings, the communities vote on the projects, but more
often they are merely informed about the projects by local government officials.
The introduction mentioned that the MRP is similar to a social fund. The fact that it is
not typically the communities who directly vote on and implement a project makes the MRP
somewhat different from the standard type of social fund that allows only community groups to
chose and implement projects, without local government participation. However, there are also
social funds that allow for local government participation. Moreover, some social funds have
the community elect a committee that is responsible for the projects. Electing a committee
may not be very different from electing a local government. In this case, project choice and
implementation under the MRP would actually be very similar to a social fund.
Funding for the MRP is structured a follows. The federal government does not make addi-
tional funds available for the MRP. Instead, eligible municipalities are given priority for receiving
existing funds, and development efforts by federal government agencies are to be concentrated
in eligible municipalities. The expenditure on a white flag sometimes comes out of SEDESOL's
budget, other federal agencies' budget, the state budget and/or the municipal budget. In 2001,
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about US$12 million were invested under the MRP. As illustrated in Table 5, the amount of
funds channeled in the MRP increased in the years after 2001, peaking at US$146 million in
2004.
3.3 MRP: Identification Strategy
As explained in Section 3.2, eligibility for the MRP was determined by the 2000 marginalization
index. Generally speaking, only municipalities that had a high or very high marginalization
level were eligible for the MRP. Thus, there was a clear eligibility rule based on a cutoff value
in the marginalization index. This suggests the use of regression discontinuity (RD) design to
estimate the effect of the MRP on development outcomes.
Note that also a few municipalities with index values below the cutoff value were eligible
for the MRP, the predominantly indigenous municipalities and the relatively most marginalized
municipalities. To perform a RD analysis based on the marginalization index only, I drop all
predominantly indigenous municipalities from my sample. I also drop all eligible and non-
eligible municipalities located in states that had relatively marginalized municipalities since the
within-state cutoffs apply only to a very small sample as shown in Table 4.
This paper first uses two different non-parametric RD techniques to measure the impact of
the MRP. It then also estimates the impact with parametric RD regressions. The validity of all
different RD techniques essentially relies on the local continuity assumption which says that,
in the absence of treatment, outcome variables would be continuos functions of the assignment
variable (in this case the 2000 marginalization index) around the cutoff. The following three
subsections describe the different RD techniques and the last subsection below discusses the
validity of the local continuity assumption in the context of the MRP.
3.3.1 Non-Parametric Estimation I: Graphic Analysis
The analysis begins by examining graphically whether the MRP caused a discontinuity in
outcome variables. Following Lee (2005), it divides the marginalization index into small intervals
(0.04 point wide) starting from the cutoff and going in both directions. It takes the unweighted
average of the outcome variables within each of these small intervals. Note that, as one moves
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away from the cutoff, the intervals contain fewer and fewer municipalities. This is because, as
shown in the histogram in Figure 1, the distribution of the marginalization index is concentrated
around the cutoff (-.11325) and has fairly thin tails.
The analysis then fit a polynomial of order 3 to the averages, separately on each side
of the cutoff. Finally, it plots the local averages and the estimated polynomials against the
marginalization index. If the program had an effect, then there should be a clear discontinuity
in outcome variables at the cutoff, meaning that the estimated points and polynomials should
show a jump at the cutoff.
3.3.2 Non-Parametric Estimation II: Limits
As outlined in Porter (2003), estimating treatment effects in the RD model is equivalent to
estimating the size of a discontinuity in a conditional expectation. More specifically, the effect
of the MRP on outcome y at the discontinuity point can be measured as
a = lim E(ylMI) - lim E(yIMI), (3.1)
MILMI MITMI
where MI is the marginalization index, and MI is the cutoff in the marginalization index,
above which municipalities are eligible for the MRP. In the limit, this difference represents
the expected causal effect of the MRP evaluated at the discontinuity, MI = MI. The only
required identification assumption is smoothness in expected potential outcomes at the discon-
tinuity point, MI, (and a positive density in a neighborhood of the discontinuity), without any
parametric functional form restrictions.
Note that Equation (3.1) corresponds to a sharp RD, which applies only if all eligible
municipalities adopt the program. However, for the MRP, there are 1,292 eligible municipalities
above the cutoff and, as shown in Table 5, only 1,182 of them had white flags by 2005. Much
fewer municipalities had white flags in the early years of the program. Equation 3.1 thus has
to be modified to a fuzzy RD design and becomes
limMIV-7 E(yjMI) - limMltMI E(ylMI)
a= (3.2)limMil / E(MRPIMI) - limMITmY E(MRPIMI)'
where MRP is a dummy variable indicating wether the municipality had the MRP or not.
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Identification now requires the difference in potential outcomes to be independent of MRP
conditional on MI.
In the case of the MRP, limMIt~y E(MRPIMI) = 0, implying that (3.2) reduces to
a lim lMIJ E(yIMI) - limMIT 7 E(yIMI)
limMILMI- E(MRPIMI)
This paper estimates each of the three limit terms in (3.3) using local linear (Fan, 1992)
regression. It uses the Epanechnikov kernel (.75)(1 - u^2) for u > -1 and u < 1 for the kernel
weights. Standard errors are computed through bootstrapping. The local linear estimation
requires choosing a bandwidth. Since there is no widely agreed-upon method for choosing an
optimal bandwidth, I present the estimates for several different bandwidths, following Lustig
and Miller (2005).
3.3.3 Parametric Estimation
When measuring the effect of the MRP parametrically, the basic estimating equation for a
sharp RD is as follows
yc = o + IMRPc + ec, (3.4)
where the subscript c refers to the municipality level and e is an error term (see Hahn et al
.,2001, and Van der Klaauw, 2002). Within a very small neighborhood around the cutoff, the
coefficient 01 measures the effect of the MRP, provided that the local continuity assumption is
satisfied.
For the fuzzy RD design, Equation (3.4) is not estimated with OLS, but instead with
two-stage least squares, using the above-the-cutoff dummy variable, 1 {MIc > MI}, as an
instrument for MRPc.
The parametric analysis in this paper first uses only municipalities that lie in three different
small intervals around the cutoff MI, corresponding to 0.1, 0.15, and 0.2 points of the mar-
ginalization index. These three intervals include 165, 252, and 346 municipalities, respectively.
All three intervals include approximately 50 percent eligible and 50 percent ineligible munici-
palities. The local continuity assumption is likely to be satisfied in small intervals around the
cutoff since the municipalities are similar in terms of the marginalization index. However, to
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take into account that the marginalization index is slightly different within the intervals, and
that it is probably correlated with the outcomes, I control for MIc in the regressions. The 2SLS
regression estimated in this paper is thus
Yc = 0o + /IMRPc + 2MIc + Ec,
with 1 {MIc > MI}, as an instrument for MRPc.
One issue with using only municipalities around the cutoff in the parametric analysis is that
it implies a relatively small sample size and low power for detecting small effects. To address
this problem, the paper then extends the analysis to using all municipalities in the sample.
When the analysis includes municipalities that are further away from the cutoff, the argument
that they would be similar in absence of treatment breaks down. More specifically, these munic-
ipalities have very different marginalization indices, and the marginalization index is likely to
be correlated with the outcome variables. The RD model now requires an additional functional
form assumption to identify the causal effect of the MRP. In particular, the regressions have to
include a control function k(MI) that captures the "natural" relationship between outcomes
and the marginalization index, such that Equation (3.4) becomes
yc = a + PMRPc + k(MIc) + wc. (3.5)
Identification of the effect now comes from the fact the MRP selection rule implies a disconti-
nuity in the probability of receiving treatment at the cutoff MI, while the "natural" relationship
between the outcomes and the marginalization index would be smooth (see also Angrist and
Lavy, 1999). That is, the control function k(MI) has to be continuous around the cutoff MI.
To get valid estimates of the treatment effect, k(MI) also needs to be specified correctly. The
analysis in this paper uses different specifications of k(MI) to explore whether the estimates are
sensitive to the functional form. Results are presented for linear, quadratic and cubic control
functions.
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3.3.4 Validity
The validity of all different RD techniques relies on the local continuity assumption which states
that potential outcomes are continuous functions of the assignment variable around the cutoff.
In the case of the MRP, municipalities just below the cutoff should have similar outcomes to the
municipalities just above the cutoff in absence of the MRP. This assumption is fundamentally
un-testable. However, it is possible to compare pre-program outcome variables for municipalities
below and above the cutoff. If there are no big differences, this suggests that the municipalities
would have also had similar outcomes in absence of the program.
To provide evidence for the local continuity assumption, Section 3.5, which presents the
impact estimates for each outcomes variable, compares pre-program outcome variables below
and above the cutoff. In addition to the comparisons in Section 3.5, this section checks the
continuity of pre-program economic activity variables. The economic activity variables are total
gross production and total employment at the municipality level. Both variables come from the
1999 Economic Census. The 1999 Economic Census data refers to the period January 1998 to
December 1998. The numbers are converted to per capita values using population from the 1995
Population Count. Figures 2 and 3 plot the local averages and polynomial fits for 1998 total
production per capita and 1998 total workers per capita against the 2000 marginalization index.
Both graphs show that the economic activity variables decline monotonically and continuously
with marginalization. There is no discontinuity in the estimated polynomials around the cutoff,
supporting the argument that RD is a valid strategy to measure the impact of the MRP.
Another concern with RD design is often that subjects may manipulate their value of the
assignment variable, resulting in sorting around the cutoff. This could violate the local continu-
ity assumption. However, sorting is very unlikely in this case since the assignment variable (the
marginalization index) was calculated from 2000 Demographic Census data. In 2000, the MRP
was not yet announced. Moreover, it seems unlikely that municipalities could manipulate their
Census data. The Census data is not self-reported, but collected by INEGI through household
surveys.
A related concern is that the cutoff that determines eligibility for the MRP could have been
set to include certain municipalities above the cutoff that are fundamentally different from
municipalities below the cutoff. The cutoff used by the MRP was, however, determined by
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CONAPO in 2000, before the MRP was announced. Moreover, CONAPO employed a widely-
used stratification method, the Dalenius and Hodges method, to determine the cutoff, rather
than choosing the cutoffs at their discretion.
Both sorting and selecting the cutoffs strategically should produce discontinuities in pre-
program characteristics around the cutoff. However, pre-program characteristics are fairly
continuous as shown in Figures 2 and 3 and also in Section 3.5. These concerns thus don't seem
to apply in the case of the MRP.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the RD method measures the impact only at
the discontinuity. However, for the cost-effectiveness comparison, I need an estimate of the
average impact over all treated municipalities. The estimated impact at the cutoff is equal
to the average impact under the assumption of common treatment effects. To assess whether
this assumption would makes sense in the context of the MRP, Table 6 shows the distribution
of white flags by quartile of the marginalization index above the cutoff. More marginalized
municipalities received more white flags, but the composition of white flags was fairly similar
across quartiles. The fact that municipalities closest to the cutoff received fewer white flags
on average implies that the estimates in this study probably represent a lower bound on the
impact of the MRP.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 MRP Treatment Variables
As explained in Section 3.3, the RD analysis in this paper uses CONAPO's 2000 marginalization
index as the assignment variable. As a measure of eligibility for the MRP, I create a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the municipality has a marginalization index value greater than
the cutoff value (-.11325) and equal to zero otherwise. Table 7 shows the summary statistics for
the marginalization index and for the above-the-cutoff dummy. The source and the construction
of the index are discussed in Subsection 3.2.2.
Not all eligible municipalities adopted the MRP by 2005. It is thus necessary to account for
treatment status when measuring the impact of the program. SEDESOL's white flag database
contains a comprehensive list of all the white flags implemented including their location and
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the year they were completed. Based on this list, I create two different treatment dummies
that measure treatment status by indicating whether the municipality had at least one white
flag by the end of 2003, and 2004, respectively. The reason for creating treatment dummies for
two different years is that the outcome data is for different years, as explained below. For each
outcome variable, the analysis uses the treatment dummy for the year right before the variable
was observed. For example, infant mortality is observed for 2004 and the analysis here only
considers the white flags that were implemented by the end of 2003. Table 7 shows that 55.1
percent of municipalities were eligible for the MRP, but only 37 percent had a least one white
flag by 2003, increasing to 46.7 percent in 2004.
3.4.2 MRP Outcome Variables
As discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, the evaluation of Progresa focused on a number of variables
related to human capital (education, health, nutrition), consumption, time allocation, and
household, community relations and women's status. Most of these outcome variables are
not available for the MRP due to the lack of detailed surveys that are representative at the
municipality level. This paper thus focuses on the three variables that are available and that
could have been affected by the MRP: primary school enrollment, secondary school enrollment,
and infant mortality. Data on all of these variables come from the Mexican Statistical Institute,
INEGI.
School enrollment rates are calculated from information contained in INEGI's 2005 Popu-
lation Count. The 2005 Population Count provides the total number of children in different
age groups and also the number of children in these age groups who are not enrolled in school.
Combining this information, I calculate the primary school enrollment rate as one minus the
number of children between the ages of 6 and 11 not enrolled in school divided by the total
number of children between the ages of 6 and 11. The secondary school enrollment rate follows
the same definition, except that the relevant age group is now 12 to 14. Pre-program enrollment
rates are constructed in the same way, drawing on data from the 2000 Demographic Census.
Table 7 illustrates that average primary enrollment rates were quite high in 2000 and 2004, with
93.9 and 96.5 percent, respectively. The average secondary enrollment rates stood at a lower
81.5 percent in 2002, but had increased to 88.1 percent in 2004, narrowing the gap between
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primary and secondary enrollment rates.
The infant mortality rate is based on vital statics available from INEGI. INEGI publishes
yearly data on the number of deaths for different age groups, by municipality of residence
of the deceased. The same yearly data base also contains the number of live births in each
municipality. The information on births and deaths contained in this database comes from the
Mexican Civil Registry. Using this information for 2000 and 2004, the most recent year for
which the data is reported, I calculate infant mortality as the number of deaths of children
under the age of one per 1000 live births.
As shown in Table 7, infant mortality rates vary widely across municipalities. In fact,
both the averages and the standard deviations are influenced by outliers on the high end. The
maximum infant mortality rates are 333 in 2000 and 167 in 2004. These high numbers are mostly
driven by municipalities where there were few births and a relatively high number of deaths,
such as 3 out of 9 infants dying. These values are not necessarily representative of the average
infant mortality in a municipality. Infant mortality rates can be thought of as consisting of an
average component and a random, mean zero, component. The random component represents
good or bad shocks that a municipality experiences in any given year (related to the climate
or epidemics). I am interested in measuring whether the MRP changed the average component
of infant mortality. However, unless one looks at several years of infant mortality, the random
component is not zero in expectation. Looking at several post-program years is not possible
since the MRP was widely adopted only in 2003 and the last year of data is 2004. As an
alternative solution, I drop the highest 5 percent of observations from the data in 2000 and
in 2004 to reduce the variability. As Table 7 illustrates, the reduced sample has much lower
standard deviation in 2000 and in 2004.
3.4.3 Progresa and MRP Operational Data
The cost-effectiveness comparisons require knowledge of the average yearly costs of both Pro-
gresa and the MRP, as well as of the total number of beneficiaries. For Progresa, this information
is detailed in Coady (2000). In addition, Skoufias (2005) reports the average monthly transfer
amounts for November 1998 to October 1999. Operational data for the MRP are taken from
SEDESOL's white flag data base and SEDESOL's list of CEC localities. The former provides
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detailed information on each implemented white flag, including it's location, termination date,
and the amount spent on the project. The list of CEC localities provided by SEDESOL also
contains data on the population in each CEC, based on the 2000 Demographic Census.
3.5 MRP: Estimation Results
As explained in Section 3.3, the empirical analysis in this paper follows a fuzzy RD design
since not all eligible municipalities have adopted the MRP. This section first examines the
"first stage" relationship between eligibility and adopting the MRP. Figures 4 and 5 display the
probability of having a least one white flag by 2003 and 2004, respectively. The points in the
figures are local averages and the lines represent polynomial fits, both of which were constructed
as described in Subsection 3.3.1. Figures 4 and 5 clearly show a discontinuity in the probability
of treatment at the cutoff value (-.11325). This discontinuity is most pronounced for 2004.
The "first stages" from Figures 4 and 5 are portrayed numerically in Tables 8 and 9. Table
8 shows the estimated differences in the limits on each side of the discontinuity. In 2003, about
60 percent of municipalities above the cutoff had the MRP, while no municipalities below the
cutoff had the MRP. In 2004, the number of municipalities above the cutoff with the MRP
increased to about 80 percent. Table 9 contains the parametric first stage regressions. Columns
1 through 3 display the results for intervals around the cutoff and columns 4 through 6 for the
whole sample. These regressions show very similar estimates to the ones obtained in Table 8,
and they confirm that both the MRP by 2003 and 2004 dummies have strong first stages.
3.5.1 Primary and Secondary School Enrollment
Figures 6 and 7 contain the graphical analysis of the MRP's effect primary school enrollment.
Section 3.3 emphasizes that the RD analysis relies on the local continuity assumption for iden-
tification. In the absence of the program, outcomes right below and right above have to be
identical. This assumption is fundamentally un-testable. However, it is possible to compare
pre-program outcomes below and above the cutoff. If these are similar, it gives some validity
to the claim that post-program outcomes would have been similar in the absence of the MRP.
Figure 6 shows local averages and polynomial fits for primary school enrollment as a function
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of the marginalization index for 2000, before the MRP was implemented. The local averages
are very similar just below and just above the cutoff. The polynomial fits meet almost at the
same point at the cutoff. This suggests that the local continuity assumption holds. Figure 7
provides the same analysis as Figure 6, but for the post-program year 2005. Primary school
enrollment rates still do not look very different below and above the cutoff, implying that the
MRP had basically no impact on primary school enrollment.
Tables 8 and 10 contain the second part of the non-parametric analysis, which estimates the
difference in limits right below and right above the cutoff. Table 8 show simple differences at the
cutoff, corresponding to the numerator in (3). Table 10 shows "IV" differences, corresponding
to the whole expression in (3). The size of the discontinuity in primary school enrollment at
the cutoff is essentially zero in the pre-program year 2000. In the post-program year 2005, the
estimates indicate a small positive difference in primary school enrollment at the cutoff.
Parametric regressions for primary school enrollment are in Table 11. The reduced form
regressions are in Panel A and the 2SLS regressions in Panel B. Columns 1 to 3 show that, in
the intervals around the cutoff, the analysis detects a small effect on primary school enrollment.
However, the size of this effect and its statistical significance vary widely when all municipalities
are included in Columns 4 through 6. Overall, the non-parametric and parametric analyses
indicate that the MRP had no effect (or only a small effect of about 1 percentage points) on
primary school enrollment.
The graphical analysis for secondary school enrollment is in Figures 8 and 9. Both figures
show that secondary school enrollment appears to be slightly higher above the cutoff than just
below the cutoff. This is, however, not different in 2005 from how it was in 2000. The MRP thus
did not have an effect on secondary school enrollment. Table 8 also shows that the difference in
school enrollment rates at the cutoff was the same in 2000 and in 2005. The parametric analysis
in Table 10 again shows no significant impact of the MRP on secondary school enrollment in
the small intervals around the cutoff. The differences that are detected in the full sample were
already there in 2000. It is puzzling that secondary school enrollment jumps slightly at the
cutoff even in the pre-program period. One possible explanation would be that municipalities
above the cutoff are discontinuously more likely to receive Progresa. However, Figure 10 plots
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the number of families per population receiving Progresa in 199912 and illustrates that this is
not the case.
It is perhaps not surprising that the MRP did not have an impact on primary and secondary
school enrollment. Both enrollment rates were already quite high before the MRP. The primary
school enrollment rate was 93.9 percent on average and the secondary enrollment rate was 81.5
percent. In fact, Progresa also had little effect on primary school enrollment since enrollment
was already high before the program. Moreover, the two education-related white flags may
actually affect other educational outcomes, such as test scores, rather than enrollment. The
basic education services white flag focusses the quality of education by providing adequate
infrastructure for education facilities (such as the buildings and rest rooms), teachers and
sometimes study materials13 . The public computer center white flag provides a small library
and electronic tools for studying that are probably being used by students who are already
enrolled in school. These white flags were the second and third most common white flags as
shown in Table 6. It would thus be interesting to also measure the effect of the MRP on test
scores or other measures of educational quality. The required data is, however, not available at
this point.
3.5.2 Infant Mortality
Figures 11 and 12 show infant mortality as a function of the marginalization index pre- and
post-MRP. In 2000, there was not much of a difference in infant mortality below and above the
cutoff. In 2004, however, infant mortality is much lower above the cutoff than below the cutoff.
The MRP thus appears to have reduced infant mortality.
The nonparametric estimates in Tables 8 and 10, as well as the parametric estimates in
Table 12 are broadly consistent with this result, at least for the larger samples. Interestingly,
12The numerator is number of families with Progresa per municipality as listed in SEDESOL's records. The
denominator is total population from the 1995 Population Count. The total number of families per municipality
in 1995 is not readily available.
13Note that several papers that study the impact of social funds actually find an increase in school enrollment
and attendance after an increase in spending on school infrastructure (see Chase, 2002, Paxson and Schady, 2002,
and Pradhan and Rawlings, 2002). These finding may not generalize to Mexico since initial enrollment rates were
higher in Mexico. For example, the enrollment rate for children corresponding to Mexican primary school age
was 83 percent in the Chase paper on Armenia, as opposed to 94 percent in Mexico. Another important factor
may be that most MRP areas already had Progresa when the MRP was implemented. Any possible increases in
school enrollment may already have been caused by Progresa.
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for smaller bandwidths and for small intervals around the cutoff, the coefficient on the MRP
dummy has a positive sign both in 2000 and 2004. The standard error on this difference is very
high though and the estimate is not statistically significant. For higher bandwidths and for the
larger samples, infant mortality is lower above the cutoff. The standard errors on these negative
differences are lower, but still not low enough to make the estimate statistically significant.
Considering the graph together with the estimates in the tables suggests that the MRP
reduced infant mortality by about 2 deaths per 1000 live births. This reduction corresponds
to about one fifth of a standard deviation and to 17 percent of average pre-program infant
mortality. This result is, however, not very robust, probably due to the fact that infant mortality
still shows a very high variance. Among all the outcome variables considered in this paper, it
has the highest dispersion by far, as can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 and Figures 6 through 11.
From a theoretical standpoint, it seems reasonable that the MRP would reduce infant mor-
tality as a result the provision of concrete floors, and public water and sanitation, which all
limit the spread of infectious disease, and also as a result of the improvement of health centers.
Existing evidence on similar programs finds results of a similar and even bigger magnitude.
Galiani et al. (2005) document that a water privatization program in Argentina, which in-
creased access to water and sewage and also improved the quality of these services, lowered
under-age-five mortality by 24 percent in the poorest municipalities. Newman et al. (2002)
find that health center and water system improvements led to a decline in under-age-five mor-
tality in Bolivia by 42 percent. In a review of several studies, Esrey et al. (1990) suggest that
improvements in water and sanitation facilities can reduce under-age-five mortality by 55 to 60
percent. Unlike my paper, most of these studies examine under-age-five mortality instead of
infant mortality. Newman et al. split up the results into infant mortality and under-age-five
mortality and find slightly smaller effects on infant mortality. The estimate presented above
of a 17 percent reduction in infant mortality as a result of the MRP is thus in the ballpark of
previous estimates, and is in fact on the lower side. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.4, the RD
analysis is likely to estimate a lower bound on the impact of the MRP if treatment effects are
not constant across municipalities above the cutoff.
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3.6 Cost-Effectiveness Comparison
Table 14 summarizes the estimated impacts of Progresa and the MRP on the three variables
examined in this paper. Progresa had a small impact on primary school enrollment (an increase
of about 1 percentage point) and a much larger impact on secondary school enrollment (an
increase of about 7 percentage points). The MRP did basically not affect school enrollment
rates, although there is some weak evidence that it increased primary school enrollment by
about 1 percentage point. With respect to infant mortality, both Progresa and the MRP had
the same effect. Both programs decreased infant mortality by 2 deaths per 1000 live births14 .
The goal of this paper is not to aggregate all different types of impacts that the programs
could have had, but rather to illustrate that even when focusing on only one impact, cost-
effectiveness calculations require strong assumptions that can lead to very different results. I
thus consider only the impact of the programs on infant mortality and calculate the social cost
per beneficiary required to achieve this impact"5 .
It is also important to emphasize that this paper performs cost-effectiveness analysis, not
cost-benefit analysis. The difference is that cost-effectiveness analysis compares impacts with
social costs, without trying to quantify the social benefits of the impacts. For this paper, it is
less interesting to measure social benefits, since both programs had similar impacts with respect
to infant mortality.
The measure of cost-effectiveness used in this paper is the social cost per beneficiary per
infant death prevented. This can be written as
Total social cost
Infant deaths prevented*Beneficiaries
The denominator of this simple formula is relatively straightforward to calculate if an impact
evaluation and operational data exist for the program. For both Progresa and the MRP, the
14This effect of the MRP is not robust, but for the cost-effectiveness comparison exercise I take it to be the
correct effect.
15Coady (2000) performs a cost-effectiveness analysis as part of the evaluation of Progresa. Similarly, to this
paper, he also does this analysis for only one component of Progresa: the education component. He calculates
the total amout spent on transfers per extra year of education and separately the total amount spent on new
school buildings per extra year of education. Implicit in these calculations are specific assumptions about the
transfers that are not spelled out in Coady, but that are discussed in detail in this paper.
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number of infant deaths is 2/1000. The number of beneficiaries is listed in Table 15 for different
years of operation of the programs. On average, Progresa had 9,488,478 beneficiaries and the
MRP had 1,955,425 beneficiaries.
Calculating the numerator of (3.6) is tricky. In fact, as this section later illustrates, it is
impossible to arrive at a single answer without making ad-hoc assumptions. Table 15 shows
the operational costs of Progresa and of the MRP by year. For Progresa, costs are broken
down into transfers and administrative costs. Taken together, Progresa had US$499 million
operational costs per year on average. For the MRP, costs are listed separately for each white
flag. Data on administrative costs for the MRP is not readily available. Therefore, I estimate
the administrative cost of the MRP using information on Progresa's costs. Progresa first selects
localities and then targets families within these localities. The bulk of the administrative cost
is related to collecting information on families, distributing transfers to families and monitoring
compliance with Progresa's conditions. The MRP, on the other hand, selects eligible localities
only. Localities then decide which projects to implement. The targeting, distribution and
monitoring costs of the MRP should thus be much lower than Progresa's costs. Since both
programs start with the same universe of localities, I use Progresa's average annual cost of
selecting localities as an estimate for the MRP's average annual administrative cost. Private
costs related to the selection of projects are taken into account later in this section.
One issue to consider when calculating the total social cost is whether to count all program
costs or only the costs related to interventions that are likely to have affected infant mortality
directly. For Progresa, should we only count food transfers, spending on the health component,
and administrative costs, or should we also add education transfers? For the MRP, should
we only count the cost of public water, sanitation, concrete floors, and basic health services
plus administrative cost, or should we count the cost of all white flags? The answers to these
questions depend on whether the other components have any spillover effects on infant mortality.
Maybe education transfers are being spent on goods that impact infants health positively.
Maybe roads open the door to otherwise inaccessible medications or specialized health services.
Given that these questions do not have a clear answer, I count all operational costs in this
paper. The following analysis can, however, be modified to include only certain costs and not
others.
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3.6.1 Framework for Calculating Social Costs
The costs listed in Table 15 are not necessarily equal to the social costs of the program. Table
16 lays out a framework that illustrates this point. Columns (1) through (3) list the social
costs incurred by Progresa and the MRP due to actions by the government, the community,
and individuals, respectively.
Social costs due to government actions include two components. First, the government
incurs administrative costs that would not be incurred in the absence of the program. It
is important to take into account that these costs are financed through tax collection, which
produces dead-weight loss. Administrative costs thus need to be multiplied by the marginal cost
of funds (MCF)16. The existing literature gives very different estimates for the MCF of indirect
taxes in developing countries, ranging from a low 1.04 to 1.05 in Indonesia and Bangladesh
(Devarajan et al., 1999) to between 1.59 and 2.12 in India (Ahmad and Stern, 1987). For the
United States, the estimates are 1.17 to 1.56 (Ballard et al., 1985). Taking an average of these
estimates, the MCF used in this paper is 1.3. The second type of cost resulting from government
actions is the dead-weight loss associated with raising the funds for cash handouts in the case
of Progresa and for white flags in the case of the MRP.
As illustrated in Table 16 there are no social costs due to community actions for Progresa
since transfers go directly to individuals. For the MRP, costs due to community actions consist
of white flag spending. For Progresa, social costs due to individual actions include the cost of
picking up transfers, of attending health centers, and of attending school. For the MRP, social
costs due to individual actions are the opportunity cost of time of attending meetings and the
cost of any non-hired labor that beneficiaries may contribute to the projects.
Table 17 reports monetary values for the costs listed in Table 16 under two different as-
sumptions. Under Assumption 1 (Al), the whole amount of funds spent on white flags and cash
handouts is counted as a resource cost. This approach is commonly used in cost-effectiveness
calculations, for example in Coady's (2000) paper on Progresa.
Counting the whole amount of white flag and cash handout cost is, however, not necessarily
16Strictly speaking, a small amount of the funds used in the MRP was contributed directly by the beneficiares
instead of being collected in the form of taxes and then disbursed to communities. This portion of funds is thus
not subject to the MCF. However, since this fraction was very small (only about 2.5 percent of all funds), this
paper counts it together with funds disbursed by the government for simplicity reasons.
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correct. Traditional cost-benefit analysis stresses that the cost of any program is the social
opportunity cost of the resources used in the program (See for example Dasgupta and Pearce,
1974, Draze and Stern, 1987, and Pearce, 1983). Counting the whole white flag cost assumes
that resources used in building white flags were paid exactly their opportunity cost. This
is, however, only true if there are no market failures, such as involuntary unemployment and
monopoly. If there is involuntary unemployment, then the opportunity cost of the workers hired
to build white flags is in fact zero or the value of their lost leisure, which may be greater than
zero but smaller than the market wage (Layard and Glaister, 1994). Stiglitz (1973) also points
out that the opportunity cost of workers hired depends on whether they are urban or rural
workers and that rural workers hired for a project may be paid an urban wage in the project
even if their opportunity cost is much lower.
Similarly, the social cost of the materials used for building white flags is not necessarily equal
to their market price. For example, if cement is produced by a monopolist (which is basically
true in Mexico), then project costs should be counted at the market price of cement only if
production does not increase in response to the project since, in this case, the market price is
the alternative use value. However, if production increases, then costs should be counted at
marginal production cost since the monopoly rent is a transfer payment from consumers to the
producer rather than a resource cost (Layard and Glaister, 1994).
Making the extreme assumption that the opportunity cost and resource cost of all workers
and materials used to construct white flags is zero (Assumption 2) gives very different total
social costs than assuming that all white flag costs are resource costs, as shown in Table 17.
Another way of stating Assumption 2 (A2) is that all white flag spending is a pure transfer.
Correspondingly, Progresa's cash handouts are also not counted as a cost under A2 since they
are pure transfers according to the rule that only opportunity costs associated with the program
should be counted as costs. The cash handouts itself have no opportunity cost. They are simply
transfer payments1 7 .
The next subsection discusses whether Al or A2 is the more appropriate assumption for each
1 7 The fact that Progresa effectively redistributes money from the rich to the poor may in itself generate
social benefits since the poor probably have a higher marginal utility of consumption. This paper abstracts
from distributional benefits resulting from Progresa and the MRP since it's primary focus is to go through the
excercise of calculating social costs.
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program, but first, I describe how I estimate the other costs listed in Table 17. The individuals
cost of participation in Progresa consist of the associated financial cost of travel and of the
opportunity cost of time. Coady (2000) calculates the financial cost of travel. He estimates
the yearly cost per family of additional trips for picking up transfers to be US$4.10, the cost of
additional trips to health clinics to be US$2.49 and the cost of additional trips to school to be
US$2.87. Multiplying these figures by the total number of families gives the numbers listed in
Table 17. Coady assumes the opportunity cost of time of these activities to be zero. To gauge
whether this assumption is appropriate, I refer to Parker and Skoufias (2000) who estimate the
impact of Progresa on labor force participation and time use. Parker and Skoufias find that
adults are more likely to spend time on taking family members to school or to a clinic. The
time given up to engage in these activities is time spent on domestic work. Time spent on
leisure and market work does not change. In fact, everybody in the family spends less time on
domestic work as a result of Progresa. Parker and Skoufias suggest that the cash transfers allow
families to purchase certain goods, such as ground corn to make tortillas, instead of producing
them at home. If families indeed give up only the least productive tasks in order to comply
with Progresa's time requirements, then opportunity cost of adults' time is essentially zero.
For children, however, the opportunity cost of attending school is not zero. Parker and
Skoufias show that children between the ages of 12 and 17 with Progresa are less likely to
perform market work. The extra time spent at school should thus be valued at the their market
wage. Children between 12 and 17 spend on average 0.22 fewer hours per day on market work
(averaging over boys and girls), amounting to 80 hours per year. The average hourly wage in
Progresa areas is 52 cents18 , implying an opportunity cost of US$41.60 per student per year.
Assuming that on average each family has a child between 12 and 17, and multiplying the
opportunity cost by the total number of families gives a total of US$67.9 million per year.
For the MRP, I estimate the opportunity cost of attending meetings to be zero. This
estimate is based on the fact that Soto Romero et al. (2007b) find that, although about 90
percent of localities in the MRP hold meetings related to new construction and investment in
the locality, non-eligible localities are just as likely to hold such meetings. The MRP thus seems
'
8 This figures is for ages 18 and over, but I use the same value of the 12 to 17 age group since their wage is
not avlaiable. Most people in Progresa localities work in either agriculture or self-employment.
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to not have created additional meetings, implying no additional opportunity cost 19 .
It remains to estimate the cost of non-hired labor for the MRP. Soto Romero et al. (2007b)
find that 56 percent of beneficiaries contributed some labor to construction projects in MRP
localities. In localities without the MRP, only 49 percent of residents contributed labor to
these types of projects. MRP localities thus saw an increase in non-hired labor by 7 percent.
According to my calculations based on survey data from Soto Romero et al., MRP beneficiaries
contributed an average of 4 days of work conditional on contributing labor. Assuming an 8-
hour work day, the total number of hours contributed per person is 32. The cost of this time
is its opportunity cost. There is no detailed information on wages in MRP areas, but most
people work in the same activities as in Progresa areas, agriculture and self-employment. I thus
take the average hourly wage in Progresa areas, 52 cents, to be the opportunity cost of time
in MRP localities. The total cost of non-hired labor then is US$16.64 times 7 percent of the
beneficiaries, equalling US$2.3 million.
3.6.2 Cost-Effectiveness Under Different Assumptions
Table 18 shows that the cost-effectiveness calculations give very different results, depending on
whether Al or A2 holds for each program. For example, if the white flag cost for the MRP
is a pure transfer and the cash handouts for Progresa are all resource costs, then the social
cost of the MRP per life saved per 1000 live births is five times less than that of Progresa. If
the assumptions are flipped across the two programs though, then Progresa is two times more
cost-effective for lowering infant mortality than the MRP.
It is thus very important to get a sense of whether Al or A2 approximates reality better for
each program. For Progresa, it seems most reasonable to assume that the cash handouts are
a pure transfer since the recipients have no opportunity cost other than the participation cost
which is accounted for separately. The social cost of Progresa is thus US$14.1 per life saved
per 1000 live births.
For the MRP, however, the true estimate most likely lies somewhere between Al and A2, so
that a fraction of the funds is a resource cost and the rest represents a pure transfer. Estimating
191t is possible that meetings in MRP localities take longer than in other localities. There is, however, no data
on the length of these meetings.
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this fraction, would require knowing the exact opportunity cost of labor and materials used in
the program. The previous section gives a value for the opportunity cost of local labor, however,
there is no information on how much of the labor used was local and how much was not. In fact,
the only centrally available data gives total project spending and not does not disaggregate this
into prices paid and total amounts of labor and materials used. With the available information
it is thus not possible to estimate the opportunity cost of labor. Any estimate of the resource
cost of hired local labor would be a pure guess.
With respect to building materials that are produced by monopolists, like cement, the
question then is whether the demand generated by the MRP's construction projects was big
enough to increase their national supply. For cement, this is in fact unlikely since MRP spending
represents a very small share of the market. The average amount spent on roads under the
MRP represents less than 1 percent of the total average spending on roads in Mexico from 2001
to 200420. If demand did indeed not increase, then using the cost estimate valued at market
prices is the right estimate since it represents the alternative use value (see also the explanation
in the previous subsection). The same would, however, have to be true for all materials used
in the MRP.
This examples illustrates that distinguishing between Al and A2 is not an easy task and
that is necessarily requires other assumptions. Without assumptions, we do not know which
fraction of the total spending went towards materials and which fraction went towards wages.
Furthermore, even if we did know, we would still have to assume what fraction of the wages
paid represents a true opportunity cost. Unless we are willing to make many relatively strong
assumptions, all we can say is that the MRP costs between US$29 and US$7.6 to save one life
per 1000 live births. This range spans the estimate of Progresa (US$14.1), and we can therefore
not conclude whether Progresa or the MRP is more cost-effective in terms of saving infant lives,
despite having good evidence of their impacts.
20Author's calcuations based on information from the SEDESOL white flag database and Gende Rodrfguez(2005).
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper illustrates that calculating the cost-effectiveness of public development programs
relies heavily on assumptions about the social costs of a program. These assumptions are often
made implicitly in studies that perform cost-effectiveness calculations, but are typically not
spelled out. Once they are stated it becomes clear that we currently lack a rigorous method for
calculating cost-effectiveness. Although the literature on cost-benefit analysis points to some of
the problems, there are no guidelines for correctly accounting for them in applied work. This
paper does not provide a solution to this dilemma, but it provides a framework for thinking
about the issue, and it illustrates the extent of the problem.
Using the example of Mexico's Progresa program and the MRP, a Mexican program which
resembles a social fund, the paper arrives at very different conclusions about their relative
cost-effectiveness, depending on the assumptions made about social costs. Both programs are
estimated to reduce infant mortality by 2 deaths per 1000 live births, yet the amount of US$
required to save one life per 1000 live births varies widely. For Progresa, the most reasonable
estimate of the amount of US$ required to save one life per 1000 live births is 14.1, given
that Progresa's cash handouts are pure transfers. For the MRP, however the number could lie
anywhere between 7.6 and 29. To arrive at a final number, we would have to know what fraction
of the funds is a resource cost and what fraction is a pure transfer. However, this requires
knowing the exact opportunity cost of labor and the alternative use value of materials utilized
in the programs. The basic problem lies in the fact that these numbers are not necessarily equal
to their market prices in the presence of market failures and that we thus have to assume how
close they are to their market prices and observed program spending.
This paper hopes to stimulate further research on how to calculate social costs since knowing
the social costs of a program is an important factor in public policy decisions. Given that
development budgets are often limited, governments should strive to implement the programs
with the lowest social costs for a given effect. To inform these decisions it would be useful to
develop a set of guidelines to follow when performing cost-effectiveness calculations.
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Figure 1 - Distribution of 2000 Marginalization Index
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Figure 2 - Pre-Program Total Production per Capita (1998)
Figure 3 - Pre-Program Workers per Capita (1998)
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Figure 4 - Probability of Having at Least One White Flag by 2003
Figure 5 - Probability of Having at Least One White Flag by 2004
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Figure 6 - Pre-Program Primary School Enrollment (2000)
Figure 7 - Post-Program Primary School Enrollment (2005)
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Figure 7 - Pre-Program Secondary School Enrollment (2000)
Figure 9 - Post-Program Secondary School Enrollment (2005)
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Figure 10 - Families per Population Receiving Progresa (1999)
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Figure 11 - Post-Program Infant Mortality (2000)
Figure 12 - Post-Program Infant Mortality (2004)
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Table 1: Projects Implemented Under the MR Program
Types of Projects (= White Flags) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Concrete floors in houses 31 123 393 460 452 1,459
Public computer and internet center 31 135 484 480 310 1,440
Basic education services (facilities and teachers) 17 282 299 183 154 935
Electricity 47 89 255 247 157 795
Public water 45 102 245 243 122 757
Supply of basic foodstuffs (regular & at low prices) 12 250 316 117 27 722
Roads connected to state or federal road network 10 170 267 158 84 689
Land titling 21 15 73 149 285 543
Sewage, water treatment plant or letrines 18 89 142 173 56 478
Birth certificates and personal ID numbers (CURP) 7 0 92 182 195 476
Basic health services 10 59 120 109 154 452
Impulses for economically productive activities 16 126 109 115 19 385
Local development plan 11 14 82 63 33 203
Public telephone 0 14 19 45 28 106
Total 276 1,468 2,896 2,724 2,076 9,440
Note: The numbers refer to the year when the white flag was completed, implying that they differ slightly from
the numbers on the SEDESOL website.
Source: SEDESOL white flag database
Table 2: Components of Marginalization Index
Category Variable
Education Percentage of population over 15 who is illiterate
Percentage of population over 15 without completed primary education
Housing Percentage of residents living in houses without piped water
Percentage of residents living in houses without sewage or sanitation
Percentage of residents living in houses with dirt floors
Percentage of residents living in houses without electricity
Percentage of houses with some level of overcrowding
Urbanization Percentage of population in localities with less than 5000 inhabitants
Income Percentage of employed population with income under two minimum salaries
Source.: CONAPO
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Table 3: Marginalization Levels Based on the Index
Marginalization level
Very low
Low
Medium
High
Very high
Total
Source: CONAPO
# of municipalities
247
417
486
906
386
2,442
Fraction of municipalities
0.101
0.171
0.199
0.371
0.158
1
Lower cutoff
[ -2.44852
(-1.28088
(-0.69707
(-0.11325
( 1.05438
Upper cutoff
-1.28088 ]
-0.69707 ]
-0.11325]
1.05438]
3.38964 ]
Table 4: Relatively Marginalized Municipalities Eligible for MR Program
State Total Municipalities MR Municipalities Cutoff
Aguascalientes 11 2 -0.5837
Baja California 5 2 No clean cutoff
Baja Califonia Sur 5 2 -1.22648
Coahuila 38 6 -0.68684
Colima 10 1 -0.22921
Table 5: MR Program Yearly Operational Data
Cumulative Municipalities with Amount spent
Year
municipalities completed white flag(s) (US$ million)
2001 132 132 12
2002 338 275 59
2003 868 837 119
2004 1,095 899 146
2005 1,182 818 83
Source: SEDESOL website and white flag database
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1.
Table 6: Projects Implemented Under the MR Program by Quartile of Marginalization Index
Quartile of Marginalization Index Above Cutoff
Types of Projects (= White Flags) 25 50 75 100 Total
Concrete floors in houses 0.147 0.169 0.126 0.149 0.165
Public computer and internet center 0.171 0.196 0.133 0.130 0.153
Basic education services (facilities and teachers) 0.092 0.105 0.049 0.097 0.097
Electricity 0.097 0.111 0.056 0.066 0.082
Public water 0.082 0.094 0.054 0.069 0.079
Supply of basic foodstuffs (regular & at low prices) 0.048 0.054 0.047 0.085 0.077
Roads connected to state or federal road network 0.054 0.062 0.050 0.071 0.074
Land titling 0.083 0.095 0.052 0.040 0.057
Sewage, water treatment plant or letrines 0.065 0.075 0.033 0.043 0.049
Birth certificates and personal ID numbers (CURP) 0.060 0.069 0.037 0.039 0.050
Basic health services 0.047 0.053 0.033 0.041 0.044
Impulses for economically productive activities 0.028 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.042
Local development plan 0.021 0.024 0.011 0.024 0.021
Public telephone 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.011
Total 1,999 1,744 2,427 2,737 8,907
Note: This table includes only white flags in municipalities with marginaliziation values above the conventional
cutoff. It does not inlcude predominantly indigenous and relatively marginalized municiaplities.
Source: SEDESOL white flag database
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Table 7: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Marginalization index (2000) 2346 0.041 0.993 -2.449 3.390
Treatment variables
Above cutofff dummy 2346 0.551 0.498 0 1
MRP by 2003 dummy 2346 0.370 0.483 0 1
MRP by 2004 dummy 2346 0.467 0.499 0 1
Outcome variables
Primary school enrollment (2005) 2346 0.965 0.026 0.563 1
Secondary school enrollment (2005) 2346 0.881 0.068 0.340 1
Infant mortality (2004) w/o top 5% 2217 10.227 8.303 0 33.21
Infant mortality (2004) 2333 12.167 12.604 0 166.67
Pre-program variables
Primary school enrollment (2000) 2346 0.939 0.045 0.457 1
Secondary school enrollment (2000) 2346 0.815 0.090 0.369 1
Infant mortality (2000) w/o top 5% 2220 11.604 9.484 0 38.10
Infant mortality (2000) 2338 14.204 17.337 0 333.33
Ln total production per capita (1998) 2316 0.479 1.841 -5.854 6.952
Ln workers per capita (1998) 2316 -3.212 1.000 -7.691 -0.143
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Table 8: Non-Parametric Simple Differences at the Cutoff
Bandwidth
Observations with nonzero weight
MRP dummies
2003
2004
Primary school enrollment
2000
2005
Secondary school enrollment
2000
2005
Infant Mortality
2000
2004
0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2
205 424 828 1535 2258
0.620***
(0.104)
0.796***
(0.090)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.010**
(0.005)
0.011
(0.027)
0.013
(0.024)
3.905
(2.744)
2.275
(2.890)
0.563***
(0.072)
0.839***
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.006*
(0.004)
0.006
(0.017)
0.013
(0.015)
2.419
(2.018)
0.863
(2.014)
0.600***
(0.053)
0.795***
(0.044)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.003
(0.002)
0.009
(0.011)
0.015*
(0.009)
-0.782
(1.287)
-1.306
(1.321)
0.576***
(0.037)
0.764***
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.001)
0.017**
(0.008)
0.019***
(0.006)
-0.511
(0.899)
-1.244
(0.989)
0.525***
(0.028)
0.752***
(0.020)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.026***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.005)
-0.048
(0.670)
-1.007
(0.660)
Note: Boostrap standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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Table 9: Parametric First Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: MRP by 2003 dummy
Above cutoff dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
0.643***
(0.112)
-0.671
(0.960)
(2)
0.618***
(0.089)
-0.433
(0.503)
(3)
0.543***
(0.076)
0.243
(0.318)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
-0.109
(0.156)
0.410
165
0.1 interval
-0.081
(0.095)
0.380
252
0.15 interval
0.052
(0.068)
0.420
346
0.2 interval
Above cutoff dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
0.807***
(0.094)
0.183
(0.811)
Dependent
(2)
0.869***
(0.074)
-0.552
(0.451)
variable: MRP by 2004
(3) (4)
0.836*** 0.759***
(0.062) (0.021)
-0.273 0.055***
(0.273) (0.010)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
0.030
(0.132)
0.710
165
0.1 interval
-0.104
(0.085)
0.650
252
0.15 interval
-0.058
(0.058)
0.630
346
0.2 interval
0.047***
(0.009)
0.720
2346
All
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(4)
0.508***
(0.026)
0.101***
(0.013)
(5)
0.543***
(0.023)
0.079***
(0.010)
0.029***
(0.005)
0.039***
(0.006)
0.500
2346
All
(6)
0.492***
(0.032)
0.14***
(0.026)
0.037***
(0.005)
-0.017***
(0.006)
0.061***
(0.013)
0.500
2346
All
0.086***
(0.011)
0.490
2346
All
dummy
(5)
0.774***
(0.019)
0.045***
(0.008)
0.013***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.005)
0.720
2346
All
(6)
0.736***
(0.026)
0.091***
(0.020)
0.019***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
0.042***
(0.010)
0.720
2346
All
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 10: Non-Parametric "IV" Differences at the Cutoff
Bandwidth
Observations with nonzero weight
Primary school enrollment
2000
2005
Secondary school enrollment
2000
2005
Infant Mortality
2000
2004
0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2
205 424 828 1535 2258
-0.003
(0.010)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.014
(0.035)
0.016
(0.032)
6.299
(4.903)
3.670
(5.114)
-0.003
(0.007)
0.007
(0.004)
0.007
(0.021)
0.015
(0.018)
4.295
(3.668)
1.532
(3.718)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.003
(0.003)
0.011
(0.014)
0.019
(0.012)
-1.304
(2.146)
-2.178
(2.236)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
0.023**
(0.011)
0.024***
(0.008)
-0.887
(1.569)
-2.160
(1.733)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.034***
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.006)
-0.092
(1.255)
-1.919
(1.257)
Note: Estimates are simple differences at the cutoff, adjusted for the fact that not all municipalities
had adopted the MRP by 2003 and 2004. Boostrap standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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Table 11: Impact on Primary School Enrollment
A. Reduced Form
Above cutoff dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
0.012**
(0.005)
-0.094**
(0.039)
Dependent variable: Primary school enrollment
(2)
0.008*
(0.004)
-0.041"*
(0.022)
(3)
0.006*
(0.004)
-0.03*
(0.016)
(4)
0.013***
(0.002)
-0.016***
(0.001)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
0.952***
(0.007)
0.030
165
0.1 interval
0.96***
(0.005)
0.020
252
0.15 interval
0.962***
(0.004)
0.010
346
0.2 interval
0.959***
(0.001)
0.188
2346
All
(5)
0.008***
(0.001)
-0.013"***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.966***
(0.001)
0.227
2346
All
B. 2SLS
MRP by 2004 dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.097**
(0.043)
Dependent variable: Primary school
(2) (3) (4)
0.009* 0.008 0.017***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
-0.037* -0.028* -0.017***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.002)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
0.951***
(0.008)
165
0.1 interval
0.961***
(0.004)
252
0.15 interval
0.963***
(0.004)
346
0.2 interval
0.958***
(0.001)
0.147
2346
All
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(6)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.006***
(0.002)
-0.004"**
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.001)
0.968***
(0.001)
0.239
2346
All
enrollment
(5)
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.001)
0.965***
(0.001)
0.213
2346
All
(6)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.001)
0.968***
(0.001)
0.236
2346
All
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 12: Impact on Secondary School Enrollment
A. Reduced Form
Above cutoff dummy
Marginalization index
Dependent variable: Secondary school enrollment
(1)
0.016
(0.022)
-0.033
(0.175)
(2)
0.017
(0.017)
-0.044
(0.090)
(3)
0.013
(0.014)
-0.010
(0.059)
(4)
0.028***
(0.005)
-0.035***
(0.002)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
0.873***
(0.030)
0.010
165
0.1 interval
0.870***
(0.018)
0.010
252
0.15 interval
0.877***
(0.013)
0.010
346
0.2 interval
0.866***
(0.003)
0.130
2346
All
(5)
0.029***
(0.004)
-0.036***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.865***
(0.003)
0.130
2346
All
B. 2SLS
MRP by 2004 dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
0.020
(0.028)
-0.036
(0.185)
Dependent variable: Secondary school
(2) (3) (4)
0.020 0.015 0.037***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.006)
-0.033 -0.006 -0.037***
(0.082) (0.056) (0.003)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Samole
0.872***
(0.032)
165
0.1 interval
0.872***
(0.017)
252
0.15 interval
0.878***
(0.013)
346
0.2 interval
0.865***
(0.003)
0.098
2346
All
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(6)
0.019***
(0.005)
-0.024***
(0.004)
0.002**
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.869***
(0.004)
0.135
2346
All
enrollment
(5)
0.038***
(0.006)
-0.037***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)
0.864***
(0.003)
0.097
2346
All
(6)
0.026***
(0.007)
-0.026***
(0.005)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.868***
(0.004)
0.116
2346
All
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
III
I
Table 13: Impact on Infant Mortality
A. Reduced Form
Above cutoff dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
2.476
(2.801)
-32.122
(23.529)
Dependent variable: Infant mortality
(2)
0.800
(2.312)
-11.508
(12.891)
(3)
0.843
(1.972)
-12.122
(8.275)
(4)
-0.984
(0.617)
-0.578**
(0.289)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant
R-squared
Observations
Sample
(5)
-0.681
(0.623)
-0.766***
(0.284)
0.271**
(0.127)
4.876 8.384*** 8.321*** 10.774*** 10.346***
(4.044) (2.619) (1.908) (0.371) (0.426)
0.010 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.020
153 237 328 2217 2217
0.1 interval 0.15 interval 0.2 interval All All
B. 2SLS
MRP by 2003 dummy
Marginalization index
(1)
3.876
(4.437)
-30.428
(21.998)
Dependent variable:
(2) (3)
1.259 1.509
(3.653) (3.544)
-10.926 -12.456
(11.480) (8.982)
Marginalization index squared
Marginalization index cubed
Constant 5.152
(3.774)
R-squared
Observations
Sample
153
0.1 interval
8.494***
(2.330)
0.000
237
0.15 interval
8.249***
(2.070)
0.010
328
0.2 interval
Infant mortality
(4) (5)
-1.828 -1.202
(1.152) (1.101)
-0.419 -0.683*
(0.378) (0.351)
0.301**
(0.126)
10.91***
(0.449)
0.000
2217
All
10.388***
(0.458)
0.010
2217
All
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(6)
-1.086
(0.744)
-0.282
(0.543)
0.335***
(0.128)
-0.132
(0.108)
10.524***
(0.472)
0.020
2217
All
(6)
-2.087
(1.437)
-0.020
(0.701)
0.403***
(0.138)
-0.164
(0.121)
10.64***
(0.543)
0.010
2217
All
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
1
I
I
Table 14: Summary of Impact Estimates
Outcome Progresa MRP
Primary school Increase by 0.96 to 1.45 percentage points Increase by 1 percentage point (if any)
enrollment for girls, by 0.74 to 1.07 percentage points
for boys
(Schultz 2000)
Secondary school Increase by 7.2 to 9.3 percentage points for No effect
enrollment girls, by 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points for
boys
(Schultz 2000)
Infant mortality Decrease by 2 deaths per 1000 live births Decrease by 2 deaths per 1000 live
(Barham 2005) births (but not robust)
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Table 15: Program Participants and Operational Costs (US$ million)
Progresa 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Total beneficiaries 1,319,102 9,877,860 13,306,852 13,450,098 9,488,478
Total transfer cost 31.1 345.9 644.5 838.1 464.9
Education transfers 12.0 83.3 254.3 363.9 178.4
Food transfers 8.8 93.6 271.4 341.3 178.8
Health component 10.3 168.9 118.7 132.9 107.7
Administrative cost (w/o evaluation) 24.6 45.3 42.0 26.4 34.6
MRP 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
Total beneficiaries 299,200 787,100 2,830,500 3,904,900 1,955,425
Total MRP spending 11.8 59.4 118.6 145.9 83.9
Roads 2.3 21.2 38.3 52.2 28.5
Electricity 1.6 5.4 16.1 23.5 11.7
Public water 2.8 6.4 17.0 18.0 11.1
Sanitation 0.7 5.2 7.5 12.3 6.4
Education 0.5 9.7 10.5 4.4 6.3
Impulses for production 2.2 3.0 7.9 6.9 5.0
Concrete Floors 0.8 3.8 6.3 7.8 4.7
Computer Centers 0.6 1.7 6.9 8.6 4.4
Basic health services 0.2 2.4 4.1 7.8 3.6
Land titling 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.9 1.6
Supply of basic foodstuffs 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.4
Public telephone 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2
Local development plan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
Birth certificates 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Estimated administrative cost 1.7
Note: The number of Progresa beneficiaries is calculated as the number of beneficiary families times the
average family size (5.81). The number of MRP beneficiaries is calculated as the number of CECs (eligible
localities) times the average CEC population (1,700). Data on administrative costs for the MRP is not readily
available. The MRPs estimated average annual administrative cost equals Progresa's average annual cost of
selecting localities.
Source: SEDESOL Progresa data, Coady (2000), and SEDESOL white flag data base.
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Table 16: Framework for Calculating Social Costs
Social costs due to actions by
(2)
Community
1. MCF*Administrative costs -
2. (MCF-1)*Cash handouts
1. Cash handouts
2. Cost of participation
a. Picking up transfers
b. Attending health centers
c. Attending school
1. MCF*Administrative costs 1. White flags cost 1. Opportunity cost of meetings
2. (MCF-1)*White flags cost 2. Non-hired labor
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Government
Progresa
MRP
(3)
Individuals
Table 17: Estimated Social Costs Under Diferent Assumptions (US$ millions)
Social costs due to actions by
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government Community Individuals Total
Progresa
Al: All resource cost' 1. 1.3*34.6 = 45 - 1. 464.9 732.8
2. 0.3*464.9 = 139.5 2. 83.4
a. 6.7
b. 4.1
c. 4.7 + 67.9 = 72.6
A2: Pure transfer 2 1. 1.3*34.6 = 45
2. 0.3*464.9 = 139.5
1.0
2. 83.4
a. 6.7
b. 4.1
c. 4.7 + 67.9 = 72.6
MRP
Al: All resource cost 1. 1.3*1.7 = 2.2
2. 0.3*83.9 = 25.2
A2: Pure transfer 1. 1.3*1.7 = 2.2 - 1.0 29.7
2. 0.3*83.9 = 25.2 2. 2.3
Note: Cost of participation for Progresa consists of financial travel cost and opportunity cost of time.
Financial travel cost estimates from Coady (2000). Opportunity cost of time calculated by author (a. and b.
have zero opportunity cost).
SAl assumes that the amounts spent on white flags and cash handouts equal the opportunity cost of
resources used in the programs.
2 A2 assumes that white flag spending and cash handouts have zero opportunity cost.
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267.9
1.83.9 1.0
2. 2.3
113.6
Table 18: Cost-Effectiveness Under Different Assumptions
Progresa MRP
Reduction in infant mortality 2/1000 2/1000
Beneficiaries 9,488,478 1,955,425
Social Costs (US$ million)
Al: All resource cost 732.8 113.6
A2: Pure transfer 267.9 29.7
Cost-Effectivness (US$ per life saved per 1000 live births)
Al: All resource cost 38.6 29.0
A2: Pure transfer 14.1 7.6
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